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The aim of this dissertation is to locate and give a comparative analysis of the historical processes 
of cooperative agency that engendered a decolonised Africa under the aegis of the Pan-African 
diplomacy and agency. More specifically, it conducts a comparative analytical study of three Pan-
African initiatives, namely the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU) 1980 Lagos Plan of Action 
(LPA); 1991 Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC); and the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) adopted and ratified by the African Union (AU). The 
comparative analytical study predicated on integrated meta-theories will provide an intersubjective 
theoretical and conceptual framework on which to address the two main research questions: What 
reasons led to the formation of the 1980 LPA, the 1991 Abuja Treaty and the 2002 adoption of 
NEPAD under the aegis of the AU? Why has Africa’s self-reliant continental aims and objectives not 
been realised?  
The study arrives at the following four conclusions: First, it finds that the ultimate adoption of the 
1980 LPA was Africa’s independent self-assertion to define itself against global hegemonic forces 
but with no translation into tangible deliverables. Second, it finds that the 1991 Abuja Treaty 
emerged in response to the failed implementation of the 1980 LPA and differed from its predecessor 
as it was informed by the neoliberal orthodoxy that dominated the international development 
discourse in light of the fall of communism at the end of the Cold War. Third, it finds that the adoption 
and ratification of the AU-NEPAD in 2002 was influenced by Africa being pragmatic by developing 
its domestic industrial base in partnership with neoliberal global capital.  
Lastly, this dissertation concludes that Africa’s self-reliant continental aims and objectives have not 
been realised because Africa simply lacks a hard-power military diplomatic arsenal in both its LPA 
and NEPAD policy documents to give effect to genuine Pan-African diplomacy.  
 
 
Keywords: Pan-African diplomacy; regionalism; regional cooperation; regional integration; 











Since the slave trade, colonial and post-colonial African governments have operated within a 
politically, culturally and economically marginalising and vulnerable global environment. There is 
thus an urgency for Africa to cooperate and integrate its non-viable nation states towards a United 
States of Africa. Continued balkanised nation states, a colonial legacy, is ever more susceptible and 
vulnerable to external global dominance, politically, culturally, economically and otherwise. This 
pursuit of a United States of Africa will enhance its advantage and bargaining edge against a fast-
paced global economy (Adetula 2004:3-4). Pan-African cooperative agency, both continentally and 
from the diaspora, was attributed to those who resisted slave trade, racism, colonialism and present-
day neo-colonialism. Key African revolutionary change agents whose endeavours cooperatively 
contributed to transboundary global Pan-Africanism include, among others: Henry Sylvester 
Williams (1869-1911) a Trinidadian lawyer; Marcus Garvey (1887-1940); Edward Wilmot Blyden 
(1832-1912); African-American Martin Delaney (1812-1885); and the African personality articulated 
by W.E.B DuBois (1863-1963) (Tondi 2005: 301-328; Thompson 1969: 38; Prah 2006: 223; Ackah 
1999: 13).  
Given the successful decolonisation of Africa under the aegis of the OAU the continent as 
forewarned by the late president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, has remained a prisoner of neo-
colonialism. With the multiple global challenges that have militated against Africa’s development, 
the 1980 LPA and NEPAD have been two notable programmes that have sought to extricate Africa 
from global vulnerability and marginalisation. To this end, the 1980 LPA was first a formal inward 
regionalism of state actors in response to the impact of the adverse global economy. This was 
followed a decade later by the 1991 Abuja Treaty in response to Africa’s debt-trap and the global 
north’s neoliberal onslaught on Africa to deregulate and privatise its political economy under the flag 
of the Washington Consensus (Lamberte 2004:4). The subsequent revitalised 1991 Abuja Treaty 
articulated and aspired for the establishment of a self-reliant and self-sustaining AEC.  
These events ignited civil society activism both continentally and globally and demanded the global 
economy to be equitably operable within the United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Grant and Soderbaum 2003:6; Boas and 




These events, compounded by the socio-economic global vulnerability and the continued 
marginalisation of Africa within the global economy, influenced the transitioning of the OAU to the 
AU. Subsequent to the failure of both the LPA and 1991 Abuja Treaty to achieve regional economic 
integration on the African continent, African leaders adopted NEPAD in 2002 under the aegis of the 
AU (Oppong 2010:92-103). 
 Problem Statement: 
The deepening of regional economic integration in Africa has thus been more rhetorical with less 
tangible evidence of attained key result areas. How, therefore, is Africa to attain its aims and 
objectives of self-reliance and sustainability in a global marginalising milieu? The AU, in its effort to 
achieve an integrated and cooperative Africa, faces a plethora of challenges and hurdles, which 
include, among others: 
• A codified and binding supra-national entity that supersedes narrow nation states’ 
sovereignty and their neo-patrimonial based Regional Economic Communities (RECs); 
• Mandatory budgetary contributions of all nation states to the African Union Commission 
(AUC) to give effective and further traction towards an African Continental Free Trade Area 
(AfCFTA) which was finally ratified on 30 May 2019; 
• Annulling of overlapping and multiple membership within RECs as this will discourage intra-
interstate conflicts engendering peace and stability that is imperative to attraction of 
investments; 
• The AU Agenda 2063 that echoes the objectives of the 1991 Abuja Treaty is perceived as an 
elitist government-driven agenda with little or imperceptible contributions from the public and 
civil society fraternity. Organs of the AU such as NEPAD, Economic Social and Cultural 
Council(ECOSOCC) and the Pan-African Parliament were instituted to be a platform for both 
vertical and horizontal participation and activism and this challenge must be continuously 
reviewed and improved (Akokpari 2008:85-113; Bah 2012: 521-532; Weltz 2014:4-24). 
 
The research conducted within this dissertation does so with a view to problematise and interrogate 
the continued failure of Africa to achieve its regional integration objectives. This research locates 
and provides a comparative analysis of the historical processes of cooperative agency that 
engendered a decolonised Africa under the aegis of the Pan African diplomacy and agency. More 
specifically, it will highlight three Pan-African initiatives such as the OAU’s 1980 LPA; 1991 Abuja 
Treaty establishing the AEC, and NEPAD (Okhonmina 2009:86-95).  
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In so doing, this dissertation makes the following four arguments: First, it argues that the ultimate 
adoption of the 1980 LPA was Africa’s independent self-assertion to define itself against global 
hegemonic forces but with no translation into tangible deliverables. Second, it argues that the 1991 
Abuja Treaty emerged in response to the failed implementation of the 1980 LPA and differed from 
its predecessor in that it was informed by the neoliberal orthodoxy that dominated the international 
development discourse in light of the fall of communism at the end of the Cold War. Third, it argues 
that the adoption and ratification of the AU-NEPAD in 2002 was informed by Africa being pragmatic 
by developing its domestic industrial base in partnership with neoliberal global capital. Lastly, this 
dissertation argues that Africa’s self-reliant continental aims and objectives have not been realised 
because Africa simply lacks a hard-power military diplomatic arsenal in both its LPA and NEPAD 
policy documents to give effect to genuine Pan-African diplomacy.  
This dissertation will outline the AU’s Strategic Plan (2009-2012) that embraces the variable 
geometry integration approach that promotes the RECs to implement their priority programmes at 
different speeds under the Minimum Integration Programme (MIP) (UNECA 2012:1-10). A critique 
of variable geometry will also inform a cost benefit evaluation of its efficacy towards the AEC (Dawn 
Nagar 2019 and ECA/UNDP/IGOs/UNSAS/VII/10). The MIP strategy is a subset to the overarching 
vision of the AU’s Agenda 2063 towards an integrated continental free trade area (FTA). This 
dissertation will further explore the AU’s inherited institutional challenges that hamper progress 
towards regional integration (Mohammed 2008:61; Gottschalk and Schmidt 2004:141). As advised 
by a review study by Adedeji (2007) the AUC lacks autonomous power to implement the AU’s 
decisions, the refusal of ceding of national sovereignty to effectively capacitate the RECs in terms 
of enforcing compliance (Gottschalk and Schmidt 2004:141). This finds resonance with Mbete 
(2008:308) who argues for harmonisation, rationalisation and institutional streamlining of all the AUs 
organs such as the Pan-African Parliament, RECs, and AUC. This symmetry in policy and protocols 
is imperative to effect delivery towards continental economic integration.  
Africa’s Agenda 2063 is a policy continuum within which an ex-post and ex-ante comparative 
analysis of Pan-African agency is studied. Continuous policy formulation that supports monitoring 
and evaluation instruments such as the Africa Regional Integration Index and the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM) are imperative as they give a structured focused comparison of the 
processes that inform Africa’s Agenda 2063. To this end, the Computable General Equilibrium 
Model (CGE) will assist the comparative analysis process as it enables an integrated past, present 
and future comparative analysis evaluation of all Africa’s political economy within the global 




1.2. Rationale of the Study 
The comparative study is imperative in order to establish the reasons why Africa has not achieved 
its objectives articulated within its programmes of self-reliance and self-sustenance. This is against 
the backdrop of former president of Ghana Kwame Nkrumah who, from as early as 1957, rallied for 
a United States of Africa unitary government. The motivation of the study resonates with President 
Kwame Nkrumah’s warnings that the further balkanisation of Africa will continually subject it as a 
neo-colonial extractive appendage of the global north countries. This belatedly, resulted in the 
adoption of the continent-wide 1980 LPA. 
This was against increased global vulnerability and marginalisation of Africa in the throes of multiple 
politico-socio-economic world crises: The 1971 financial system collapse of the Bretton Wood 
Institutions (BWIs), the global Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil crunch of 
1973 and the United States of America (USA) unilaterally delinking from the gold standard regimen. 
The foregoing exogenous externalities and shock exposure worsened Africa’s balance of payments 
deficit. With increased debt distress, this virtually stagnated Africa’s economic growth and 
competitiveness militating against its independent development policy space. 
1.3. Research Objectives 
This research seeks to outline the factors that motivated the OAU’s adoption of the 1980 LPA, the 
Final Act of Lagos and the 1991 Abuja Treaty. The study interrogates the extent to which these 
aforementioned programmes were realised as well as the factors and actors that contributed 
towards its successes and/or failures. In so doing, the dissertation seeks to analyse the 1999 Sirte 
Declaration, the 2002 adoption of the AU and NEPAD and the Accra Declaration for a Union 
Government.  
The dissertation further reviews the demonstrable deliverables of Africa’s regional cooperation and 
economic integration against global inter-regionalism such as the European Union (EU), North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It also seeks 








1.4. Research Questions 
The research conducted in this dissertation poses the following two main research questions: 
1. What reasons led to the formation of the 1980 LPA, the 1991 Abuja Treaty and the 2002 
adoption of NEPAD under the aegis of the AU? 
2. To what extent have the African self-reliant continental aims and objectives been 
realised? 
In addressing the two main research questions, the following 11 subsidiary questions further guide 
the research undertaken and presented in this study: 
a) Why is Africa pursuing regional cooperation and politico-economic integration? 
b) The reviewed 1991 Abuja Treaty recognised eight RECs as the building blocks and pillars 
towards a more homogenous effective AEC. Against this backdrop of global multilateralism, 
it is urgent and imperative for Africa to structurally, economically and politically mitigate 
further side-lining and marginalisation in the global economy. How is Africa to achieve that? 
c) What are the short-, medium- and long-term objectives of Africa’s regional cooperation and 
politico-economic integration? 
d) What are the successes and challenges/weaknesses thus far? 
e) What are the similarities and dissimilarities in Africa’s entire agency or is it just rhetorical shifts 
without underpinning substance? 
f) How would NEPAD’s three governance reforms help in achieving African countries’ long-term 
development goals in contrast to LPA’s failure?  
g) How likely is ’voluntary’ based APRM similar to LPA’s ‘non-interference in the internal affairs 
of a sovereign member state’ to effect compliance of African governments to regionally 
agreed norms and standards of governance without a non-compliance sanction?  
h) Can Africa in the new millennium under the aegis of NEPAD successfully industrialise by a 
value addition process to a diversified intra-regional value chain base and thus compete 
effectively in the global market economy? Further given the 1980s LPA’s and the OAU’s 1991 
Abuja Treaty and the AU’s NEPAD what lessons can Africa learn from the EUs integration 
strengths and weaknesses? Are global dynamics the only factors affecting Africa’s integration 
project? How beneficial and relevant is every increase in trade and economic growth 






1.5. Research Design and Methodology  
The focus of this research is to undertake a historical comparative analysis on the Monrovia 
Declaration and the 1980 LPA, the 1991 Abuja Treaty and the transitioning of the OAU to the AU 
with NEPAD towards a Union government of Africa (Adedeji 2005). The dissertation is predicated 
on a qualitative research methodology. Berg (2003) defines qualitative research as a 
“comprehensive understanding of a particular event, individual, or group”. Against this assertion, he 
explains that the goal of qualitative research is to critically and comprehensively comprehend social 
dynamics that variously and severally impact events, groups and individuals. Attendant in qualitative 
research are theories that explicate human politico-socio-economic dynamics and actions. 
 In this regard, the study critiques both primary and secondary sources of information, that include 
archival and manuscript material, audio and video recordings, films and photographs, speeches, 
diaries, letters and government policy documents, books, academic journal articles, publications, 
newspapers and other relevant literature. 
It consists of a critical literature review wherein traditional and contemporary theories of International 
Relations (IR) are applied (Sprinz and Wolinksy 2004:12). For example, the theory of Pan-
Africanism and ’African solutions to African problems’ is an epistemic restoration and challenge to 
the Eurocentric dominance and delineation of IR (Landsberg 2008, Zondi 2013). The qualitative 
research will help identify the coining of Pan-Africanism as a mobilisation instrument that 
engendered the Monrovia Declaration and the LPA, the 1991 Abuja Treaty, AU and NEPAD. 
1.6. Research Assumptions 
The research conducted within this dissertation finds its basis in the following three assumptions: 
i. African leaders will automatically support rhetorical self-reliant trade creation opportunities 
promoted by the 1980 LPA and the 1991 Abuja Treaty programmes that supplant trade 
diversion. 
ii. African nation states lack the political will and enthusiasm to cede sovereignty to a continental 
supra-authority to implement continent-wide integrated economic programmes as a threat to 
their rent-seeking and patronage networks. 
iii. Predicated on political voluntarism just as the APRM, it was assumed that the 1980 LPA ex- 
post study and its ex-ante predicted benefits would elicit Africa’s leadership support. 
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1.7.  Outline of the Chapters  
This dissertation consists of eight chapters: 
Chapter 1 introduces the subject matter. It also discusses the aim of the study and its scope. This 
chapter also provides the problem statement, motivation, the objectives, questions, design and 
methodology, assumptions and structure. 
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical and conceptual framework to better interrogate and compare the 
historical processes that engendered Pan–Africanism, the LPA, 1991 Abuja Treaty and the AU. This 
chapter undertakes a comparative analysis with multivalent theories to arrive at a less biased 
outcome. A functionalist and constructivist Pan-African conceptual framework of development and 
integration, evident from the OAU to the present-day AU, will underpin this. 
More specifically, this chapter will examine the following theories: Functionalism and Neo-
functionalism; Traditional Integration Theories; Dependency Theory; CGE; Policy Implementation 
Theoretical Models; Intergovernmental Institutionalism; Neoliberal Institutionalism; Bargaining 
Theory; and Constructivism. 
Chapter 3 will discuss the existing literature review on Pan-Africanism, LPA. The continental and 
global factors that contributed and inspired the 1980 LPA. It does so by way of a historical analysis 
that assesses the key African and international actors and factors in the run-up to the Monrovia 
Strategy and the 1980 LPA. The historical analysis flags and discusses four important events: The 
Pre-World War I International Monetary System (1870 – 1914), the Cold War (1946 – 1991), the 
1970s Oil Crisis and the Emergence of the NIEO, and the Failure of the NIEO Campaign in the late 
1980s and the need for ‘Home-Grown’ African Development Programmes. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the Monrovia Strategy and the 1980 LPA. 
Chapter 4 presents Pan-African diplomacy and agency within the framework of the LPA. This 
chapter will discuss the aim of the dissertation using the meta-analytic comparative methodology in 
showing the differences between early post-independence regionalism as espoused by the 
Monrovia and Brazzaville gradualist and incrementalist school and how it differed from the continent-
wide LPA envisaged by Nkrumah in 1957. 
Chapter 5 provides an audit of the LPA towards the 1991 Abuja Treaty within an interplay of 
conceptual frameworks such as critical, rational, Marxist and constructivist theories, this chapter will 
demonstrate their application in cost-benefit evaluations criteria that informed the Abuja Treaty and 
the AEC.  
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These evaluative processes aid in locating comparative advantages and economies of scale to the 
benefit of the integration project. The chapter will further explain the rationalising of more than 19 
RECs to eight of the AU’s officially recognised Recess Variable geometry is an anti-one-size-fits-all 
strategy that has modelled and guided the AU’s eight RECs programmes in sequenced timing given 
their asymmetrical levels of development. In addition, this chapter assesses the introduction of the 
1991 Abuja Treaty amid the simultaneous implementation of the BWI’s structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs). In so doing, it explores factors that influenced the reviewing relevance of the 
OAU as well as the drivers behind the transitioning of the OAU to the present-day AU. 
Chapter 6: Pan-African agency is further interrogated in how it contributed to NEPAD. This chapter 
begins with a discussion of how NEPAD emerged within the global context of the new millennium. 
Second, it critically interrogates the three key frameworks of NEPAD, namely: Peace and Security 
Governance; Economic and Regional Governance; and Political and Democratic Governance. This 
section concludes with a comparative analysis of NEPAD’s three governance frameworks in relation 
to the 1980 LPA. Third, this chapter assesses regional infrastructure development in Africa under 
NEPAD. Thereafter, it explores the impact of external actors (such as the US under AGOA and 
emerging economies) on NEPAD’s integration objectives. The chapter concludes by interrogating 
continental anti-competitive behaviour. 
Chapter 7: Against the backdrop of globalisation and multilateralism, the WTO regimen and the 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), will be the highlight of this chapter. The global north’s 
neoliberal conditionalities are resisted by Africa’s integration variable geometry policies in its critical 
and constructivist theory application. In order for Africa to be a competent global participant, the 
aforementioned conceptual theories to continentally industrialise are explored. Thereafter, it 
provides an assessment of the LPA and NEPAD by focusing on the following areas: the mining 
sector; public health, peace and security; financial integration and convergence, free movement of 
persons and right of residence; free movement of capital goods; comparison of trade policies and 
multiple memberships; and Rules of Origin (ROO).  In this manner, this chapter highlights 
successes and failures in these areas and provides possible recommendations.  
Chapter 8 will synthesise the findings of the research with an overview that highlights the essence 








Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
Preston has argued, “Theoretical frameworks tell us what sort of world we have, what sort of 
explanations to provide, of which particular problem” (Preston 1996:10). A comparative analytical 
study predicated on integrated meta-theories will provide an intersubjective theoretical and 
conceptual framework of the dynamics that have contributed to the formulation of the LPA and 
NEPAD. In this comparative undertaking, this chapter will render some perspectives on various 
policy implementation theoretical frameworks that display centripetal converging similarity between 
LPA and NEPAD and centrifugal diverging factors. Against this backdrop, this chapter will examine 
the following theories: Functionalism and Neo-functionalism; Traditional Integration Theories; 
Dependency Theory; CGE; Policy Implementation Theoretical Models; Intergovernmental 
Institutionalism; Neoliberal Institutionalism; Bargaining Theory; and Constructivism. 
2.1.  Functionalism and Neo-functionalism 
Functionalism asserts that international cooperation is an indispensable first step that precedes the 
integration process. The transitioning of the OAU to the AU in 2002 was a result of gradual 
incremental continental and global dynamics (Rosam 2000, Ogbeide 2010:484). Wapmuk 
(2009:652) lends credence to the functionalist theory in the development of the UN, the EU, the AU 
and its continental integration project. However, the neo-functionalist theory highlights that in Africa’s 
integration project, issues of sovereignty, intra- and interstate conflicts are bound to intermittently 
happen in the process of integration (Schmitter and Haas 2005:258).  As the review of the 1991 
Abuja Treaty stipulates, there is an imperative to cede national sovereignty to strengthen a 
continental supra-national body and its institutions to propel the process of deeper integration 
towards the AEC. This missing legal ingredient has been a cause of anarchical multiple membership 
of RECs, lack of enthusiasm and political will all contributing as non-tariff barriers towards attaining 
the objectives of AEC (Rosamond 200:51-52; Ayinde 2011:186; Biswaro 2012:31). 
The neo-functionalist thesis asserts that integration spawns spillover effects attended with multiplier 
benefits (Desonrode 2008:10; Haas 1958:16; Anadi 2005:139; Biswaro 2012:31). The dynamics 
generated will be an impetus towards Africa’s integration process invariably impacted by global 
factors and that a merger of states to function competitively and optimally is inevitable. 
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 Ayangafac (2008:166) reaffirms the prognosis that Africa’s cooperation and integration is an 
inevitable process that will eventually engender a continental supra-national entity as the integration 
deepens and matures. 
Functionalism and neo-functionalism theories also help to explain the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ processes 
of the 1980 LPA, 1991 Abuja Treaty and NEPAD in pursuit of a Union Government of Africa 
(Niemam and Schmitter 2009:3; Caporaso 1998: 1; Chen 2011:1). Collard-Wexler (2006:399) 
espouses the neo-realism theory as a calculated state-centric pursuit of interests within a globalising 
world. Another neo-realist theorist Gehring (1996:235) argues that although the international system 
is more interconnected with horizontal intrusion of non-state actors, it remains ‘anarchic’ as it is 
without any supra-national world government. This explains Africa’s state-centric neo-patrimonial 
patronage networks that have been a bane to the 1980 LPA, 1991 Abuja Treaty and which NEPAD 
tries to overcome.  
2.2. Traditional Integration Theories: Market Integration1 
After World War II (WW II) and the ascendancy of the decolonisation process in the third world, 
regional economic integration became the mainstay blueprint of newly independent states to 
cooperate to effectively leverage their comparative advantages within the global economy. The 
theories explicating these integration processes can be broadly categorised first as the “traditional 
integration theories”2. These were generally configured as tariff arrangements, the free movement 
of factors of production and cooperation in economic policy formulation, Customs Union, Common 
Market but still Africa and other third world economies stagnated and failed to compete globally.3 
The  FTA theory4 was  predicated on the assumption that the elimination of tariff barriers on goods 
produced and traded within the union, for example, the East African Community (EAC) or the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) would result in multiplier benefits as a result of trade 
creation and trade diversion.5 On the other hand,  the Customs Union theory would complement the 
FTA theory by creation of a Common External Tariff (CET) within the union against third parties.6 
                                                          
1 See Tom Ostergaard and Jacob Viner 1993. 
2 Market integration theory also known as customs union theory: See Tom Ostergaard and Jacob Viner 1993. 
3 P. Robson, The Economics of International Integration. London 1980. See also Ali EL-Agraa (Editor) International Economic 
Integration S. Martin’s Press N.Y. 1982: See Bela Balassa. “Types of Economic Integration” in, Machlup, F. (Editor) Economic 
Integration World Wide, Regional, Sectorial. 
4 See Bela Belassa. 1961 on economic integration which encompasses free trade areas, customs unions, common markets, 
economic unions and total economic integration.  
5 Arthur Hazlewoood, “The East African Community” in El-Agraaa A.M. (Editor) International Economic Integration. St. Martin’s 
Press. New York 1982: See also William. P. Avery and James. D. Cochrane, “Innovation in Latin American Regionalism: The 
Andean Common Market” International Organisation. Vol. 27 No.2 Spring 1973. 
6 R.F. Mikesell “The Theory of Common Markets as Applied to Regional Arrangements among Developing Countries” in R.F. 
Harrod and D.C Hague (Editors) International Trade Theory in a Developing World. MacMillan, 1963. 
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The traditional integration theories had limited relevance to the New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) and by extension to the design of the LPA.  
The LPA sought an inward looking self-reliant “import substitution industrialisation” of Africa delinked 
from the structurally marginalising global economy and this analysis found resonance within the 
dependency theory.7 
2.3. Dependency Theory 
The dependency theory was important in explaining the coalescing of the third world resistance in 
demand of a NIEO at the UN in 1974. Raul Prebisch and Andre Gunder Frank coined the term 
”development of underdevelopment”8, as the unequal and exploitative exchange relationship that 
defined the North and South relations.9 This uneven relationship kept the third world as an extractive 
export of primary commodities to the global north and the buyers of finished commodities form the 
North. This configuration resulted in the continued economic development of the industrialised North 
but was responsible for the underdevelopment of the South. Haas and Schmitter, writing within the 
neo-functionalist tradition, stated: 
Our argument then is that the shared fear of the industrialised world, and special regional 
mechanisms for converting this fear into mutual accommodation, may act as a functional 
equivalent for the shared positive expectations among elites in other settings…thus regional 
integration in the North.10 
Dependency’s strength, therefore, after the failure of the NIEO in 1979, influenced the 1980 adoption 
of the LPA. The dynamism of the ‘Dependency theory’ is that it remains relevant in evaluating and 
understanding contemporary development challenges (Kvangraven 2017:12-7).The dynamism of 
dependency theory compared to other theories is that it is a research programme rather than a 
singular theory predicated on these tenets: a global historical approach; theorising of the polarising 
tendencies of global capitalism; a focus on structures of production; and a focus on the specific 
constraints experienced by peripheral economies especially in Africa (Kvangraven 2018:1-55).  
  
                                                          
7 Lynn Mytelka, “The Salience of Gains in the Third World Integrative Schemes” World Politics Vol. XXV. No. 2 January 1973. 
8 Andre G. Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment” in Rhodes R.I. (Editor): Imperialism and Underdevelopment. A 
Reader. N.Y. 1970 
9 For Frank’s application of dependency theory to the Third World regional integration see “Latin American Economic 
Integration,” 1969 
10 Ernst Haas and Phillipe Schmitter, “Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections About Unity in 
Latin America,” International Organisation 18, (4) 1964:730 
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Although these elements are evident in contemporary theories explained in this thesis, what makes 
dependency theory unique and a particularly strong research programme is the combination of these 
varied elements. Dependency theory as a research programme demonstrates a deep and broad 
understanding that is necessary to appreciate the persistence of Africa’s uneven development and 
how it is relevant in understanding the difficulties in attaining Agenda 2063.What is Dependency 
Theory? According to Dos Santos (1970:231) and Prebisch (1950) it is where core global north 
economies now including China develop and dominate the global economy at the expense of 
peripheral developing economies of the global south like Africa. The ramifications of this dependent 
dominant configurations is also evident in the peripheral countries subordinated internal structures 
of production, social and political structures. The strength of Dependency Theory as a research 
programme eclectically combines other interrelated theories included in this thesis that factor in: 1) 
global historical dimensions; 2) socio-economic theorising that address the polarising thrust of 
capitalist development; 3) attention to structures of production; and 4) the attention to the negative 
impact to peripherals like Africa resulting from constraints in the global economy (Samir Amin in 
Kvagraven 2017). The aforementioned four elements constitute a multi-inter-disciplinary 
combination to form a holistic and comprehensive approach that characterise the research 
programme (Kay 1989:194). Dependency theory as a research programme makes it possible to 
address both strengths and weakness of individual theories, as it permits ongoing research and the 
discovery of new outcomes. Against this backdrop it helps to assess the overall rising global 
inequalities, how structurally inequality is produced and reproduced, the interminable uneven 
development of the global economy that benefits the highly industrialised polities at the expense of 











In contradistinction to dependency theory as a research programme, traditional regional economic 
integration theories have been criticised for having little relevance when applied to the development 
of Africa. Models and theories developed from the experience of the advanced industrialised 
societies proved to be unsuitable to the conditions of extractive and predominantly dependent 
agrarian countries, which were small and fragmented and clouded in a multiplicity of rival ideologies.  
For example, market forces predicated on highly developed institutions of the West as an 
indispensable variable has been absent in the least developed countries (LDCs). Leys and 
Tostensen observed that: 
In contrast to Western Europe where commodity trade and capital movements across 
national boundaries have increasingly integrated, strengthened and corporatized, the political 
economies of the area, the hidden hand of the market has not had the same effect on African 
economies11 
Thus, certain variables such as dependency and underdevelopment, the influence of foreign 
governments, and their transnational corporations, ignored in the traditional theories, underpinned 
the architecture of the LPA.12 The impact of external actors over Africa’s integration schemes is 
visible in relative super-power ideological confrontation, or as former colonial powers seeking to 
entrench their neo-colonial ties extending the interests of their multinational corporations (MNCs) in 
securing access to sources of raw materials, cheap labour, investment areas and markets. The 
dependency theory provides an explanation of the problems of dependency and underdevelopment 
in Africa and its poor performance of regional economic integration projects.13  
For example, Viatsos argues that the process of integration finds its basis in a Marxian theory of the 
class struggle. In this regard, he asserted that it was fundamental to analyse not only the instruments 
and policies, as is used in the traditional theories, but also interrogate who “integrates and for whose 
benefit, and to understand the specific conditions within which integration is sought, including the 
reasons and the forces behind the integration”.  
 
 
                                                          
11 Ernst Haas, “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorising” International 
Organisation Vol. XXIV No.4 Autumn 1970:622. 
12 See OAU Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and various documents of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in the 
bibliography. 
13 See A.Axline, “Underdevelopment, Dependency, and Integration:The Politics of Regionalism in the Third World” op. cit: Lynn 
Mytelka Regional Integration, Dependence, and Development” in A. Axline. 
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Paul Baran, A.G. Frank and Mutharika assert that the activities of MNCs and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Africa are there to establish exploitative relations and structurally depress 
Africa’s growth. Profits are repatriated back to the global north rather than being reinvested in the 
periphery. Therefore, the structural economic dependence is seen to have contributed to the 
underdevelopment of Africa and a hindrance of further development (Walter Rodney 1973).  
This dissertation argues that the nature of the LDCs, and specifically Africa, is itself a historical 
product of the international division of labour, largely entrenched structurally during the days of 
colonialism. This bequeathed a dominant hegemonic centre position to the industrially advanced 
North and relegated Africa and the Third World countries to peripheral status the “zone of the non-
being”. Characteristically, the peripheral countries are small and fragmented; devoid of any industrial 
productive capacity but are locked into competitively supplying raw materials to the North without 
complementing their own supply-side factor endowments to harness economies of scale. 
This deficit finds resonance in the dependency theory and is not addressed in the traditional regional 
theories. Axline points out that: 
A number of essential conditions relating to the process of integration differed in the new 
setting. Principle among these were the conditions of economic underdevelopment, the 
absence of pluralistic democratic political systems, and the vulnerability of the region to 
external factors.14 
It is against this backdrop that LDCs and Africa designed the LPA on a dependency theory 
framework. This self-reliant strategy was deemed post-positivist, as it was empowering and 
emancipatory as it sought to delink itself structurally from the exploitative traditional development 
theories. In the new millennium, NEPAD is an organising template for the political and socio-
economic development of Africa; sharing similarities and contrasts with the previous LPA.  
2.4. Computable General Equilibrium Model 
With the ascendancy of information communication technologies (ICTs) and the fourth industrial 
revolution (4IR), the CGE models consider all sectors in an economy simultaneously and take 
full account of economy-wide resource constraints and spill-over effects across markets for 
individual goods and services (Willenbockel 2004:1065-1099). 
                                                          
14 Andrew Axline “South Pacific Regional Cooperation in Comparative Perspective: An Analytical Framework: Unpublished Paper 
prepared for presentation at the Annual Conference of the Australian Political Studies Association, Sydney. 1983. 
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 It is against this background that the AfCFTA within the AU Agenda 2063 driven by NEPAD is 
based. Thus: 
The CGE approach enables a consistent integrated predictive evaluation of sectoral 
production and employment impacts, aggregate income and welfare effects of changes in 
trade barriers while taking full account of the macroeconomic repercussion arising e.g. from 
terms-of-trade effects, tariff revenue changes and inter-sectoral input-output linkages. CGE 
models take consistent account of the full circular flow of income in an economy from (i) 
income generation through productive activity, to (ii) the primary distribution of that income to 
workers, owners of productive capital, and recipients of the proceeds from land and other 
natural resource endowments, to (iii) the redistribution of that income through taxes and 
transfers, and to (iv) the use for consumption and investment.15 
Unlike the LPA, NEPAD16 has taken a deliberate policy step to integrate into the global economy 
while simultaneously industrialising its continental economy. In this regard, it uses the GLOBE CGE 
trade model, a global multi-region and multi-sector instrument that has been widely used in regional 
economic integration analysis (Narayanan 2012). The data set provides a detailed and consistent 
representation of the global economy-wide structure of production, demand and international trade 
at a regional and sectoral disaggregated level. 
2.5. Policy Implementation Theoretical Models 
Lasswell’s communication model (1902-1978) developed in 1948 aligns with De Coning and Cloete 
(2000:49) and presents functional policy theory as comprehensively encapsulating the policy 
conceptualisation, formulation and the policy design process in terms of agenda setting, decision- 
making and implementation and with its intermittent monitoring and evaluation. Hogwood and Gunn 
reinforce that “this model lends support to deeper understanding of how various kinds of analysis 
can be brought to bear at different stages of the policy process and underscore the advocacy of the 
model being beyond a simplistic analysis where one rung follow the next”. Given the complexity 
around the global dynamics that informed the formation of both the LPA and NEPAD, functional 
policy theory lends itself to pragmatism in order to understand global intersubjective factors of both 
centripetal and centrifugal forces (Hogwood and Gunn 1984:4 quoted in De Coning and Cloete 
2000:45). 
                                                          
15 See Cirera, X., d. Willenbockel and R.W.D. Lakshman (2014) Evidence on the Impact of Tariff Reductions on Employment in 
Developing Countries: A Systematic Review. Journal of Economic Surveys 36(3):449-471. 
16 See The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): Emerging Conditions Impacting on the Implementation Process 
by Eyobong Okon Efretuei: A Thesis submitted in the partial fulfilment for the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy (PhD) in Public Affairs: https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/27498/complete.pdf 
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This theory also has to locate the multi-actor and group theoretical frameworks as the foundational 
creed of both the LPA and NEPAD in the group struggle coined as Pan Africanism (Anderson 
2003:16). In this regard, Pan Africanism as a model is founded on the argument that interaction and 
struggle among groups vis-à-vis the global north versus the global south are central to the policy 
process (Ibid.16).  
As is the case with the LPA and NEPAD the multi-actors are constituted by African member-state 
governments, public opinion, the press and civil society organisations as non-state actors. The 
horizontal non-state actor activism influences policymaking, its implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation. The horizontal bottom-up non-state actor activism foils the linearity perspective 
emphasised by the vertical top-down model and recognises multiplicity of actors at various levels 
and environmental variables in the implementation process. However, public policy at any level 
reflects the interests and the viewpoints of the dominant group who are adequately resourced in all 
facets of policy benefit. 
2.6. Intergovernmental Institutionalism 
The state-centric-led LPA is defined at best as vertical intergovernmental institutionalism with no 
public participation and scrutiny within a one-party state government. The lack of a supra-national 
authority to sanction non-compliance by the member states led to the demise of the LPA.17 In this 
regard, institutional cooperation focuses on how nations choose to cooperate. Interdependence is 
defined by domestic political expediency whereby African leaders held jealously and sacrosanct 
their independent sovereign power. They would not cede aspects of their sovereign power that 
would curtail their independent discretion in policy formulation. 
2.7. Neoliberal Institutionalism 
In 1989 the demise of the USSR was a counterweight to the neoliberalism of the USA and the West 
at large. Neoliberal institutionalists focus on the benefits of cooperation within a democratic 
government and a free private market space. Neoliberalism does resemble neo-realism as it  
accepts the rational actor model in which states function with an anarchic international system with 
the distribution of power as a central feature (Keohane and Martin 1995:39; Lamy 2005:213).18  
                                                          
17 Wendt argues, cooperation between states is predicated on positive interdependencies and potential patronage gains is 
unlikely by unilateral action (Wendt 1992:416) See also, Mitrany 1966:131-137; Haas, 1968: 161-162; Cooper, 1972:161-168 and 
Keohane and Nye, 197726-228. See also Paul, “Africa’s external economic relations: 1960-1990,” African Affairs 90 (1991):339-
34; Paul Collier and J. Willem Gunning, “Why Africa has grown slowly?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 13, 3 (1999):41-66. 
18 Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions” in James Baldwin, 
ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York, Columbia University Press), p.94: See also Arthur Stein, 
“Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” in David Baldwin, ed. Neorealism and Neorealism : The 
Contemporary Debate (New Yorik, Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 45. 
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Contrary to the 1989 USSR demise, the US’s newfound dominance and hegemony demanded the 
emasculation of the African states and their non-intervention in the affairs of the economy while the 
United States (US) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) increased and strengthened the 
capacities of their states. Neoliberalism with its attendant World Bank (WB) SAPs and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) overburdened Africa with unsustainable debt and endemic 
poverty impacting on the autonomy of African states to formulate and implement their independent 
policies. This resulted in the LPA resembling a damp squib. 
 
2.8. Bargaining Theory 
 
The theory of Bargaining is a variant of Game Theory as propounded by Kenneth George Binmore, 
John Forbes Nash Jr and Ariel Rubinstein. As defined by Abhinay Muthoo19 bargaining is “any 
process through which the players try to reach an agreement”. As argued by Adedeji that by 1979, 
it was clear that the UN NIEO by the Third World countries was totally side-lined by the global north 
and subsequently the 1980 LPA policy blueprint was equally challenged and expunged by the WB’s 
1981 Berg Report.  Bargaining theory is applicable at both the level of bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations. African governments as poor players trapped in debt displayed desperation and 
eagerness for donor funding from the 1980s to date embraced the neoliberal Washington 
Consensus and its SAP’s/PRSP in order to maintain and consolidate their political power. In this 
regard, the global north countries dominated negotiated outcomes vis-à-vis the poor global south. 
Within the LPA, some member states displayed lack of commitment by not ratifying the policy 
blueprint, as is the case with the voluntary NEPAD-APRM. 
2.9. Constructivism 
As a social theory within IR, constructivism as a post-positivist theory highlights human cognitive 
social construction on structures, environment and conditions in order to actualise aims and 
objectives (McDonald 2008:59). Central to constructivism is its diffusion and influence of ideas, 
interests among actors and community to attain particular objectives, be they political, economic or 
cultural (Fennimore and Sikkink 2001). As argued by Barnett (2005:258) that “the meaning and 
construction of material reality is dependent on ideas and interpretation”.  
                                                          
19 Muthoo, Abhinay, A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory, in World Economics Vol.1 No.2, April-June 2000.  
Pp145-166. 
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This assists in interpretive analysis and understanding of the global socio-economic dynamics and 
that shared ideas both directly and indirectly, vertically and horizontally shape the organisation of 
world politics (Kaztenstein 1996:17-26; Barnet 2005:258). The organisation of world structures and 
institutions has become more and interdependent given the ascendancy of globalisation predicated 
on global ICTs and the 4IR. As argued by Wendt (1992); Fennimore and Sikkink (2001:392-393) 
non-territorial issues such as the MDGs, the SDGs and the challenges of climate change are globally 
held collective ideas defined as inter-subjective. In this regard this chapter argues in support of 
Barnett (2005:253) that neo-realism and neoliberalism institutionalism emanates from the state that 
constructs ideas, norms and institutions to promote state interests in both bilateral and multilateral 
encounters.  
This constructivist approach also gives credence to the formation of the LPA and its transition to 
NEPAD. As observed by Katzenstein (1996:17); Wendt (1992:393); and McDonald (2008:59) that 
the world is constituted through intersubjective interaction and therefore constructivism upholds that 
the agents and structures within the global system are inextricably mutually intertwined. For the 
purposes of this study, we seek to examine on a comparative framework the differences of the LPA 
and NEPAD in design and implementation and the prevailing conditions that impacted their 
formation and how the global structures, institutions and agents influenced one another. In 
comparison with nature’s intrinsic structures such as land, water, air, sun, flora and fauna, which 
exist regardless of human existence, collective intersubjective social facts cannot exist without 
shared commonality and agreement within communities. Examples of social facts are authority 
structures within communities such as a government, security structures such as police, army, 
intelligence, judiciary institutions, hospitals, money, and states. These social facts are underpinned 
by human agency in all manner of configurations such as checks and balances, dictatorships, zero-
sum and positive sum games (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Barnet 2005:259). The aim of this study 
is to examine and understand how and why the LPA was formed and equally how and why it 
transitioned to AU/NEPAD. 
 I argue that ideational factors, inseparable from culture and identities, have explanatory and causal 






Hence, the culture, norms and identities that informed the formation of the OAU/LPA and AU/NEPAD 
are diametrically different to motivations that influenced the formation of the EU and therefore: 
For constructivists, understanding how things are put together and how they occur is not 
mere description. Understanding the constitution of things is essential in explaining how they 
behave and what causes political outcomes. Constitution in this sense is causal, since how 
things are put together makes possible, or even probable, certain kinds of political behaviour 
(Fennimore and Sikkink 2001: 394). 
Within social theory therefore, social construction processes are intrinsically part of the international, 
regional, national and sub-national levels. In this regard we see how norms influence international 
politics and change the international system as, for example, the UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 
diffused the norm of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the “use of force” in Libya in 2011 to protect 
its citizens against the late Gadhafi’s threat of human rights abuse (1998:888). 
Norms, a component ingredient of social constructivism theory, both enable and constrain the 
behaviour of actors in the international system continuum as they are not static but fluid (Katzenstein 
1996; and Acharya 2004:240). For example, the OAU Article 111 which promoted “the non-
interference in the internal affairs of a member state” was eclipsed by AU 4(h) R2P that in cases of 
genocide, human rights abuse etc the AU can sanction the use of force to protect the citizenry 
against its regime’s human rights abuse. In the post-AU era there has been unconstitutional change 
of governments (UCGs) and coups in Gambia, Mali, Togo and Burkina Faso and the AU within its 
normative constitution has invoked proviso 4(g) and 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act to sanction 
against unconstitutional regime change and return the authentic elected governments. Against this 
backdrop, norms may spontaneously evolve or may be consciously promoted and negotiated and 
provide premise for action to sanction non-compliance to unconstitutional change of government. 
As with the voluntary NEPAD/APRM, peer reviews of member states’ governance norms encourage 
a certain type of behaviour and are not a determinant (Sikkink 1998; Williams 2007:258). 
The constructivist theoretical framework will help to examine NEPAD as a regional institutional 
arrangement for development as it is predicated on a functionalist secretariat staffed with technocrat 
personnel. Evidently, NEPAD has been a catalyst and continuous contributor to the AU’s key 
theoretical frameworks of peace and security governance that are underpinned by constitutional 
democracy and a neoliberal market economy in tandem with an enabling state. Unlike LPA, this 
study will demonstrate that NEPAD has registered catalytic supra-nationalistic continental 
development programmes and projects.  
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 As such, it is necessary to engage some of the meta-theoretical frameworks of policy 
implementation in order to test and validate the object of the study thus the comparative analysis 
between LPA and NEPAD. As De Coning and Cloete (2000:29) have argued, “The development of 
various theories in disciplines such as political science, sociology, public administration and others 
is highly relevant to policy application”, the fluid and adaptive processes of NEPAD befit this profiling. 
2.10 Conclusion 
On balance therefore, this study will employ the integrative theoretical framework to comparatively 
examine the reasons and circumstances that informed the OAU/LPA, its revitalisation in the 1991 
Abuja Treaty and finally its transitioning to the 2002 AU/NEPAD. The relevant integrative and 
intersubjective theoretical frameworks and models implicated in the study render a comparative 
analysis between the OAU/LPA and the AU/NEPAD.  
This comparative analysis is mixed methodologies determined and offers both exploratory and 
explanatory perspectives. They are derived essentially from IR and policy studies. As much as all 
theories and models have strengths and weakness, they provide useful working theoretical 
frameworks of analysis and interpretation. Both the LPA and NEPAD are policy frameworks that 
sought to provide detailed development imperatives that continue to confront Africa as they both 
bear significant similarities of fundamental implementation problems. The RECs of both the LPA 
and NEPAD help to draw a comparative analysis and perspectives in their contrast and similarity. 
 Different theories and models have delineated contrast and similarity in aims, objectives and 
processes of implementation. The concept of regional integration has received its first traditional 
explication in the form of norm and theoretical diffusion from the former global north colonisers to 
be replicated in a post-colonial 1960s Africa. This was under the banner of the “modernising 
theories” for Africa to catch up with the civilised First World. This was subsequently challenged and 
debunked by the structuralist interpretist dependency theory, which has remained relevant in both 
LPA and NEPAD analyses.  
Trade liberalisation and expansion without addressing the problem of Africa’s structural dependency 
has resulted in stunted economic development. In other words, from the formation of the OAU/LPA 
to its transition to the AU/NEPAD the historically conditioned structural imbalances in Africa upon 
which regional economic integration is based is likely to prove to be unviable for Africa given its 




While literature on integration has focused on the evaluation of the means and instruments used 
such as the traditional FTAs, Customs Union, Common Market, only a few have examined the 
questions relating to specific conditions within which the LPA and NEPAD are pursued and that is, 
dependency within a superpower rivalry. I argue that notwithstanding other integrative aspects of 
meta-theories, the dependency theory contributes poignant elements in highlighting Africa’s 
limitations historically and presently to challenge the dominance of past and present hegemons, 






Literature Review  
3.1 Introduction 
A comparative analytical study multivalent literature review anchored on eclectic meta-theories will 
provide an intersubjective theoretical framework underpinned by ex-post and ex-ante analysis. The 
literature review conducted in this chapter will discuss the development of Pan-African diplomacy 
showing its strengths and challenges given the myriad domestic and global asymmetrical dynamics 
that it continues to wade through. It does so by way of a historical analysis that assesses the key 
African and international actors and factors in the run-up to the Monrovia Strategy and the 1980 
LPA. The historical analysis flags and discusses four important events: The Pre-WWI International 
Monetary System (1870-1914), the Cold War (1946-1991), the 1970s oil crisis and the emergence 
of the NIEO, and the failure of the NIEO campaign in the late 1980s, and the need for home-grown 
African Development Programmes. The chapter ends with a discussion of the Monrovia Strategy 
and the 1980 LPA. Wendt (1999:135-6) and Tannewald (2005:19), proponents of constructivism, 
explain that societal structures and actors share an inextricable relationship that involves 
intersubjective meaning and understanding. In this regard, structures do constrain actors, but actors 
can also transform structures by thinking about them and acting on them in new ways. For this 
reason, this chapter will conduct its historical analysis against this theoretical background of 
constructivism (Alexander and Bennet 2005:67-72).  
3.2. The Continental and Global Factors and Actors that led to the Monrovia Strategy and the 
Lagos Plan of Action  
3.2.1. The Pre-WWI International Monetary System (1870-1914) 
The pre-1914 gold system was predicated on an international financial system structure where the 
key currency standard was underpinned by Great Britain’s pound sterling. In this regard, Britain was 
the world hegemonic regime of the international monetary order. This gave London power in global 
financial policy formulation and control.20 In this section, this dissertation will consider the historical 
processes of the international monetary system from 1870-1914 and the role played by the US 
especially after WWII will be examined.  
                                                          
20 See Walter (1991):86 and Cohen (1977):81-82 
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Using the integrative meta-theory of constructivism, causality and multi-comparative methods, this 
dissertation will examine historically why and how global north countries created international 
monetary institutions and structures reflective of their dominance and influence to the disadvantage 
of the global south countries and how this ultimately led to the adoption of the LPA. 
The period from 1870-1914 was predicated on the gold standard within the rule of international 
monetary regiment dominated by Great Britain. Essentially, among the developed industrial 
countries the gold exchange contributed to the balance of payment adjustments thereby facilitating 
ease and international trade and investments. For example, a balance of payments surplus in one 
country would trigger an increase in import supplies with a multiplier effect of decelerating of exports 
and the reduction of the surplus.21 When Britain or any other country experienced a balance of 
payments deficit, the Bank of England would raise the bank rate, thus increasing domestic interest 
rates that would reduce money supply.  
Against this backdrop, the Bank of England would act as lender of last resort to stabilise the global 
economy within the gold standard regimen.22 This arrangement helped capital-exporting countries 
to mitigate the consequences of the balance of payments deficit, domestic inflation that would erode 
the value of the currencies and dampen margins and thereby threatening gold convertibility of the 
local currency. This would stagnate the global economy by producing deflationary downward 
pressure on the currencies. The same balance of payment adjustment by Great Britain had a 
disadvantageous effect on countries on the periphery who were Britain’s colonies, like Africa. The 
gold standard dominated by Britain was vertically and hierarchically arranged with Africa at the 
bottom as an extractive appendage colony and price-taker of finished European goods. This 
arrangement allowed Britain to continuously draw surplus capital from the peripheral colonies that 
had underdeveloped financial markets and no manufacturing base.23  
As argued by Walter Rodney (1973) the arrangement of the systems of the West including the gold 
exchange regimen and its classical theory of economics by Adam Smith in 1776 in “The Wealth of 
the Nations” were exploitative and impartial towards Africa.24 This dissertation argues that not only 
intra-rivalry between European countries was diminishing the dominance of Britain within the gold 
standard mechanism but also the traction of resistance to slave trade and colonialism by Africans 
rendered these diabolical business models inoperable.  
                                                          
21 See Scammell (1985):103 
22 See Kindleberger (1984):70 
23 See Triffin (1968):8-10 and Triffin (1986) 
24 See Triffin (1968):9 and See Classical theory in economics from the works of Adam Smith in 1776, “The Wealth of Nations” 
where he purported the phenomena of a free markets predicated on individual self-interest in a laissez faire world. 
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These competitive global tensions reached critical mass and in 1914 WWI broke out and the gold 
standard collapsed. With the demise of Great Britain as the sole global financial and economic 
hegemonic centre, different countries sought their own policy position.  
Post-WWI, from the 1920s-1930s repeated efforts were made to reinstate the pre-war gold standard 
with limited success. The US which remained the unscathed power after the war became the net 
creditor nation to the devastated nations of Europe and demanded that its debts be repaid. The lack 
of structures, rules and institutions in the aftermath of WWI to coordinate, sequence and regulate 
the global financial system resulted in the 1930s Great Depression as countries applied competitive 
counter currency devaluations and protectionist policies of their economies.25The burden of 
repayment of debt fuelled nationalistic discontent and contribution to the rise of Nazism in Germany 
resulting in WWII and in its aftermath,  a new monetary reconstruction, was considered at the 1944 
Bretton Woods Conference.26 The Bretton Woods conference of July 1944 resulted in the formation 
of the WB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under the hegemonic dominance of the USA. 
It is against this backdrop that the US dollar currency which was good as the pre-1914 gold standard 
became the medium of international exchange. It is there that the global rules and instructions of a 
neoliberal world economy were dictated.27  
The dependency prism theory had clearly articulated Africa’s unequal and asymmetrical position 
from the colonial to a post-colonial Africa within the global political economy. The OPEC oil-induced 
crunch of 1970 impacted the global economy and the sustainability of the BWIs. This led President 
Nixon of the USA in 1973 to delink unilaterally from the fixed gold standard that underpinned the 
global foreign exchange control regimen.  Furthermore, this dissertation asserts that the global 
foreign exchange control regimen is a noose Africa has found it hitherto impossible to escape. This 
global financial control by a global financial oligarchy is not a result of some Adam Smith free market 
economy ingenuity.  
3.2.2. The Post-WWII Period: Third World Liberation Struggles amid Cold War Rivalry (1946-
1991) 
The post-WWII period was evidenced by palpable Cold War rivalry between the former USSR and 
the USA. The former materially, diplomatically and politically supported the anti-colonial struggles 
of the Third World against mainly the global north’s foreign and alien rule (Wolfers 1988:14).  
                                                          
25 See Higgs (2006) and Drinotand Knight (2014) 
26 See Bernanke (2009) 
27 See Gilpin 1975:85 and Cohen 1977:81-82 
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The West through overt and covert mechanisations, soft and hard diplomatic power-play contested 
the Third World space for hegemonic influence of its hearts and minds (Hart 1985:148). The 
increasing tension of the Cold War rivalry proffered a favourable space to the developing countries 
to extract value from both the USSR and USA protagonists with minimal conditionality. Mengisteab 
(1996:153) attests to the aforementioned assertion that the Group of 77 (G77), the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM), the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), and United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) 
were among  the international forums that the developing countries leveraged for their influence in 
the global agenda and to participate in global processes vis-a-vis the space presented by the 
superpower Cold War rivalry. Against this backdrop, regional initiatives in Africa were extensions of 
proxy wars by the superpowers vying for spheres of influence in Africa. Therefore, the regional 
initiatives were bereft of homogeneity and orientation of goals and purpose. They all subscribed to 
Pan-Africanism within the OAU − but with divergent superpower allegiance and loyalty. This resulted 
in strictures, even in the OAU and the UN, surrounding the principle of non-interference in affairs of 
a sovereign and autonomous state. Clearly, there was no commitment to long-term regional goals 
and ex-ante benefits and their equitable distribution. 
Other global forums and agreements, such as the European Economic Community and the Africa, 
Caribbean and the Pacific (EEC-ACP), the Generalised System of Preferences (GSPs) of the 
General Agreement Tariff and Trade (GATT) were some of the Cold War era concessions and value 
extracted by the African countries. The coalescence of the Third World around the NAM in support 
of OPEC, the success of Third World anti-colonial liberation struggles; catalysed and reinforced 
confidence in Africa to support the NIEO and later its 1979 Monrovia Declaration and LPA strategies. 







                                                          
28 See Adedeji Adebayo, “The crisis of development and the challenge of a new economic order in Africa,” ECA Thirteenth 
Session and the Fourth Meeting of the Conference of Ministers (Kinshasa, 1977) and “Indegenisation of African economies 
(London: Hutchinson and co. Publishers, 1981b) 
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3.2.3. The 1970s Oil Crisis and the Emergence of the NIEO 
With the added OPEC global oil crunch of 1970 the US global gold standard control reduced to 21 
per cent worsening its balance of payments deficit.29 These multiple causes impacted the structure 
and the workings of the BWIs making the gold-standard’s hegemonic dominance of the US 
untenable. On Sunday, 15 August 1971, under the Nixon presidency the US  delinked from the BWI 
gold standard regimen.30  
It was during this period that the US applied its hard-power military diplomacy of enforcing its policies 
through the IMF by destabilising Third World countries, including Africa. 
These neo-colonial mechanisations by the US resonated with Kwame Nkrumah’s book Neo-
Colonialism of forced policy subjection, indirect imperialism, dependency and a debt-trap for the 
Third World.31 In the aftermath of the 1971 collapse of the BWI gold standard system the IMF’s 
‘conditionality’ vested  power in it to dictate domestic policy of borrower nations, specifically the Third 
World.32 This neo-colonial attack by the global north resulted in the convergence of resisting forces 
of the global south calling for a new international economic order.  
This was the NIEO set of proposals demanded by the Third World countries through the UNCTD 
constituting the G77 and NAM. The adoption of the resolution by the UN General Assembly on the 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order: 
Solemnly proclaim our united determination to work urgently for the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest 
and cooperation among all States, irrespective of their economic and social systems which shall 
correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap 
between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic   and 




                                                          
29 See Cohen 1977:98-99; Pilling 1986; Walter 1991:150 
30 See Lowestein 2011; Also see Federal Reserve Bank New York 2007; Meltzer 2005. 
31 See Barakat 2004; Igwe 2011a; Hoogvelt 2001. 
32 See Lee 2002:284 and Strange 2011. 
33 Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order:  2229th plenary meeting of the United Nations 
General Assembly Document A/RES/S-6/3201. 
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3.2.4. The Failure of the NIEO Campaign in the late 1980s and the Need for Home-Grown 
African Development Programmes 
The NIEO vociferously demanded the re-calibration of balance of forces and that the post-WWII 
international order underpinned among others by the IMF, WB, and GATT and lately the WTO 
formed in 1995 are unjust and biased against the global south. The proposals and demands 
proffered by the global south to restructure and create an equitable global new order was 
diametrically opposed to the global north’s hegemonic dominance and interests. The global north 
was only agreeable to selective reforms in international trade, financial and investment relations that 
still left its global hegemony unscathed.  
It was evident that by 1979 no fundamental and comprehensive policy overhaul enjoyed any support 
in the global north and that the NIEO campaign was a failure, as reinforced by Adebayo Adedeji: 
In spite of the 6th and 7th special sessions of the UN General Assembly, in spite of the 
UNCTAD IV and V, we are no nearer to establishing a NIEO now than we were in 1974. One 
is not being alarmist if one says that between 1974 and 1979, the international situation has 
gone from bad to worse.34 
Walters and Blake (1992:221) explain that NIEOs failure further reinforced a coalescing of Third 
World forces’ economic agency and diplomacy to capitalise on its agenda-setting and gave 
legitimacy to the global principles as demanded by the NIEO UN resolution. It is against this 
backdrop that the formulation of Africa’s self-reliant development strategy contained in the LPA 
resonated with 1957 antecedent demands of Kwame Nkrumah for a United States of Africa.  
The global multiple crisis as was predicted by President Kwame Nkrumah predisposed Africa to 
violent and diplomatic mechanisations of the West’s neo-colonialism. The practical failure of the 
NIEO campaign and the aftermath of coerced political and economic policies forced on Africa’s 
governments by the global north’s institutions left no doubt that Africa’s leadership had to chart their 




                                                          
34 Adebayo Adedeji, “Africa and the new,” p.2 





3.2.5. Towards the Monrovia Declaration and the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action  
Adedeji (1982:2) explained that by 1979, the NIEO campaign to equitably restructure the global 
economy had failed and the global north countries with their institutions such as the IMF, WB, and 
GATT etc had upped the ante to maintain their global hegemony. This led to the OAU working 
together with the United Nations Economic Commission on Africa (UNECA) to review the 
development policies that Africa had pursued since independence.  
This was in response to the UN General Assembly resolution 3508(XXX) which called upon ECA 
and the other four regional economic commissions to “prepare studies on the long-term trends in 
and forecasts of the economic development of their respective regions”. UNECA undertook and 
published in 1977 a preliminary assessment of long-term development trends and prospects in 
Africa. Both the ex-post and ex-ante assessment confirmed Africa’s downward slide since 1971 
against the global oil crisis of the 1970s that adversely impacted its balance of payments and 
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This resulted in global negative terms of trade and a current account deficit that created a debt crisis 
for Africa as shown in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Africa’s Share in World Merchandise 
 
 
In the years 1948-2002 Africa exhibited the lowest world merchandise of exports and was 
 mainly an extractive economy of primary goods destined for value addition in the global  
north. 
The ECA ex-ante study predicted dim future prospects for Africa within the prevailing international 
economic order if its peripheral position continued36. Adedeji (1983:1) explains that a search for 
home-grown alternative development policies and strategies to the colonial and neo-colonial policies 
being practised by independent African countries became imperative. This resulted in the 1979 
Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa for National and Collective Self- Reliance 
in Social and Economic Development. 
 
                                                          
36Statements by the Executive Secretary of ECA at the formal opening of the 7th meeting of the Conference of African Ministers 
of industry held at ECA headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 26 to 28 March 1984 and at the fourth General Conference of 
UNIDO on 6th August 1984. 
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The African Heads of State and Government adopted this strategy in July 1979 and in 1980  adopted 
the LPA for the implementation of the strategy.37 The Monrovia strategy and the LPA were 
predicated on five main pillars: 
• Promotion of national African self-reliance. 
• The acceleration of Africa’s intra- and inter-regional processes of production: economic 
growth and diversification to achieve an optimal self-sustained continental development 
process. 
• The democratisation of the development process with complete public participation, 
transparency and accountability. 
• Self-sustainable food security thus developing competitive agro-regional value chains: 
eradication of mass poverty and unemployment and equitable distribution of income, wealth 
and benefits of development to the African populace. 
• Acceleration of the process of regional economic integration through cooperation and 
establishment of supra-national authorities. 
The inward-looking development strategy of the LPA prioritises the development of the domestic 
market rather than dependence on the foreign global north’s markets at the heart of Africa’s 
development efforts. The strategy emphasises the fundamental importance of indigenous factor 
inputs in the development process. Contrary to the Western neoliberal export-oriented development 
as espoused by NEPAD, the LPA argued that the central concern of development must be the 
African individual and communities, without the destruction of their culture (Adedeji 1980:4). Three 
factors underpinned the self-reliant, self-sustaining process of development. These are: rediscovery 
of self-confidence; mastering the sovereignty over natural resources; and strengthening the 
leadership role of government in socio-economic engineering. On the latter factor this contrasted 
with the Washington Consensus’ neoliberal stricture of delinking the state and government from the 
ambit of a free market. 
On the contrary, this dissertation argues that it is a demonstrable axiom that both the LPA and 
NEPAD have not been able to delink from the global economy. Comparatively the latter has 
exhibited global overtness to its programmes in contrast to the former’s quixotic unattainable 
rhetorical assertions. Nevertheless, the recovery of self-confidence as articulated by the LPA was 
not only a technical treatise but also a political document that articulated the assertion of self-
confidence as an indispensable factor to Africa’s recovery and development (Adedeji 1980:48).  
                                                          
37 Organisation of African Unity, Lagos Plan of Action for the economic development of Africa: 1980-2000. (International 
Institute for Labour Studies. Geneva, 1981: 9) 
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The WB report titled Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action was 
diametrically opposed to the LPA citing Africa’s governments and nation-states as intrusive in the 
domain and operations of a free and deregulated market system.38 The LPA contrary to the WB 
report demanded establishing  effective control over Africa’s natural resources that had become the 
property of multinational corporations. This further contrasts with NEPAD’s export-oriented trajectory 
for Africa as the LPA rejected foreign trade as the engine for growth and development. In contrast, 
the development of the domestic continental African market underscored the LPA’s self-reliant and 
self-sustaining processes of development strategy with the government at the epicentre as stated: 
If substantial meaning is to be given to self-reliant, dynamic growth and diversification, governments 
are expected to play a larger role in the process of socio-economic transformation than they have 
explicitly and formally agreed to play so far. In view of the multiple objectives of socio-economic policy, 
governments will inevitably find themselves performing several roles. They will act as planners, 
instituting State-wide planning network, linkages, plan monitoring facilities, control mechanisms, 
information systems and feedback effects: as entrepreneurs running state enterprises; and, as 
allocators of national resources through fiscal and monetary policies, incentives and disincentives.39 
Undoubtedly, this dissertation argues that the above underscores all the elements that constitute a 
developmental state. This was anathema to the WB’s programme for Africa, which sought to 
emasculate the African state and give ease of operation to the so-called ‘invisible hand’ of the 
privatised market economy. Browne and Cummings (1984:24-33) in the Berg Report asserted the 
WB’s vision of how the global economy should be ordered and that the LPA was inimical to Western 
interests. By emphasising interdependence of the global economy the Berg Report40 ensured that 
Africa remains “the storehouse of natural resources necessary for the maintenance of the West’s 
hegemonic global industrial dominance”.  
The LPA’s self-reliant development strategy was perceived as antithetical and a threat to the 
capitalist system of the West. Still, projections for the historical ex-post trends scenario of the LPA 
and its comparative ex-ante normative scenario, if left structurally unchanged, portended a bleak 
future for Africa. The ex-ante predictive study of the LPA correctly projected that by 2008 Africa 
would become more economically dependent and marginalised within the global political economy.  
 
                                                          
38 The Declaration of Tripoli on the World Bank Report “Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action 
by the ECA Conference of Ministers at the 17th Session of the Commission held in Tripoli from 278 to 30 April 1982. Robert R. 
Browne and Robert Cummings. The Lagos Plan vs. The Berg Report. Contemporary Issues in African Economic Development 
(Brumswick Publishing Company, Virginia, 1984): p 24. 
39 The Lagos Plan of Action: ECA Revised Framework, p.7-54. 
40 World Bank 1981.Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (Washington D.C.: World Bak) 
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The 2008 global financial meltdown impacted Africa as it experienced a global trade deficit 
compared to other regions. Africa’s food security was adversely exposed; 90 per cent of all its capital 
goods were imported; and, critical intermediate goods such as fertilisers and cement were imported. 
In this regard, I argue that the productive and value addition capacity of Africa should be the 
mainstay that drives both its industrial and trade policies. Trade facilitation measures alone, like the 
lifting of trade and non-trade barriers; will not make Africa structurally competitive within the 
extractive and exploitative trap it finds itself in. A development state/s (the AU and the RECs) with 
a participative horizontal activism by civil society organisations must drive this process. In this 
regard, Pan-African diplomacy has never been a destiny that awaits final arrival but a civilised way 
of life that asserts agency in the world’s knowledge production systems. 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter on the literature review has used integrated meta-theories of development and 
multivariate analysis to interrogate the continental and global factors and actors that contributed and 
inspired the 1980 LPA. Among these is the global multiple crunch of the OPEC inspired oil crisis 
and the 1973 US government delinking from the gold standard to unilaterally enforce global 
financialisation.  Consequently, the increased debt distress of the global south resulting in the 
demand of the NIEO. In line with this dissertation’s integrative constructivist and multi-causal 
framework, this chapter has demonstrated that there have been dialectical events globally 
influenced by human actors in their varied perceptions on how they influence structures, institutions 
and events in the interplay and distribution of power and benefits. Against this backdrop, the 
formulation of LPA was Africa’s policy framework of self-reliance in contrast to the global north’s 
neoliberal one-size-fits-all dominance. Beginning in the pre-WWI era, characterised by British 
hegemony, this chapter traced the global multiple crises of the 1970s such as the oil crunch, the 
collapse of the BWIs, the failure of the NIEO campaign and the exacerbation of the Cold War 
superpower rivalry which underscored the acrimonious and unbalanced nature of the North-South 
relationship. It was the aforementioned multiple global oil crises effected by OPEC in 1970 that 
resulted in stagflation and the dysfunctionality of the BWIs and the unilateral delinking of the USA 
from the fixed gold standard foreign exchange control regimen, that exposed Africa’s vulnerability 
to the vagaries of the global economy (Ravenhill 2011). The ultimate adoption of the 1980 LPA was 
Africa’s independent self-assertion to define itself against global hegemonic forces but with no 






The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action and the Last Act of Lagos 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As concluded in the previous chapter (3), the LPA formation resulted from the exposure to the 
multiple global crisis that highlighted the marginalisation and vulnerability of Africa’s economy within 
the global economy. This chapter presents Pan-African diplomacy and agency within the framework 
of the LPA. This chapter will discuss the aim of the dissertation using the meta-analytic comparative 
methodology in showing the differences between early post-independence regionalism as espoused 
by the Monrovia and Brazzaville gradualist and incrementalist schools and how it differed from the 
continent-wide LPA as envisaged by Nkrumah as early as 1957. Given the ex-post inward, focus of 
the LPA based on import substitution industrialisation (ISI) and its ex-ante predictive analysis that 
unless Africa is self-reliant, the contrary export-oriented prescriptions of NEPAD would inform the 
significance of study of the dissertation. An integrated meta-analytic framework constituting 
constructivism and the causal model will help in the comparative analysis (Adler 2001:95-118; 
Carlsnaes 1992:245-270; Eckstein 1975:79-138; George 1979:43-68; Rehder and Hastie 2001: 
323-360; Achen and Duncan Snidal 1989:143-69). The continent-wide LPA regional programme 
was diametrically different to pre-LPA regional initiatives in Africa. The former was a comprehensive 
economic blueprint under the aegis of the ECA and ratified by the OAU. 
4.2 ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT IDEAS OF POST-COLONIAL AFRICA 
There are varied schools of thought as to the economic and development ideas of colonial and post-
colonial Africa that influenced the design of the LPA and its self-reliant approach. First, the economic 
and development ideas underpinning the post-WWII international order vis-a-vis the BWIs, Warsaw 
Pact Countries, UN and GATT were dominantly liberal and Marxist – albeit with Africanist indigenous 
ideas agitating for self-determination such as the Ujamaa advocated by late president Julius 
Mwalimu Nyerere of Tanzania (Nyerere 1968). This was contrary to the neoliberal economic and 
development ideas of the West and Ujamaa was opposed to Marxism as a conceptual analytic 





The dominant post-WWII liberal modernisation theory ideas viewed development as a process of 
economic growth diffused from the advanced industrialised states to the backward traditional 
societies. In this regard, modernisation theory presented a unidirectional process of change from 
traditional to modern attributes.41  
Third World theorists like Walter Rodney, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Amilcar Cabral and 
Frantz Fanon et al  challenged neoliberal theories like modernisation theory as they were designed 
to disguise and rationalise the hegemonic and exploitative colonial capitalistic patterns of production 
and benefit.42 From the post-independence era, beginning with Ghana in 1957, throughout the 
decades hitherto, despite the adoption of liberal theories such as modernisation theory and SAPs, 
PRSPs, development has continued to elude Africa. Contrary to the modernisation theory ex-ante 
predictions that Africa would progress on to greater heights of industrialisation and development, 
rather Africa stagnated and increasingly relied on Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). As 
argued by Walter Rodney (1973), in contrast to the modernisation theories, underdevelopment 
theory as explicated in the structuralism or dependency version interprets the global economy 
configuration as inimical to the LDCs. This all ran concurrent with the ascendancy of neo-colonialism 
that seeks to keep the extractive export-dependent economy of Africa a permanent feature.43 As 
discussed in the previous chapter (3),  this backdrop of dynamics  informed the developing countries’ 
NIEO campaign to restructure and redesign a stratified world that predominantly benefited the North 
at the expense of the South.44 As noted in the previous chapter (3), with the collapse of the NIEO 
campaign in 1979, its development ideas of self-reliance became the centrepiece strategy in the 
LPA’s design. 
4.3 Pan-African Diplomacy and Agency in LPA’s Design 
Senghor (1989:343) explains that the Pan-Africanist philosophy, as espoused by Kwame Nkrumah 
to urgently unite Africa politically, economically, culturally and otherwise; now resonated within the 
LPA programme.  
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Pan-Africanism incrementally has become the banner and framework encompassing resistance to 
slave trade, colonialism and neo-colonialism and the expression of global African spirituality. With 
African states, gaining their independence under the aegis of the OAU it became imperative that 
political independence needed to be reinforced with economic freedom and competitiveness. 
Kwame Nkrumah the president of independent Ghana in 1957 forewarned that a United States of 
Africa was imperative to eliminate the vulnerability and marginalisation of Africa by the global north’s 
neo-colonialism. At the formation of the OAU in Addis Ababa on 25 May 1963, Kwame Nkrumah 
urgently and radically appealed for this trajectory towards a unitary African government.  
However, the Monrovia and the Brazzaville Group of Pan-Africanists within the OAU did not share 
the Casablanca Group’s fast-paced unitary supra-nationalism; rather they opted for a gradual 
incremental approach. Against this backdrop, gradual incremental regionalism would be the 
panacea against Africa’s vulnerability bestowed by the legacy of slave trade and colonialism.45  
The 1979 Monrovia Declaration and the 1980 LPA, urgently designed an inward-looking self-reliant 
economic blueprint to mitigate the vagaries of the global economy and Africa’s vulnerability thereto. 
The ratification of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) treaty in 1975 long 
divided along Anglophone and Francophone states, became a contributory catalyst to the 1979 
Monrovia Declaration Strategy and the 1980 continent-wide LPA. The LPA for the first time, linked 
Africa’s five regions towards regional cooperation and integration towards achieving an African 
common market with a common external tariff regimen by the year 2000. The five regions were 
southern, eastern, western, northern and central Africa and this was ratified in the OAU’s 1981 Full 
Act of Lagos (FAL)46.  
The LPA consisted of short-, medium- and long-term intervening programmes that sought to make 
Africa self-sustainable within the global economy. Further, its inward-looking orientation is markedly 
different to NEPAD that is export-oriented and contingent on being funded by the global north (G8) 
– and will be discussed later in this dissertation.47 Inter- and intra-regional cooperation and 
integration of all multi-countries underpinned the LPA alongside the attendant development of 
Africa’s human and natural resources. 
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 Its factor endowments needed to be invested in productive sectors of the economy, such as: 
mechanised and modernised agriculture, to achieve self-sufficiency in food-security; value addition 
of its primary commodities, to effect favourable  terms of trade predicated on regional value chains 
(RVCs) in order to harness economies of scale; and capital account controls within the global 
exchange rate regimen against the global  financialisation  by the BWIs −- with its debt-trap policies 
visited on Africa. A self-reliant political economy became the mainstay and bedrock upon which the 
LPA was to be realised in terms of sustaining economic growth on domestic factors of production, 
distribution and consumption.  
In this regard, the LPA sought to be an equitable competitive participant in the global economy 
without total disengagement and therefore to redesign the exploitative export dependent regimen.48 
In July 1979 in Liberia, Monrovia the precursor to the LPA the Monrovia Declaration of Commitment  
of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU committed  individually and collectively on behalf 
of Africa’s government to facilitate the attainment of objectives of self-reliance and self-sustainment 
thus49: 
• Eliminate illiteracy and prioritise the training in human resources development and research. 
• Position science and technology to be relevant and supportive to Africa’s milieu and 
development. 
• Achieve self-sufficiency in food production, supply and security. 
• Implement United Nations Transport and Communications programmes for Africa. 
• Develop sub-regional and regional internally located industries predicated on regional value 
chains. 
• Co-operate in the field of natural resource control, exploration, extraction and use for the 
development of our economies for the advancement and benefit of Africa’s populace 
supported by appropriate institutions. 
• Develop and support indigenous entrepreneurship, technical manpower and technological 
abilities to enable Africa’s citizenry to assume greater competitive local and global 
participation. 
• Co-operate in the preservation, protection and enhancement of the natural environment. 
• Support development policies that reflect Africa’s cultural socio-cultural values in order to 
reinforce Africa’s cultural identity. 
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• Co-operate in areas of trade and finance, statistics and population. 
The aforementioned elements are fundamentally inward-looking. They underpin Africa’s orientation 
for the first time to be self-reliant and to disengage from the exploitative export dependent 
mechanisms of the global economy. In this regard, Africa would partially retain global aspects that 
add value and are of benefit to it. They are therefore, of particular significance for this study. 
Incremental proposals and sectoral policy formulation processes within the main pillars of self-
reliance were contributions by African ministers of trade and industry, communications and planning. 
This reached critical mass as the African strategy was consummated during the ECA conference of 
ministers of development and planning at the 14th session of the commission held in Rabat, 
Morocco, in March 1979.50 The following year in April 1980 during the ECA conference of Ministers 
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the African ministers and the ECA technocrats crafted a detailed Plan of 
Action for endorsement by the African Heads of State and Government. It was titled The Plan of 
Action for the implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for Economic Development of Africa. 
Subsequently the document was adopted by the African leaders at their Economic Summit in Lagos 
in April 1980, and became known as the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of 
Africa 1980-2000.51 
The Plan was also presented to the UN General Assembly at its 11th special session in September 
1980 and it became an integral part of the International Development Strategy for the Third United 
Nations Development Decade.52 This dissertation argues that Africa’s exploitative extractive posture 
is pedantically and robustly maintained by the global north as it informs their business model of 
surplus value extraction. More important, this strategy is contingent not only on the global north’s 
coordination of soft-power, but hard-power of its military might that was unleashed in 2003 on Iraq 
and March 2011 in Libya. Since the inception of the LPA to the present-day NEPAD, nowhere does 
Pan-African diplomacy counter global north military hard-power, as evidenced by China that has 
nuclearised and North Korea that engages in nuclear sabre-rattling as a countervailing strategy. 
This fundamental weakness of Africa not to aspire to equal the permanent five (P5) of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) will always be a lingering failure in its Pan-African diplomacy. This 
dissertation further argues that soft- and hard-power diplomacy are inextricably intertwined and the 
latter engenders a balance of power among P5 equals of which Africa is not a part. 
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4.4 Africa’s Deepening Economic Crisis and its Implications for the LPA 
A mismatch has existed from the 1970s to date as Africa experienced a rapid growth in population 
and urbanisation in disconnect to a deterioration in food production and supply for its population. 
Within the dependency theory framework, this has increased dependence on food imports resulting 
in negative terms of trade (TOT) whereby foreign exchange resources secure expensive food supply 
at the expense of financing self-sustaining development programmes.  
Against this backdrop, again this dissertation reiterates its argument, that Africa lacks a hard-power 
diplomatic arsenal in both its LPA and NEPAD policy documents. How else is Africa going to be 
globally industrialised and competitive with no hard-power leverage such as China at least exercises 
in its trade and tariff wars with the US’s Donald Trump presidency? As argued by McMichael (2011) 
the mono-cash crop export economy dominated by Western multinational corporations, has 
encouraged rent-seeking agri-policies benefiting the few ruling elites. This is at the expense of a 
self-sustainable comprehensive holistic food and agricultural policy framework that sufficiently 
promotes and sustains both urban and rural livelihoods. In support of sufficient food production and 
supply, the LPA programme recommended a 50 per cent reduction in post-harvest food losses.53 
To alleviate food losses, the following policy recommendations were proffered: First, careful 
assessment of the extent of food losses. This included formulation of national policies for food loss 
reduction. Second, advocacy and education of the public through media campaigns to reduce food 
waste. Third, construction of appropriate processing and storage facilities supported by technical 
expertise. Fourth, research and development to promote infrastructural techniques to benefit 
farmers and fishery industries in methods of drying, preservation, storage, pest control and 
processing. Lastly, integrated intra-regional training of staff for food loss control technologies. 
The aforementioned policy recommendations of the LPA encouraged African countries to lessen 
their dependence on imported industrial inputs by engaging in intra-African industrial cooperation. 
Fundamentally underpinned by intra-African cooperation in pursuit of its industrialisation African 
states adopted the following measures: 
• Creation of sub-regional and regional plans for cost-effective RVCs whose cost and 
production capacity would exceed national supply and demand side economies in financial 
absorptive capacities. 
• Creating regional value chains supported by multinational regional institutions to facilitate an 
inventory of and exploit shared national resources. 
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• Prioritising joint ventures and public private partnerships’ establishment of sectoral Africa’s 
strategic multinational industries in areas of primary commodities such as metallurgy, 
foundry, chemicals, value addition, distribution and marketing. 
• Strengthening and remodelling African regional institutions such as the African regional 
centre for technology; the African regional centre for engineering design and manufacturing; 
the African development fund. 
• Establish monitoring and evaluative machinery over Africa’s industrialisation programmes. 
• Creating industrial cooperation areas with a common external tariff regimen and elimination 
of all tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). 
• Adoption of standardised continental measures in harmonising administration systems 
towards a common tax regimen and a single continental currency eventually supported by 
Africa’s Central Bank (ACB). The ACB would work with standardised and harmonised 
multinational institutions to promote financial flows that unlock and attract both domestic and 
foreign investment capital for acquisition of technologies and businesses beneficial to Africa. 
• Instituting policy measures at regional levels to facilitate the optimal utilisation of excess 
industrial production capacity in Africa.54 
Against the backdrop of the aforementioned global multiple crisis and the global north’s neo-liberal 
unbridled global finalisation, the LPA policy document indicated in its preamble that ”efforts towards 
African economic integration must be pursued with renewed determination in order to create a 
continent-wide framework for the much needed economic cooperation for development based on 
self-reliance”55.  In this regard, a regionally integrated and interdependent African economy would 
be the initial building blocks towards establishing an African common external tariff, African Central 
Bank (ACB) and a single common currency and market thus establishing a singular diversified 
dynamic AEC.56 The LPA’s policy assertions insisted that Africa’s almost total reliance on  the export 
of raw materials must change. Rather, Africa’s development and growth must be based on a 
combination of Africa’s considerable resources, its entrepreneurial, managerial and technological 
resources, and its markets (restructured and expanded), to serve its people.57 With the onset of the 
global north’s financial globalisation under the aegis of the BWIs, the LPA document called for 
increased South-South cooperation in all facets of global political economy creating preferential 
trade areas within the framework of ECA Multinational Programming and Operational Centres 
(MULPOSCS).58  
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This new global redesign and rebalancing by LPA within the South-South NIEO aimed at extricating 
Africa as an extractive colonial appendage supplier of unprocessed primary commodities for the 
West.59 Thus, the gradual elimination of the exploitative and dependent North-South trade patterns 
and relations would give way to a fairer NIEO. The LPA promoted an interventionist developmental 
state contrary to the WB’s Berg Report’s neoliberal free market without involvement60. The LPA 
would enforce capital account controls and a tax regimen that would constrain multinational 
monopolistic dominance. Within the NIEO, the LPA demanded elimination of protectionist measures 
by developed countries; especially its farm subsidies that rendered Africa’s exports inaccessible to 
the global north’s markets61. 
The LPA’s self-reliant economic programme did not preclude global financial assistance as long as 
it was not exploitative in intent. In this regard, the LPA under the banner of the NIEO called for the 
reform of the global monetary and economic system and the cancellation of constraining 
conditionalities and debt. Increased ODA from the global north was a request put forward by the 
LPA in support of an equitable NIEO. In comparison between LPA and NEPAD, the latter just as the 
former has demanded increased ODA and this has opened a plethora of criticism of an externally 
dependent self-reliant sponsored programme. Ravenhill (1986) commented ”for the most part, the 
plan appears to be little more than a plea for externally-generated resources; international donors 
are expected to foot the bills”.62  In principle, on a comparative basis both the LPA and NEPAD 
converge on sourcing of external funding support for Africa’s self-reliant economic programme. Still 
this reinforces the assumption and stereotype that Africa is ever- dependent on handouts for its 
socio-economic programmes.63In 1984, Africa experienced multiple crises of drought and 
desertification that spread to 36 of its 50 member states and this was a kind of stress testing for the 
LPA.  
The global economic recession and its attendant collapse of commodity prices affected Africa’s 
balance of payments negatively. This resulted in external mounting debt levels and confirmed 
Africa’s deteriorating economic crisis.64 Unlike  NEPAD that has taken self-responsibility as also 
contributing to Africa’s economic failure, the LPA apportions the blame to the persistence of the 
colonial and neo-colonial mix of economic policies.  
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For example, Adedeji blames the 1984 food crisis induced by drought on the colonial economic 
policy that concentrated all resources on production, marketing of export mono-cash crops to the 
neglect of the production, and marketing of food crops, which were left largely to the subsistence 
sector.65During this period Africa’s population grew faster at about 3 per cent per annum, 
urbanisation at a rate of about 5 per cent per annum; this rural urban migration was unsustainable 
due to low productivity in the food production sector, and negative current account balances. 
The LPA design had short-, medium- and long-term interventions. The short-term interventions were 
for emergencies like the food crisis but underpinned by medium- and long-term interventions to 
structurally reposition Africa to be a self-reliant economy. In support of food security, the LPA called 
for the immediate re-afforestation programmes for soil stabilisation and exploitation of underground 
water for irrigation to mitigate effects of droughts and the establishment of meteorological and 
hydrological monitoring stations to enforce strict sustainable land management.66 The implications 
for the 1984 global recession had a deleterious impact on the implementation of the LPA. As the 
WB confirmed, 
 the crisis management of recent years has resulted in widespread neglect of programmes 
dealing with the long-term constraints on development; schools are unable to teach 
effectively because of shortages of books and other materials; clinics are without medicines; 
deforestation, overgrazing and other environmental hazards are not being checked.67 
The persistent declining trend in net capital flows to Africa to support especially productive 
investment and an industrialising policy has been evident from the LPA and the new millennium 
NEPAD. This has somewhat vindicated and affirmed Christine A. Bogdanowics-Bindert’s ex-ante 
prediction in her article entitled Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action which “foresees a 
continuation of economic stagnation and human misery, recurrent crises and stop gap measures.”68 
The transitioning of the LPA to NEPAD in the new millennium demonstrates Africa’s resolve against 
Afro-pessimism69 a product of colonialism and neo-colonialism directed at sapping Africa’s optimism 
and confidence. Africa’s optimism and confidence now finds resonance in the WB’s report: 
Against this disquieting background, is it possible to look with hope toward the future? The 
World Bank has answered with an emphatic ‘yes’. This optimism can be justified by recent 
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experience in both Africa and elsewhere. For instance, the despair that is now focussed on 
Africa was matched by a comparable feeling about India in the early 1960’s. In recent years, 
India, despite its terrible poverty, has emerged from despair to hope in the eyes of the world. 
This change has been achieved largely through sustained improvement in the government’s 
policies and programmes, with support from donors wherever their finance, technical 
assistance or advice could be useful. There are many other cases around the world of 
mutually reinforcing roles of good domestic programmes and appropriate external assistance. 
The same combination of domestic reform and donor support can be successful in Sub-
Saharan Africa.70 
The above optimism about Africa’s future was also supported at the Special Memorandum by the 
ECA Conference of Ministers on Africa’s Economic and Social Crisis which was addressed to the 
1984 Second Regular Session of the Economic and Social Council of the UN that  “Africa is capable, 
in the not-too-distant future of establishing at national, sub-regional and regional levels truly 
dynamic, self-reliant and interdependent economies, capable of functioning as effective partners in 
the international economic system.” In this regard, this statement heralded the transitioning of the 
LPA to NEPAD.71 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented Pan-African diplomacy and agency within the framework of the LPA. 
Using a post-positivist meta-theoretical framework that aggregates other multivalent theories such 
as constructivism, the causal model theory and multi-method comparative case study analysis that 
are transformative, emancipatory and empowering theories. These theories help to understand 
cause and effect, action and reaction of human cognitive choices and measures around their 
structures, institutions and solutions in pursuit of solving their challenges. In this regard, this chapter 
has found that the underlying principles of the LPA demonstrated a radical development African 
framework that was self-reliant and self-sustaining in essence but alas only in theory.  
As much as the LPA’s overall strategy was inward-looking, self-reliant and self-sustaining, its partial 
disengagement from the exploitative global economy was not permanent but rather strategically and 
tactfully informed. This was to strengthen Africa foundationally so that it can engage fairly and 
equitably in the global political economy. 
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 Building upon the previous chapter’s discussion, the context within which the LPA was formulated, 
this chapter has argued that there was a historical incremental gradual process informed by Africa’s 
resistance to slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism that coalesced in the coining of the term Pan-
Africanism. Although the term Pan-Africanism has no one definitive explication, but it has gained 
currency of epistemic meaning, it is Pan-African diplomacy and agency as an act of epistemic 
restorative justice against Eurocentric marginalising epistemologies. 
 
Chapter Five 
Auditing the Lagos Plan of Action: Towards the Abuja Treaty 
5.1 Introduction 
From the 1980s onwards, the LPA buttressed Pan-African diplomacy and agency in IR in pursuit of 
equitable economic development and cooperation. The creation of new regional economic 
groupings (REGs) was encouraged to improve and support the existing ones as pillars and building 
blocks towards a continent-wide economic community. However, despite a plethora of multi-
membership RECs and the signing of the Abuja Treaty in 1991 to revitalise the implementation of 
the stagnated aims and objectives of the LPA in establishing the AEC, Africa continually displayed 
rhetorical success with no practical policy application and implementation.72This position of 
stagnation and lack of policy implementation was echoed hereunder: 
Regional self-reliance has been given the same symbolic status in the 1980s as was 
accorded Pan-Africanism in the 1960s: a concept to which lip service is paid but one which 
is largely ignored when it comes to policy implementation (John Ravenhill: 1986) 
In  light of the aforementioned commentary, this chapter will conduct an audit of the LPA towards 
the 1991 Abuja Treaty within an interplay of conceptual frameworks such as critical, rational, Marxist 
and constructivist theories; this chapter will demonstrate their application in cost-benefit evaluations 
criteria that informed the Abuja Treaty and the AEC. These evaluative processes aid in locating 
comparative advantages and economies of scale to the benefit of the integration project. The 
chapter will further explain the rationalising of more than 19 RECs to eight of the AU’s officially 
recognised REC’s. Variable geometry is an anti-one-size-fits-all strategy that has modelled and 
guided the AU’s eight RECs programmes in sequenced timing given their asymmetrical levels of 
development. 
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This chapter argues on a comparative framework of a cost benefit analysis that for Africa’s 
leadership choosing between the long-term benefits of the LPA and the perceived short-term costs 
for African governments, the latter implicit option was threatening. Not only would this be a recipe 
for domestic destabilisation of the sacrifices to be made by the populations for the LPA’s long- term 
gains but this would invite the global north’s soft and hard power zero game tactics to maintain its 
hegemony. Without the global north’s financial input and skills, Pan-African diplomacy is dead in its 
tracks. 
5.2 THE LPA MODEL ON A COST BENEFIT ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
The vulnerability and marginalisation of Africa in a post-WWII dispensation and the formation of the 
BWIs excluded Africa from the policy formulation and decision-making structures and institutions 
that governed the global economy. With the multiple crisis of the 1970s, the OPEC oil crunch, the 
collapse of the BWIs, the expunging of the gold standard monetary system and unilateral pursuit of 
financial globalisation by the US aided by it IFIs such as the IMF, WB and GATT added a debt 
burden on Africa’s economic development policies.73 This resulted in Africa adopting the continent-
wide 1980 LPA as an inward-looking self-reliant economic programme partially disengaged from the 










                                                          
73 Conway, P. 1994. “IMF Lending Programs: Participation and Impact”, Journal of Development Economics 45: (1994), 365-91. 
67 
 
As shown in Table:2 below the Washington Consensus neoliberalist policies promoted globalisation 
against the anti-globalisation inward policies of the LPA.  
Table 2: Summary of Arguments for and Against Globalisation 
Globalisation has disadvantaged Africa, as it has remained a global extractive economy 
dominated by the global north, but lately also by China that has imported large amounts of Africa’s 
commodities. 
The LPA programme suffered from a litany of problems, ranging from overlapping memberships of 
its RECs, through unfulfilled commitments (Dinka and Kennes; Draper et al 2007; UNECA 2006 and 
2008). The ex-ante policy rhetoric of the LPA was not matched by the reality of realising 
implementation key result areas.  
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The 1884 colonising Berlin Conference arbitrarily divided Africa into small weak domestic economies 
that were largely underdeveloped and rural-based. These subsistence-based states had weak 
productive capacities concentrated in dependent export industries, an appendage of the metros. 
Hitherto, huge continental infrastructure or supply-side and demand-side deficits militated against 
rationalised competitive integration into global value chains of the global economy. Collier (2007:7) 
explains the following development traps as being characteristic in thwarting Africa’s development 
of LPA programmes: 
1. The conflict trap. Wars and coups prevent countries from realising their economic and 
developmental potential and they will become dependent on unprocessed primary 
commodities. Therefore, Africa, with its LPA programme, lacked an institutional structure to 
coordinate its economic development, remained essentially stagnant and poor, dependent 
on primary extraction of commodities and therefore prone to wars and continuous instability 
that militates against development (Collier 2007:37). These wars were evident in Angola, 
Ethiopia, and Liberia. 
2. The natural resources trap.  Patrimonialism and resource rents have compromised the LPA 
programme trapping the elitists in vertical patronage politics. The lack of public institutions to 
demand accountability and transparency and participation in the policy formulation and 
implementation of the LPA programme rendered African Heads of State and Government 
only paying lip-service to it. The horizontal and public participation in a democratic milieu 
threatened the governments who were mainly one-party state machineries and did not 
tolerate dissent. 
3. The trap of being landlocked with bad neighbours. Poor landlocked countries with no 
infrastructure and access to the sea for their trade frustrated the implementation of the LPA. 
For example, in southern Africa: Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Rhodesia, Malawi and 
Zambia were dependent on the apartheid government of South Africa of the 1970s.  Worse 
still these small African countries like Lesotho and Malawi had sparse and illiterate 
populations with a small land base. This did not attract large scale foreign investment that 
would earn economies of scale for shareholder returns (World Bank 2000:51-61).74 
4. The bad governance trap. From the 1970s-1980s Africa was strewn with one-party state 
dictatorships that extended their governance through military force, patronage networks and 
bribery such as Uganda of Idi Amin, Libya of Muammar Gaddafi and Zaire of Seseko Mobuto. 
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The numerous RECs formed to support the LPA suffered from multiple overlapping membership 
that resulted more in ad hoc intergovernmentalism arrangements benefiting the ruling elites rather 
than ceding sovereignty to a supra-national continental authority that would enforce penalties for 
non-compliance to the LPA’s programmes. The absence of effective and adequate institutional 
incentives, such as payment of a country’s revenue loss; accentuated collective actions, problems 
and disinterest. Trade facilitation measures are predicated on sophisticated and effective measures 
that engender trade liberalisation to unlock and attract both foreign and intra-regional investments.75 
Against this backdrop, rationalisation and harmonisation of sectoral industries would benefit some 
regions and countries more than others. This would result in the loss of tariff revenues; a source of 
revenue for most African governments. This arrangement  constricted the patronage networks and 
therefore created disinterest in the LPA.76 At the time, the only highly industrialised country in Africa 
was apartheid South Africa and its racist policies were antithetical to the LPA. The comparative 
balance between trade creation and trade diversion threatened seemingly smaller economies of 
Africa to support the LPA programme through shared market institutions and jointly formulated 
regulatory policies. This was perceived as threatening individual African governments’ sovereignty 
and discretionary authority over economic policy formulation.77 
Trade creation would therefore consist of shifting production of goods and processes of services 
from a less efficient to a more efficient member of the union. For example, within the Southern Africa 
Customs Union (SACU) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), South Africa 
benefits from trade creation to the chagrin of its other members. Conversely, tradition diversion 
consists of the shifting of production and services from an efficient non-union member to a less 
efficient union member. In this regard, the UK neither an AU member nor one of its RECs, enters 
into trade agreements with less developed Africa’s RECs and enjoys superior economies of scale,  
thereby threatening implementation of the LPA and NEPAD to achieve AEC.78The disinterest of 
some African governments towards the LPA is underscored by the cost benefit analysis between 
trade creation and trade diversion.79  
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The former whereby production would shift from small-based and less efficient regional producers 
to more efficient RECs threatened the immediate and short-term economies of weaker member 
countries notwithstanding the ex-ante welfare benefits of the LPA80. In the North-South divide, the 
LPA’s proposals underscored by the failed NIEO campaign would demand a trade diversion 
configuration. This would shift production from the more efficient North of the developed world to 
less developed South regional producers with welfare enhancing benefits. This kind of trade 
diversion initially demanded by the G77 NIEO campaign then by the 1980 LPA was perceived to be 
a challenge and inimical to the global north’s hegemony.81For example, the LPA would have 
demanded the reviewing and re-configuration of preferential trade agreements between African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries and the European Economic Community (ACP-EEC) within the 
Lomé convention protocols and the common currency arrangements and common external tariffs 
between Francophone Africa and France.  
These neo-colonial arrangements as forewarned by Kwame Nkrumah and their extrication as 
demanded by the LPA were a continent-wide initiative to mitigate and disentangle Africa from the 
perpetuation of this exploitative pattern by the global north. At the onset of the 1980 LPA, Browne 
and Cummings (1984:24) countered the LPA underpinned by the WB’s Berg Report. A year after 
the adoption of the LPA, the WB followed again with the Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: An Agenda for Action. Both the WB reports were antithetical to the LPA.  The former 
emphasised colonial export-oriented economies in contrast to the LPA’s inward-looking self-reliance 
and industrialisation. The WB advocated for a minimised role of the government with greater 
neoliberal privatisation and unfettered movement of global capital82.  
The LPA was considered inimical to Western interests and, consequently, had to be marginalised 
(Browne and Cummings 1984:33). Africa’s economic demise, claimed the WB Berg Report, was 
due to its political elite leadership’s gross resource mismanagement, overvalued national currencies 
and faulty exchange rate policies, excessive state intervention, public subsidies and pervasive 
corruption (Obare 2011:57). Amin (1995:47) reinforces the coercion of export dependent primary 
commodity economies of African countries as extractive supplier appendages to the global north 
countries. 
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This dissertation argues that this power imbalance favours and benefits the global north through its 
transnational corporations (TNCs), international financial institutions (IFIs) and NATO; thus a mix of 
soft and hard power in realpolitik. The Berg Report of the WB became the neo-liberal Washington 
Consensus policy doctrine that further marginalised Africa in all forms of diplomacy, be it economic, 
commercial and public.83  
5.3 Timeline Framework Towards Economic Restructuring and Diversification 
The African member states had recognised that transport and communications were pivotal to the 
restructuring and modernising of the whole of Africa’s economy. African transport and 
communications as the identified strategic hub and driver of the completely rehabilitative plan 
needed enormous resources in terms of human and investment capital, long-term time interventions 
to effectively turn the continental economy to be globally competitive. A resolution was endorsed by 
the UN General Assembly, which proclaimed the Transport and Communications Decade for Africa, 
1978-88. The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Monrovia in July 1979 
subsequently adopted this resolution.84 The summit endorsed the principal goals of the strategy for 
the decade that member states should work towards: 
1. “Promotion of the integration of transport and communications infrastructures so as to 
increase intra- African trade. 
2. Effectively and efficiently maximising the co-ordination of various transport systems. 
3. Unlocking the potential of land-locked countries and isolated regions to be effectively be 
part of the regional value chains. 
4.  Standardisation and harmonisation of national regulations and the elimination of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to enhance the facilitation of movement of persons and goods. 
5. Stimulating and promotion of local human and natural resources, the standardisation of 
networks and equipment, research and dissemination of techniques adapted to thee 
African context in the building of transport and communication infrastructures. 
6. Trade facilitation and promotion of transport and communications industries. 
7. Mobilisation of technical and financial resources to support and promote the development 
and modernisation of transport and communication infrastructures in Africa.”85 
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The aforementioned strategy was the beginning to the delinking of Africa’s dependent export 
extractive economies in order to attain self-reliance. The ex-ante envisaged multiplier effects and 
the economies of scale to be harnessed were enormous and welfare-enhancing. However, the 
development of the pivotal transport and communications infrastructures requires huge investment 
capital and an interminable time frame.86 
 In order to take ownership and charge of the LPA, the bulk of the investment would have to be 
locally sourced. This required that African governments had to divert scarce resources that 
subsidised their population’s public goods, such as, health, education, transport etc. Herein was the 
problem of Africa’s balance of payments deficit incrementally worsening from the OPEC oil crunch 
of the 1970s and locking Africa into a debt-trap from the 1980s. This left Africa with compromised 
current account deficits and forcibly at the behest of the IMF and WB having to use its primary 
commodity export earnings for external debt-servicing to global north creditors. This chapter argues 
that the ability of most African governments to withstand these external shocks was non-existent as 
they exhibited asymmetry in smallness of size and fragmentation, economic factor endowments and 
the levels of development of the participating countries.  Fourteen explains that the “economic 
differences among Sub-Saharan African countries have constituted the major obstacle to the 
realisation of trade and factor market cooperation and integration.” 87 Each sovereign country 
therefore saw no benefit in supporting integration arrangements of the LPA but rather pursued 
immediate nationalist survival interests without compromising its relationship with the West.88 The 
aforementioned arguments also highlight trade creation and trade diversion configuration namely, 
that it would be a greater benefit to industrialised countries in comparison to the less developed 
member states. Moreover, the concern of better predisposed states industrially, like Kenya, carrying 
the burden of revenue loss payments to poorly endowed Tanzania; the mistrust and disagreements 
of equitably levelling distribution of spin-off benefits from regional integration and that integration 
benefits will gravitate, for example, from less developed Lesotho to highly industrialised South 
Africa.89  
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Consequently, African public services were compromised in order to maintain external debt-
servicing and more funds were borrowed from the IMF and WB just to meagrely afford to feed its 
populations. As evidenced by SKB Asante: 
Unless governments can be convinced that economic cooperation and eventually integration 
will strengthen their capacity to cope with urgent domestic problems better than they could 
on their own, they will continue to be preoccupied with managing policy issues with a national 
orientation and lose sight of the significant benefits that regional cooperation can bring.90 
This was demanded and enforced by the WB and the IMF and its global military industrial complex 
represented by NATO. The Credit Rating Agencies as gatekeepers of monopoly global capital, thus 
Standard and Poor, Moody’s, and Fitch enforced the Washington Consensus IMF/WB neoliberal 
regimen of a market-free economy with minimal government intervention, thereby rendering African 
development states and their LPA defunct.91 This chapter argues that the economic vulnerability 
and marginalisation of Africa had become evident. The North had managed to debunk the LPA in 
totality and Africa had become once again a basket case begging for ODA and food aid with most 
of the African countries’ balance of payments supported externally by the IMF and WB. This chapter 
further argues that any timeline and time frame to support Africa’s transport and communications 
strategy was rendered threadbare or non-existent. Most African governments were in no position to 
challenge the global north, diplomatically, militarily or otherwise and followed the aforementioned 
SAPs scripts of the North. 
5.4 World Bank Berg Report and Structural Adjustment Programmes in Undermining the 
Lagos Plan of Action 
Designed as the mainstay of the post-war global economic order the IMF/WB were formed in 1944 
in the US (Bird 1994:483-505). The WB’s focus is the provision of long-term loans to support 
development projects within an economically liberalised environment that has eliminated tariff and 
non-tariff barriers.  
As shown in Table:3 below about the debt distress of Africa, the IMF concentrates on providing 
loans to stabilise countries with short-term financial crises unable to service their external debt 
obligations (Kingston 2011:116).  
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Kingston (2011:116) argues that the late 1970s multiple crisis of rising oil prices, rising interest rates 
and falling prices of primary commodities left poor African countries unable to repay mounting 
foreign debts. In the early 1980s, Africa’s debt crisis worsened, the ration of its foreign debt to its 
export income grew to 500 per cent (SAPRIN 2002:21). Against this background the Berg Report 
(1981) and Western IFIs enforced conditions on African governments in order to qualify for loans.  
Clearly, the two policy frameworks (SAPs and LPA) were diametrically opposed. The former SAPs 
conditionalities tended to reinforce neoliberal policy norms by forcefully integrating African extractive 
primary commodity exports to the global north against the LPA’s self-reliant production and 
integration programmes.92  
 
                                                          




The regional integrated production and collective intra-African cooperation of the LPA was an 
approach of effectively integrating individual African countries as appendages of a foreign trade and 
monetary exchange regimen.93 In the spirit of GATT, the BWIs demanded the elimination of tariff 
barriers and elimination of capital account controls to facilitate ease of financial globalisation.  
Global capital converged with open trading regimes to allow free market enterprise and diverged 
with closed protectionist economies underpinned by ISI.94 The policy divergence between the SAP 
and LPA was expressed and reflected herein  by the architects of the latter: 
The goals, objectives and characteristics of the strategy contained in the World Bank’s Berg 
Report are in many ways inconsistent with those of the LPA. The implication of the 
recommended approach is to make Africa more dependent on external markets for its 
agricultural and mineral products and for its essential factor inputs. This is contrary to the 
principles of self-reliant and self-sustaining development of the LPA.95 
This was the delinking role of the state in business and economics, refraining from capital account 
controls, thus allowing unhindered movement of global capital with no import tariffs to raise taxes. 
Allowing repatriation of foreign profits by TNCs, these were preconditions for structural adjustment 
loans (Obare 2011L: 57-64). This chapter argues that the authors of the LPA displayed naivety by 
not factoring in the failure of the NIEO campaign, of which they were a part. This was done by 
assuming that the policies of the LPA, although shown to be welfare enhancing, would not be 
reciprocated forcefully and even violently by the global north against an attack on its global 
hegemony. Drawing on the argument raised in the previous chapter (4), this chapter further argues 
that Africa did not have the military might to bargain for the institutionalisation of the LPA.  
5.4.1. Questionable Allegiance of the IMF and the World Bank 
Both the IMF and WB represent membership of 186 countries. Criticism against them given in the 
aforementioned statements that failed SAPs in Africa, bears witness to their undemocratic 
governance and hegemonic power nestled in global north member states. For example, the UK’s 
voting weight exceeds that of 43 African countries together: 
This structure is compounded by the structure and functioning of the IMF and World Bank 
board’s where rich countries hold 62 per cent of the votes, despite only possessing 21 per 
cent of the world’s population and providing 23 per cent of the Bank and Fund’s income. 
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Developing countries, who provide 77 percent of the institutions income and hold 79 per cent 
of the world’s population, have just 39 per cent of the votes on the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) boards.96 
The global north member states are economically more powerful and this translates to majority of 
votes thereby selecting leaders of their choice for the day-to-day management of the IFIs. Drawing 
on the functional policy theory highlighted in chapter two, the agenda setting, dominance of 
discourse and interest is in line with their objectives and aims.97 This resonates with the Structural 
Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) report, from the perspective of the 
aforementioned critics within the development countries, especially Africa and Latin America: 
To them structural adjustment programmes (SAP) and other expressions of the neoliberal 
agenda are seen as reforms that, despite the free market rhetoric, ‘regulate’ capital 
accumulation at a world level to the benefit of the interests of dominant economic and political 
elites.98 
The author John Perkins in his book, Confessions of an Economic Hit Man: How the US uses 
Globalisation to Cheat Poor Countries Out of Trillions, asserts that IFIs dominated by the US and 
the UK and France impose loan conditionalities such as the SAPs as a means for control ownership 
over indebted countries’ natural resources, labour and land, globally.99In order for the debtor 
countries to qualify for development loans, the senior members of the country’s Central Bank must 
be independent from its government’s influence and intrusion in matters pertaining to austere fiscal 
and monetary discipline. In this regard, public subsidies that support education, health, food security 
are cut in order to service external debt obligations. Interest rates are increased to limit money 
supply to the general populace, but simultaneously to earn handsome profits for global speculative 
capital that does not contribute to a country’s productive industrialisation.100 
The former vice-president of the WB and Nobel-prize winner in economics stated this about the IMF 
and WB: 
They were interested in one thing. They looked at the country and thought,’ they need to 
repay the loans they owe to Western banks. How do we get that to happen?’ So, they would 
never ask, ‘should we give this developing country a bankruptcy procedure so they can have 
a fresh start?’ They thought that bankruptcy was a violation of the sanctity of contracts, even 
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though every democracy has a bankruptcy law for people who have persistently failed. They 
were interested in milking money out of the country quickly, not rebuilding it for the long 
term.101 
This chapter asserts that is why they demand an independent central bank and the elimination of 
capital account controls for ease of their global speculative financial flows. In conclusion, the multiple 
crises of the 1970s forced many developing countries into debt distress and they had to turn to the 
IMF and WB for development finance. This was at the dictate of the IMF and WB that their export 
earnings and cut of public subsidies had to service the external global debt owed. This marked the 
de-industrialisation of most African countries and the rise in poverty levels. Hitherto Africa has 
remained largely an extractive economy whose commodities peak and dip unpredictably due to 
vagaries of the global economy. 
5.5 The Abuja Treaty: An Amendment to the LPA 
The triumph of neoliberalism, legitimacy and hegemony over communism was underscored by the 
demise of the USSR in 1989. With the implosion of one-party state governments in Africa, which 
had been supported by the now defunct USSR, the 1990s ushered in a new period of democratic 
ethos. The Washington Consensus the BWI’s victorious ideological package, demanded democratic 
conditionalities from the African governments in order to qualify for loans and balance of payments 
support of their governments. These were proffered as democratic principles such as: multiparty 
general elections leading to a multiparty constituted government; separation of powers of the 
executive government, the legislature, and independent judiciary and the fourth estate a free media. 
These principles constituted horizontal public participation and scrutiny of all processes of 
government; a practice   that was anathema in the LPA’s one-party state governments.  
Further, the BWIs demanded minimal intervention of government in the free marketplace, but only 
to uphold the rule of law and protecting private property rights. It is against this backdrop of a 
changed and neoliberal dominated space that the LPA had to be reconstituted to align with the 
dominant neoliberal hegemon of the global north. In order for African governments to qualify for the 
BWI’s much needed loans, the Abuja Treaty adopted the neoliberal precepts of private free market 
enterprise and economic openness − a fundamental departure to its precursor LPA programme that 
sought to partially disengage from the West’s exploitative dominant global economy in pursuit of 
inward-looking regionalism.102 
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Percy Mistry observed how the SAPs of the BWIs were haphazardly embraced by the African states 
and the neoliberal markets diminished the autonomy of the state.103 Like the LPA, still the Abuja 
Treaty maintained its aims and objectives towards an integrated AEC. However, this had to be 
pursued within a supra-national authority with harmonised and rationalised RECs as its pillars and 
building blocks.104 
5.6 Provisions of the Abuja Treaty 
The AEC’s revised treaties of the LPA inspired the various RECs in amending and adopting the 
Abuja Treaty to align with new compliance procedural and systematic demands towards continental 
economic integration. Article V of the Abuja Treaty epitomises the pledge towards supra-national 
authority in order to effect integration among the member states: 
1. “Member States undertake to create favourable conditions for the development of the 
Community and the attainment of its objectives, particularly by harmonising their strategies 
and policies. They shall refrain from any unilateral action that may hinder the attainment of 
the said objectives. 
2. Each Member State shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, take all necessary 
measures to ensure the enactment and dissemination of such legislation as may be 
necessary for the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty. 
3. Any Member State, which persistently fails to honour its general undertakings under this 
Treaty or fails to abide by the decisions or regulations of the Community, may be subjected 
to sanctions by the Assembly upon the recommendation of the Council. Such sanctions may 
include the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership and may be lifted by the 
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Council.”105  
In comparing and contrasting the LPA and the Abuja Treaty, the latter treaty in Article V has provided 
for a non-compliance sanction, which encourages centripetal traction towards the AEC, which the 
former lacked and resulted in centrifugal divergences from the aims and objectives of the AEC.106 
The revised treaties of Africa’s major RECs have adopted enforceable binding provisions to sanction 
non-compliance on member states, and included first, the reviewing and the revitalisation of the 
ECOWAS Treaty in 1993. Second, the Preferential Trade Agreement was transformed into the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1994. Third, the Southern African 
Development and Consultative Council (SADCC) transformed in 1992 into SADC. 
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 Fourth, the re-launching of the activities of the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS) in 1998. Fifth, the EAC was revived in 1999. 
In this regard, Article VIII confers supra-national authority on the RECs: 
1. “The Assembly shall be the supreme organ of the community. 
2. The Assembly shall be responsible for implementing the objectives of the community. 
3. To this end, it shall: 
a) Determine the general policy and major guidelines of the Community, and give directives, 
coordinate and harmonise the economic, scientific, technical, cultural and social policies 
of the Member States; 
b) Take any action, under this Treaty, to attain the objectives of the Community; 
c) Oversee the functioning of Community organs as well as the follow-up of the 
implementation of its objectives; 
d) Prepare and adopt its rules of procedure; 
e) Approve the organisational structure of the Secretariat; 
f) Elect the Secretary-General, his Deputies and, on the recommendation of the Council, 
appoint the Financial Controller, the Accountant and the External Auditors; 
g)  Adopt the staff rules and Regulations of the Secretariat; 
h) On the recommendation of the Council, take decisions and give directives concerning the 
regional economic communities in order to ensure the realisation of the objectives of the 
Community; 
i) On the recommendation of the Council, approve the Community’s programme of activity 
and budget and determine the annual contribution of each Member State; 
j) Delegate to the Council the authority to take decisions in pursuance of Article 10 of this 
Treaty; 
k) Refer any matter to the Court of Justice when it confirms, by an absolute majority vote, 
that a Member State or organ of the Community has not honoured any of its obligations 
or has acted beyond the limits of its authority or has abused the powers conferred on it 
by the provisions of this Treaty, by a decision of the Assembly or a regulation of the 
Council; 
l) Request the Court of Justice, as and when necessary, to give advisory opinion on any 
legal question; and 
m) In carrying out its function hereunder, exercise any other powers granted to it under this 
Treaty; 
4. The Council in the performance of its duties shall assist the Assembly”. 
80 
 
Unlike the LPA, that lacked the force of legal institutional sanction, the aforementioned provisions 
of the Abuja Treaty have all adopted the binding provisions to enable the realisation of the AEC.  
The Abuja Treaty, unlike the LPA, predicated on market integration has focused on all processes of 
the production value chain, sectorally and intra-regionally to unlock maximum value of the 
economies of scale.107 This homogeneity of planning and implementation paces and sequences 
complementarities of factor endowments with optimal returns on investments. The Abuja Treaty was 
signed in 1991 to revitalise the shortcomings of the LPA. Just as the latter programme, the AEC 
became operational four years later in 1994 as the member states were reluctant to cede aspects 
of their sovereignty to establish a supra-national authority. Similar to the LPA, the Abuja Treaty 
remained a declaration of intent with no implementation of its aims and objectives and another failure 
in the annals of Africa’s economic development history.108 Africa’s vulnerability and marginalisation 
had incrementally worsened from the 1970s hitherto. This chapter argues that a rhetorical shift to 
strengthen the Abuja Treaty without domestically mobilised resources and skills and a formidable 
military arsenal to leverage Africa’s diplomacy would be a utopian pursuit. 
5.7 Lack of Supra-Institutional Authority Hamstrung LPA 
This dissertation argues that from the onset, the LPA programme lacked an overarching continental 
supra-institutional authority to incrementally sequence, coordinate and enforce its legally binding 
provisions towards the fulfilment of its objectives. Within the naivety and assumption of political 
voluntarism that predicated the LPA design, the authors of the LPA and the Heads of State and 
Government did not attempt to institutionalise all manner of soft and hard power diplomacy in 
anticipation of internal or external resistance to the programme. Yarbrough (1981:201) explains 
within the constructivist framework that any ex-ante programme that must be attained needs 
institutional support predicated on rules and regulations and compliance procedures within short-, 
medium- and long-term time frames. From the onset, with no institutional incentives and 
enforcement binding mechanism to lock-in African governments that were prone to reneging on LPA 
commitments and processes was a miscalculated oversight. 
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The failure to sanction non-compliance encouraged free-riding and non-compliance, hence the LPA 
became a rhetorical mouthpiece with no monitoring and evaluative mechanism to measure 
progress. With the increased vulnerability and marginalisation suffered by Africa from the multiple 
crises of the 1970s to its escalation in the 1980s, the 1991 Abuja Treaty sought to institutionally 
remedy the non-compliance handicap. The RECs were endowed with supra-national authority to 
enforce and sanction non-compliance of the LPA. However, the following section will use a 
constructivist cum causal framework that will inform a comparative analysis of the continuing failure 
of Africa’s economic development plans from the LPA extending to the 1991 Abuja Treaty. The 
immediate post-independent Africa from the 1960s established various sub-REGs.The lack of 
coordinated continental planning resulted in multi-memberships and heterogeneity in aims and 
objectives. This militated against convergence of policy formulation and implementation as there 
was no enforceable legal framework to sanction non-compliance.109 The lack of a legal binding force 
on the LPA’s REC building blocks with recourse to sanction and penalty was its Achilles heel and 
institutional oversight. This was against the background of the UN’s and OAU’s provision of “non-
interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state”. Between the LPA programmes and national 
legislations, there was no standardised and integrated legislation to facilitate an enabling 
environment for the realisation of LPA aims and objectives.110 
The top-down intergovernmental vertical structure of the LPA lacked horizontal public participation 
and this lack of transparency and accountability resulted in its stagnation. The late- or non-payment 
of budgetary contributions by member states reflected on the fragmented vision of the LPA. The 
lack of recourse and punitive sanctions to enforce non-compliance resulted in LPA programmes 
being rhetorical exercises. For example, by March 1992, ECOWAS member states were in arrears 
of budgetary contributions amounting to approximately US$30million.111 This dissertation argues 
that  the LPA was rendered a talk-shop, not only because of Africa’s leadership disinterest, but also 
because of being trapped in the palpable Cold War rivalry of the superpowers who conducted proxy 
zero-sum games that entrenched divisions, polarity and mistrust among African leaders. With the 
demise of the USSR in 1989, and its embrace of “glasnost” and “perestroika” in sync with the West’s 
open and private market enterprise, the neoliberal doctrine that promoted a free market economy, 
as echoed by both the Prime Minister Margret Thatcher of the UK and President Ronald Reagan of 
the US, earned unchallenged legitimacy and hegemony. 
 
                                                          
109 Andras Inotia, Regional integration among developing countries revisited (Washington DC: The World Bank, Country 
Economics Department, April 1991):9 
110 Asante, Regionalism and Africa, pp.74-75. 
111 S.K.B. Asante, “Regional economic cooperation and integration: The experience of ECOWAS,” in Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o (ed.) 
Regional integration IN Africa: Unfinished agenda (Nairobi: Academy of Science Publishers, 1990). 
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 5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter highlights the structuralist dependency theory whereby African countries were 
appendages of asymmetrical global political power relations. This power imbalance favours and 
benefits the global north through its TNCs, IFIs and NATO global military industrial complex. In 
response was the Monrovia Strategy discussion policy document by the OAU within the UN. This 
Draft Plan of Action for the implementation of the strategy for African self-reliance and development 
for the 1980s was countered and undermined by the IFIs, specifically the 1981 Berg Report of the 
WB.  
Hard-power and zero-sum policy strategies were forced on African governments under the banner 
of the neoliberal Washington Consensus doctrine during the decade of the 1980s. In order to qualify 
for much needed IFI loans, African governments had to privatise their public entities, and drastically 
reduce their budget deficits and subsidies of health, education, housing, transport in order to service 
their external debt with the West.  
The Washington Consensus economic and commercial hard-power diplomacy under SAPs 
marginalised the LPA from a debt crisis of the 1970s to a debt trap of the 1980s and beyond. The 
West’s SAPs rendered the LPA a protectionist and intra-preferential regional trading system, that 
promoted export-led growth and specialisation among African countries rather than those of the 
global north, ineffective and unattainable.  
Therefore, the self-reliant economic development policies of the LPA displayed ex-ante welfare 
benefits in the long term, but contrasted by short-term induced political costs by trade creation. 
Sovereign revenue loss, standardisation, rationalisation and harmonisation of intra-regional 
industries and the overtake of a supra-national authority threatened immediate political futures. 
Additionally, the superpower Cold War rivalry between the USSR and the USA divided Africa into 
theatres of proxy internecine mistrust and confrontation. This militated against the implementation 
of a homogenous LPA. These factors agglomerated as disincentives for the support and ultimate 
failure in implementing the LPA model. To date Europe’s EPAs are compromising the RECs of the 
AU to realise a self-reliant Africa. 
This chapter has examined the revitalised Abuja Treaty as an improvement from the failed LPA. The 
former was intended as a corrective institutional measure with vested supra-national authority to 
translate and implement the aims and objectives of the AEC. It was signed in 1991 and became 
ineffectively operational in 1994; a clear indication of the member states’ disinterest to relinquish 
and cede aspects of their sovereignty.  
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Like the LPA, the Abuja Treaty remained a prisoner of its own rhetoric but remains obedient to the 
neoliberal instructions of the BWIs from whom it received sovereign loans and balance of payment 
support. Under the aegis of the AU a new economic development initiative NEPAD underscores a 
new extra-regional partnership especially with the global north in stark contrast with the LPA’s 
inward-looking self-reliant sustainable development. This will be addressed in the remaining 
chapters of this dissertation.  
 
Chapter Six 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
6.1 Introduction 
Following from the discussion conducted in the previous chapter (5), the 1990s conditionalities of 
the Washington Consensus of democracy and human rights and free enterprise affected the Treaty 
Establishing the AEC. The AEC Treaty asserted that “Any Member State, which persistently fails to 
honour its general undertakings under this Treaty or fails to abide by the decisions or regulations of 
the Community, may be subjected to sanctions by the Assembly” (Article 5). Such undertakings that 
recognised promotion of democracy, human and people’s rights and good governance evolved into 
NEPAD in the new millennium.112 This chapter, in responding to the research questions and 
objectives, will unpack the development of Pan-African diplomacy that resulted in the adoption of 
NEPAD as the socio-economic blueprint. Against the aforementioned development initiative to the 
evolution into NEPAD, this chapter examines, yet again, a shift in approach to African development 
from the failure of the 1980s LPA, and the1991 Abuja Treaty.  
This chapter argues that Africa’s socio-economic failures and problems are inclusive of both 
historical endogenous and exogenous factors. Given the state-centric top-down vertical formations 
of the LPA and the Abuja Treaty, NEPAD suffered the same regurgitated malaise that earned it 
criticism of lacking public participation of non-state actors and that it reinforced the neoliberal one- 
size-fits-all solution (Bond 2004:5-43). This chapter further argues that NEPAD, compared to the 
LPA and Abuja Treaty initiatives, is clearly pragmatic with no quixotic rhetorical policies of the 
historical failures of the 1970s. Besides, NEPAD’s architects understand the military balance of 
power that has been exercised by the West is unmatched by Africa. 
                                                          
112 Jeffrey Herbst, “Africa and the international economy,” p.65; Mengisteab, Globalisation and autocentricity; Civil Society-
Indaba, “Resolution on NEPAD,” (South Africa: Johannesburg, May 4 2002). 
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6.2 NEPAD and Africa’s Development in the New Millennium 
Previously called the New Africa Initiative (NAI) and later renamed NEPAD in October 2001 in Abuja, 
Nigeria, NEPAD was a result of a merger between the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP) and 
the Omega Plan, the latter the brainchild of President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal. Gelb (2002:1) 
recounts that MAP originated with former presidents Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), Olusegun 
Obasanjo (Nigeria) and Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Algeria) when addressing G8 summits in Japan in July 
2000.  
According to NEPAD documents, “it is a comprehensive and holistic integrated strategic framework 
for the socio-economic development of Africa” predicated on an assessment of the reality of 
globalisation and its dominant neoliberal edifice and the parallel failures of the LPA’s self-reliant ISI 
programmes. While the LPA argued that Africa’s socio-economic problems were rooted in the global 
north’s desire to maintain it as an extractive export dependent enclave, NEPAD maintained internal 
conflict and bad governance were the cause. Against that backdrop, NEPAD was constructed in 
setting Africa on a path to peace, security, democracy, good political and economic governance and 
the respect of private property and the rule of law (NEPAD 2001; Postumus 2003; Nwonwu 2006).113 
The AfCFTA, the brainchild of the AU-NEPAD, was successfully ratified on 30 May 2019 and this 
hopefully will be a legal framework that integrates Africa’s industrial and trade policies to effect a 
competitive structural manufacturing economy. There have been evident leaps and bounds in the 
WTO multilateral trading negotiations that stalled with the Doha Round and a rise in anti-
globalisation sentiment that sought to further consign the global south to a structural dependency 
format and endemic poverty (Financial Times 2015).  
The perceived zero-sum architecture and neo-colonial controversies surrounding the EU-EPAs vis- 
a-vis Africa and the UK’s Brexit sounded a warning for Africa to tread more circumspectly and 
tactfully (Draper 2014; Baldwin 2014a; Mevel and Mathieu 2016). Donald Trump’s presidency is 
likely to review the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a legal regimen underpinning the 
Africa and US trade relationship benefiting the former’s non-reciprocal preferential exports into 
America. This is to align with the WTO’s reciprocity stipulations given Africa’s economic ascendancy. 
This dissertation argues that, strictly speaking, the non-reciprocity benefits offered Africa by AGOA, 
WTO and others do not contribute significantly to the structural transformation of Africa to 
competitively industrialise. 
 
                                                          
113 The NEPAD Democratic Framework and neo-liberalism (NEPAD 2001; Mucavele 2006) 
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Since the slowdown and hiatus of the WTO multilateral trade negotiations, a profound upsurge and 
proliferation on mega-regional trade agreements (MRTAs) is in the ascendancy. This is continually 
defining new trade rules and paradigm shifts regionally and globally by e-commerce a subset of 
ICTs and the 4IR. The MRTAs include: The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
between the EU and the USA; the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) comprising the USA and Pacific 
Rim countries; the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) covering the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)  covered by China, India and others (Financial 
Times 2017;  Reuters 2017). 
 Implications for Africa against this regional and global dynamism is higher competition, prohibitive 
standards and erosion of non-reciprocal preferential trade in MRTAs markets resulting in trade 
diversion. Mevel and Mathieu (2016) argue that Africa’s net exports would approximately fall by US$ 
3 billion (about 0.3 per cent) in 2022 in its global market share. The ongoing MRTAs are forging new 
standards implicitly of global multilateralism and this might side-line and further marginalise Africa 
with a new regimen of competition policy and protocols (Lawrence 1996; Melendez-Ortiz 2014 and 
Baldwin 2014b). 
6.3 Key Frameworks of NEPAD 
The key frameworks of NEPAD of “peace and security governance, economic and regional 
governance and political and democratic governance” are inextricably intertwined and reinforce 
each other. The three frameworks enable Africa to take responsibility to influence both endogenous 
and exogenous dynamics to realise its aims and objectives towards development. This resonated 
with Wiseman Nkuhlu’s assertion of Africa taking responsibility for its development when he said 
that: “We accept that as African leaders we have not been accountable to the African people over 
the years and that we also share responsibility for the wars in the continent, for the poverty over the 
years, but that the time has come for things to change.”114  
6.3.1 Peace and Security Governance 
The NEPAD Initial Action Plan by the AU in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002 endorsed “peace 
and security governance” as critical and imperative to create an enabling environment conducive to 
pursuit of socio-economic development in Africa. As part of a three-pronged strategy, peace and 
security, governance will provide for sustainable development by unlocking investment capital both 
local and foreign. In this regard, the AU Summit adopted a protocol establishing a Peace and 
Security Council (PSC).  
                                                          
114 Wiseman Nkuhlu, “Keynote Lecture,” in Southern African Regional Poverty Network (SARPN) and Human Science Research 
Council, “Can Africa halve its poverty by 2015? The challenge to the NEPAD” (Pretoria, April 4 2002): 6-7 
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The Council is the collective security mechanism for the continent and responds timeously to conflict 
and crises.115 The PSC in conjunction with the chairperson of the AUC can institute sanctions 
whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes place in a member state. For example, 
in the following countries, the PSC has exercised its sanction against UCG: Guinea Bissau after two 
coups in 2009 and 2012; Guinea after a coup in December 2008; Niger after a coup in March 2010; 
and Burkina Faso after a coup in 2015. Constitutional governments and democracy were reinstated 
successfully within the ECOWAS region. 
 Cilliers (2004:25) also argues that peace and security governance is now broadly defined and 
involves non-state actors such as civil society groups. Security, he explains further, is no longer 
about territorial integrity and national sovereignty, but public participation in all facets of 
developments underpinned by transparency and accountability within the security sector reform 
(SSR).  
The AU and all its organs, including the PSC, suffer from the same malaise of none or late member- 
state contributions, as was the case with the LPA. Over 90 per cent of the AU budget is foreign 
donor-funded and this affects its independence and the PSC’s operational effectiveness in conflict 
prevention, management and peacebuilding (Nwonwu 2006:10). This chapter argues that the 
continuing conflicts in the Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) result from Africa being under-resourced to effectively engender a sustainable culture of 
peace and security governance. Nwonwu (2006:10) argues therefore that against this background, 
NEPAD looks to foreign partners like the EU and NATO for funding. This chapter further argues that 
as much as a semblance of peace and democracy has somewhat taken root in Africa its lack of 
independent funding compromises its policy formulation and implementation to the dictates of the 
global north governments.116  
As a result, NEPAD has been interpreted differently by varied categories of people: Its critics see it 
as outward and externally-oriented, lacking in policy independence. Its supporters liken it to its 
antecedent predecessor − the LPA edifice. This chapter, however, takes the position that it is an 
eclectic agglomeration of both internal and external, but tilted more to the latter as it has empirically 
demonstrated its lack of independence and inertia towards all conflicts in Africa. The March 2011 
Libyan crisis serves as an illustration where the AU was ignored and side-lined by the global north 
NATO in its own backyard.117 
                                                          
115 See African Union (2002) for PSC. 
116 The European Union and the US have assisted ECOWAS in its peace-keeping operations in the region. Western partners have 
given assistance to South Africa in its peace initiatives in Burundi and the DRC (Akokpari 2005:4-5) 
117 See variously, Adedeji, “NEPAD: a view from the African trenches,” Patrick Bond (ed.), “The New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development: An annotated critique: (South Africa: Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC), 2002; BOND, 
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The AU’s NEPAD’s reliance on Western donor support has forced it to gravitate to the West’s 
neoliberal sphere characterised by a democratic deregulated free enterprise market space, with the 
separation of powers and the rule of law to protect individual rights and private poverty. Drawing on 
the 2011 Libyan crisis, this chapter reiterates its argument that the AU has been ineffective in 
fulfilling its peace and security governance mandate.  
The AU did not carry over lessons learnt from the 2011 Libyan crisis, because in January 2013 two 
years after the Libya debacle, a French military intervention saved the legitimate government of 
Mali. This further exposed the inability of the AU to handle crisis in its own territory. 
6.3.2 Economic and Regional Governance 
Similar to the LPA, the primary objectives of NEPAD are to eliminate endemic underdevelopment 
and poverty. It seeks to bring about competitive human resources training and development that will 
stimulate complementarities in factor endowments and a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 7 per 
cent that will be coordinated with the continent’s population growth. A sustainable peace and 
security governance will help to unlock and hopefully attract both local and foreign direct productive 
investments, imperative to modernising structural economic design to be globally competitive 
(NEPAD 2002: paragraph 153). The hitherto ongoing unfavourable terms of trade that have 
consigned Africa since colonialism and neo-colonialism as an extractive primary resource 
appendage of the global north encourages financial speculation and resource outflow (Ibid.: 
paragraph 34). Given the primacy and hegemony of Western institutions such as the WTO, UNSC, 
NATO and BWIs, this dissertation argues that Africa will be able to muster investment capital both 
local and foreign to replicate and rival both the global north and China.  
Some anti-globalisation scholars have criticised NEPAD’s gravitation towards embracing 
neoliberalism and globalisation. These sceptics argue that Africa’s benefits from neoliberalism and 
globalisation reinforce the rent-seeking and neo-patrimonial structures within the African post-
colonial state, thereby depleting the natural resources and polluting the environment without any 
structural benefit for the greater population (Bond 2003; Onimode et al 2004; Taylor 2006).118 
NEPAD has also recognised the invidious debt-trap position of over US$220 billion that militates 
against Africa’s socio-economic development.  
                                                          
“Africa and the G8: Whose development? What partnership? In http://aidc.org.uk/networker/february 17/g8.html; Keet, “The 
NEPAD and the African Union,” pp.22-23. 
118 The oil-rich Niger Delta in Nigeria benefits the comprador ruling class on behalf of Multinational Corporations that possess 
their non-transferrable patent technologies and services protected under the  1995 WTO regimen. The oil extraction has 
resulted in environmental degradation and livelihood, human rights abuses and inequitable resource allocation(Dare 2001:14) 
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Africa’s debt-servicing amounting to approximately US$14 billion annually from its foreign export 
earnings is a structural impediment that keeps it underdeveloped. The debt instrument constitutes 
BWI’s conditionality for any PRSP loans advancement and balance of payment support. This 
translates into miniscule debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) in the short term, but 
does not contribute to long-term sustainable structural and productive development (Zulu 2004:5).119  
This chapter asserts that the debt system is a pivotal component of the neoliberal dominated foreign 
exchange control mechanism and that NEPAD under the aegis of the AU does not challenge the 
illegitimate nature of this debt. The debt was incurred by slave trade, colonialism, neo-colonialism, 
despotic and unrepresentative post-colonial governments. Against this background, NEPAD has 
positioned Africa to participate meaningfully in the global economy by competing and timeously 
taking advantage of opportunities presented by globalisation, thus, it states: 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development is a pledge by African leaders, based on a 
common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate 
poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable 
growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy 
and body politic. The programme is anchored in the determination of Africans to extricate 
themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a 
globalising world. The poverty and backwardness of Africa stand in stark contrast to the 
prosperity of the developed world.120 
Similar to the LPA, NEPAD recognises the imperative of intra-regional economic development, given 
the small and fragmented unattractive nature of Africa’s economies towards long-term sustainable 
development. Tables 4 and 5 show the eight RECs as of 2016 that are now the AU pillars and 
building blocks towards the AEC. NEPAD envisages that these RECs will substitute the small and 
fragmented nature of Africa’s economy and that they are necessary for achieving economic growth 
and sustainable development through improved global competitiveness (NEPAD 2001). These 
RECs must continue to be strengthened to structurally redesign Africa’s economy (Ibid. paragraph 
94 and 191). NEPAD is not ideologically dogmatic and inflexible, but attempts to chart new pragmatic 
ways for Africa to do business in the global economy beneficially. 
 
                                                          
119 Africa Action, 2006. Campaign to cancel Africa’s debt, see http://www.africaaction.org/campaign_new/debt.php on 20 
February 2019. 
120 See AU, “NEPAD 2001.” Introduction, paragraphs 1 and 2. 
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In this regard, NEPAD unlike the LPA, assesses both the endogenous and exogenous factors of the 
global economy that militate against its full and effective participation.  
 
Table 4 : Intra-African Regional Integration 











Source: Africa Regional Integration Report (2016) average REC scores on Regional Integration 
stand at 0.470 on a scale of zero (low) to one (high). Average Regional Integration scores for the 
eight RECs stand at below half of the scale from 0-1, showing that overall integration in the regions 
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Table 5: Degree of Donor Dependency by REC and the AU (%) 
 
The AU and NEPAD continue to formulate and implement self-financing strategies and outcomes in 
order to be self-reliant and globally competitive. The AU Assembly adopted the AU’s 0.2 per cent 
levy on all eligible imported goods into the continent to finance its projects in July 2016 in Kigali, 
Rwanda. This would vest full membership in member states, bring about budgetary sustainability 
and predictability (AU 2016a). The AU’s total budget in 2016 amounted to US$417million and only 
44 per cent was provided by the member states, with 56 per cent from international donors such as 
the EU, China, USA and the WB (AU 2015). The 0.2 per cent import levy is intended to full-fund the 
AU’s projects. However, on 7 December 2016 at the General Council of the WTO, the issue of the 
AU’s 0.2 per cent levy on imported goods was raised by the USA and Japan. It was highlighted that 
the levy’s implementation would be contrary and inconsistent to the WTO agreement and the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) principle (WTO 2017). First, as argued by the USA and Japan the levy 
imposed on imported goods to Africa would discriminate WTO members outside Africa, while African 
WTO members would not be affected by the levy.  
This would be incompatible with Article I of the GATT on MFN treatment. All WTO members are to 
be treated equally (WTO 2017). In response, the AU has policy options within the WTO legal 
regimen to counter the USA’s inconsistency charge and the implied discriminatory 0.2 per cent levy 
on imports to Africa. In accordance with Article(XII)  of the Marrakesh Agreement, Africa may apply 
for a waiver in order to implement the 0.2 per cent on imports to Africa. Its motivation as the world’s 
least developed region and the use of the levy revenue for peace, security and development 
initiatives would make a waiver highly probable.  
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Counter measures in curbing illicit financial flows out of Africa are continually and robustly 
administered by NEPAD. The ECA estimates that Africa loses as much as US$50billion annually, 
twice what it receives in donor foreign funds (ECA 2015; AU 2015). Among other remedial 
measures, prudent capital account controls are imperative to mitigate spaces conducive to 
speculative capital and unfavourable exchange rate policies. Global best practices in TNCs and their 
full disclosure, tax information and resident countries of operations would globally standardise best 
practices in financial systems, thus addressing corrupt transfer pricing, trade under-invoicing and 
tax avoidance and evasion. Ongoing training and upskilling in regional projects would engender 
savings, and bring about cost-effectiveness and higher margins of productivity and efficiencies. As 
regional programmes may affect countries differently, this therefore mismatches prioritisations to 
multi-country trade-related barriers. Coordinated interventions and policy deliverables with 
compensation for revenue loss are imperative. This is contributed to countries at different 
developmental levels, as the process of variable geometry can sequentially align them to the 
AfCFTA’s continental policies. As a result, Aid-for-Trade is more effective where standards are 
equivalent intra-regionally to boost AfCFTA (IEG 2011; World Bank 2011; UNCTAD 2013; Dube 
2016).  
6.3.3 Political and Democratic Governance 
A distinguishing key feature of NEPAD has been taking responsibility and ownership of Africa’s 
development and finding African solutions to African problems (Landsberg 2008; Dersso 2012a:8 
and Kasaija 2012:127). Ronald Kempe Hope has argued  ”ownership of policy reforms matters 
because it directly affects programme acceptance and implementation.”121 
This is reflective of the APRM (APRM-Tables 6 and 7) designed to monitor and assess the progress 
made by African countries in meeting their commitments and achieving good governance and 






                                                          
121 Ronald Kempe Hope, “From crisis to renewal: Towards a successful implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s 













Table 7: APRM Standards and Codes for Economic Governance and Management 
 
Source: Nepad Secretariat: APRM Officer, Mufor Atanga. January 2005 
This is against the backdrop of the past provision of the OAU “in the non-interference of internal 
affairs of a sovereign state”. The APRM is an innovative governance instrument targeted at domestic 
issues and “presents opportunities for strengthening democracy to ensure that the basis of 
governance transcends the narrow confines of personal rule, patron-client relations or ethno-
religious politics” (Akokpari 2004:253; Hope 2005:289; Mathoho 2003:1). Submission to the APRM 
review process is “voluntary” and to date it has a membership of 39 member states.  
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The peer review is done by a seven-member Independent Panel of Eminent Persons (IPEP), which 
conducts countries through the various stages of the review process that entails commitment to 
good governance, political stability, economic growth and sustainable development (NEPAD 
2003).122 Just like the LPA, the APRM is devoid of a non-compliance sanction provision and this 
institutional weakness is worsened in that its membership is voluntary and this opens space for free-
riding without constitutional obligation. This major limiting factor has been the bane of all Africa’s 
institutional reforms even under the aegis of the new millennium AU (Akokpari 2005:6). Another 
contending school of thought supports the voluntary membership by African countries given the 
duplicity and double standards applied by donor governments. Bekoe and Landsberg (2002:2) 
express the fears that with Western governments, given the Zimbabwe Democracy Economic Act 
as punitive sanctions against Zimbabwe, the APRM might be used selectively to punish non-
compliance of particular declared pariah countries. A parallel horizontal non-state actor activism by 
civil society organisations continues to grow and influence all manner of political and democratic 
governance, helping in policy formulation and its implementation in contrast to state-centric LPA 
initiatives (Verwey 2005:20). 
6.3.4 A Comparative Analysis of NEPAD’s Three Key Frameworks in Relation to the 1980 LPA 
Having reviewed NEPAD’s three key frameworks, this section conducts a comparative analysis of 
NEPAD vis-a-vis the 1980 LPA. It does so first by assessing how NEPADs’ aforementioned 
governance reforms help in achieving African countries’ long-term development goals in contrast to 
the LPA’s failure. Second, this section compares voluntary-based APRM with LPA’s “non-
interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign member state” in order to assess the extent to 
which African governments can enforce compliance to regionally agreed governance norms and 
standards in the absence of a non-compliance sanction.  
The literature highlights the continued failure and limits of internal institutions to sanction compliance 
and cite the examples in the ECOWAS region where the French military is often used to restore and 
maintain peace, in the Sudan and Somalia, the AU peacekeeping forces have to rely on the logistical 
and budgetary support of global north countries.123 The constructivist and causal framework will 
examine the evidence of the prevalence of democracy and whether it has resulted in improved 
peacebuilding and socio-economic development on the continent as compared to the LPA. 
                                                          
122 The IPEP consists of between five and seven members with at least one from the AU’s major sub-region. All members of the 
IPEP are appointed by the Heads of State and Government in Committee. The African Development Bank and the UNECA 
prepare reports of the findings of the peer review and discuss a country’s draft report before submitting to the IPEP. After 
examination and analysis by the IPEP it is submitted to HSGIC. The HSGIC takes ownership of the peer review reports submitted 
by the IPEP (UNECA 2002:9-10; Mathoho 2003:3) 
123 Collier, “Africa’s external relations” pp. 339-356; Collier and Gunning, “Restraint, cooperation and conditionality.”; Diamond, 
“Promoting real reform,” pp. 278-285. 
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With the launching of the AfCFTA on 21 March 2018, in Kigali, Rwanda, and its ratification on 30 
May 2019 in Nigeria, the pursuit of the AEC as envisioned by the 1991 Abuja Treaty is incrementally 
gaining traction. Attendant issues are being discussed, such as, annexes on: trade in goods 
protocol; trade in services protocol; dispute settlement mechanism protocol; tariff liberalisation 
modalities on sensitive goods; and an exclusion list for protection of infant and strategic industries. 
Thereafter phase two negotiations will commence on investments, competition and intellectual 
property rights. An action tool measuring Africa’s progress towards Agenda 2063 is underscored by 
the APRM (APRM Tables 15 and 16) and Africa’s Regional Integration Index among others 
(Mokeona 2003). For the first time and comparatively different from the OAU’s LPA/ABUJA the 
programmes under AU-NEPAD are predicated on both quantitative and qualitative databases for 
informed planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The APRM as an AU monitoring 
instrument was created under the AU PSC, adopted by the Heads of State and Government Interim 
Committee (HSGIC) at the Durban Summit in July 2002. The APRM focuses on monitoring and 
evaluating: political and governance issues; economic governance and management; corporate 
governance; and socio-economic development. The first APRM Review Mission was in Ghana on 
27 May 2004 and this encouraged other African countries to join on a voluntary basis accounting for 
more than 50 per cent of the AU’s member states (Stals 2004; Sunde 2004; Rensburg 2004). The 
APRM had been functional for 15 years on 9 March 2018 and continues on its monitoring and 
evaluation continental mandate. Parallel to the APRM is Africa’s Regional Integration Index, that 
came into force in 2016. It equally underscores intra-African integration measurement, driven by its 
RECs towards an AEC. This monitoring and evaluation of intra-African trade is imperative to locate 
gaps and weaknesses and therefore intervene remedially to deepen intra-African integration in all 
its facets. 
 The ECA (2006) observes that South Africa acts as a strong engine for intra-continental trade and 
has the largest share of intra-African imports of 11.8 per cent. Intra-African trade is dominated by 
Egypt, Kenya, Ivory Coast and South Africa that account for 62.3 per cent of total intra-African 
exports. South Africa alone accounts for half of that followed by Nigeria (IMF 2011). Further, in 
pursuit of the AfCFTA, continuous policy formulation that supports monitoring and evaluation 
instruments such as the Africa Regional Integration Index and the APRM is imperative. The CGE 
will complement other monitoring and evaluative devices enabling an integrated predictive 
evaluation of all Africa’s economic sectors within the global economy. This ex-post and ex-ante 
quantitative and statistical tool under NEPAD underscores its continental planning, monitoring and 




The CGE approach as a component of both industrial and trade policy formulation instrument factors 
a comprehensive economy-wide resources constraints and spill-over effects across markets for all 
goods and services. The CGE ex-post and ex-ante approach will assist the African economic 
integration project by taking account of the comprehensive flow of income in the continental 
economy from: 
• Income generation through productive activities. 
• Primary distribution of that income to workers, owners of productive capital, and recipients of 
the proceeds from factor endowments. 
• The redistribution of that wealth through complementary and expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policies in order to stimulate and develop Africa’s economy to be globally competitive. 
The policy formulation tools will enable a consistent integrated predictive evaluation of Africa’s multi-
country, multi-sectoral production and employment impact (Willenbockel 2004: 1065; Willenbockel 
2013). Aggregate income and welfare gains and how eliminating trade-barriers will improve Africa’s 
global terms of trade. The rationalisation and harmonisation of multi-country economic systems will 
encourage competitive RVCs. As Africa’s integration project is underpinned by the ‘new and open 
regionalism’ that trades multilaterally, the analytical framework used in this thesis is an integrative 
meta-theory framework of constructivism, causal, GLOBE-CGE Model and others. This is a global 
multi-region and multi-sector CGE trade model that studies and analyses data that affects Africa’s 
integration project. The CGE model is intermittently upgraded and calibrated to be coordinated with 
the ever-transforming global politico and economic variables. For example, the GTAP 8.0 database 
(Global Trade Analysis Project-CGE Model) released in March 2012 was calibrated to the new 
GTAP 8.1 database released end of May 2013 (Narayan 2012). 
Annually, every new data set provides a detailed representation of the economy-wide structure of 
production, international trade at a regional and sectoral disaggregated level that affects Africa’s 
integration project. The GTAP 8 combines detailed bilateral trade reflecting economic linkages 
among world regions with individual country input-output data. This accounts for intersectoral 
linkages within regions for a given benchmark year; for example, 2007. This data will be inclusive of 
the 2007-2008 financial global meltdown, the UK’s 2016 Brexit from the EU and its impact on 
multilateral EPAs (Pearson 2017:142-79). In this regard, the GTAP-CGE model is used to generate 
an updated dynamic forward projection for 2014-2063 inclusive of the AU Agenda 2063. The 
resulting CGE-GTAP 2014 model serves as the baseline for comparison with the Tripartite Free 
Trade Area (TFTA) trade liberalisation. 
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The TFTA consists of the AU’s three regional economic communities, thus COMESA-EAC-SADC. 
A simulation of TFTA tariff liberalisation scenarios with and without trade liberalisation measures will 
assist in ongoing policy formulation within the AfCFTA, Continental Customs Union (CCU) with a 
CET, a monetary union with a common single African currency provided by a continental central 
bank (Cirera, Willenbockel and Laksman 2014:449-471). The GLOBE-CGE model, as a multi-
sectoral and macroeconomic policy analytical tool, will underscore the TFTA. The GLOBE-CGE 
model will distinguish 22 commodity group and production sectors, and 21 geographical regions 
(Hertel, Narayan, McDougall 2006). Towards AfCFTA programmes will be the comprehensive trade 
and transport facilitation programme (CTTFP) launched by the TFTA. This will enable ongoing 
analysis of the reduction of the high transit times and transaction costs along corridors in eastern 
and southern Africa.  
This will enhance infrastructure facilities at border posts, thus establishing integrated border 
management practices, rationalising and harmonisation of trade and transport regulation effecting 
economies of scale (Peason 2012). The outcome of these baseline policy formulation processes, of 
tariffs, sectoral linkages and regional value chains serves as a benchmark for comparison across 
other RECs.  
6.4 NEPAD: Work in Progress - Regional Infrastructure Development 
Given the small and fragmented size of African economies, NEPAD has made it imperative to 
promote regional integration by aggressively bridging the infrastructural gap. Amjadi and Yeats 
(1995) observe that poor transport and communications infrastructure; deficient maintenance of 
road network; unreliability of rail transport, power supply and water; are key factors negatively 
affecting intra-African trade. Limao and Venables (2000) further support this assertion in arguing 
that a 10 per cent decrease in transport cost could trade volumes by up to 20 per cent.  
Currently, Africa is the least integrated continent physically and economically; intra-African imports 
accounted for only 14 per cent of Africa’s total imports in 2013124, and Africa’s share of total global 
exports was only 3 per cent in 2014125. Africa’s infrastructure deficit has been adversely affecting 
integration efforts and stunting growth. Therefore, cross-border infrastructure, particularly transport, 
energy and water has the potential to boost intra-regional trade and investment and unlock regional 
comparative advantages (World Bank 2006; AfDB 2010a).  
                                                          
124 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “Data Centre,” 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/(accessed 28 February 2019). 
125 WTO, “Statistics Database,” http://stat.wto.org/ (accessed 27 February 2019). 
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The WB’s Development Research Group estimates that sub-Saharan Africa could generate 
approximately US$20 billion annually (US$203 billion over 10 years) through trade-related 
infrastructure upgrading projects. Against this background, the AU-NEPAD as shown in Table 8 
below continues to attract new infrastructure investment for its Programme for Infrastructural 
Development in Africa (PIDA) continental programme. 
Table 8: New Investment Commitments in Africa’s Infrastructure by end-2015 by Economic 
Sector 
 
Under the aegis of the AU-NEPAD, PIDA, from 2002 to date, continues to statistically record 
improved FDI flows and investment into Africa’s productive supply side, especially in areas of 
continental infrastructure, integrated hydro-electric energy grid, thermal and solar energy 




Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2008) highlight the North-South Corridor, an infrastructural initiative, 
by an intra-regional COMESA, EAC and SADC. This ensures reforms to customs, border 
management, infrastructure upgrade and maintenance and that all regulatory regimen affecting all 
processes are properly sequenced. This one-stop border upgraded infrastructural initiative will have 
the biggest impact on overall transport costs in Southern Africa. 
As indicated in Table 4 the Africa Regional Integration Index report, the EAC is the top performing 
REC on regional integration overall. The EAC has higher than average scores across each 
dimension of regional integration: trade integration dimension; regional infrastructure dimension; 
productive integration; free movement of people dimension; and the financial and macroeconomic 
dimension. Highest scores are on trade integration with an EAC-REC average score of 0.540. 
Additionally, Kenya and Uganda as EAC members are in the top three contributors to wealth creation 
in the REC with 39 per cent of regional GDP and 21 per cent of regional GDP, respectively. The 
creation of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) in 1995 by 12 national utilities was a major step 
for SADC in exploiting the Southern African region’s numerous energy resources (SADC 2010). 
Table 9 below shows integration among COMESA and SADC and South Africa within SADC 
represents 61 per cent of regional GDP and is the first of the top performing countries followed by 
Botswana 2 per cent of regional GDP; Namibia 1.8 per cent of regional GDP; and Zambia 2.5 per 
cent of regional GDP (ARII 2016:1-10). This has also inspired ECCAS in developing a regional 
energy market managed by the Central African Power Pool (CAPP). A project is underway from the 
Inga Dam in the DRC. This approach would be a complementary element in integrating Africa’s 
regions. Drawing from the lessons of SAPP, IGAD and the EAC initiated a cross-border power pool 
implementing the 400Kv, 1200km Kenya-Ethiopia Interconnection thus supplying power and energy 
intra-regionally. Within IGAD, Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya are the principal contributors to wealth 










Table 9: Integration Among Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Members 
 




The EAC has also upgraded intra-regional terminals at Mombasa and Dar es Salaam ports in an 
East Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation Programme (EATTFP) initiative that harmonises and 
creates one-stop border posts predicated on similar protocols of automated systems (JICA 2009). 
Nigeria, a member of ECOWAS, is the first contributor of wealth creation in the region with 75 per 
cent of regional GDP but does not feature in the top performing countries on regional integration. 
Instead, within ECOWAS, the Ivory Coast is the top performer on regional integration but only 
representing 6 per cent of regional GDP (ARII 2016:1-10). The ECOWAS-REC has also synergised 
its cross-borders systems through the West African Power Pool (WAPP) and the West African Gas 
Pipeline (WAGP) as its intra-regional energy flagship programmes (UNECA 2010). Given the 
regional GDP, the difference between Nigeria (75 per cent) and Ivory Coast (6 per cent) within the 
ECOWAS the latter is the top performer on regional integration. If follows that each country can 
share and cross-pollinate lessons and insights with other countries regionally and continentally on 
the areas where they perform strongly (ARII 2016:4-10). By integrating national power systems, 
WAPP will promote regional energy and harness economies of scale creating an attractive business 
milieu for both continental and FDIs. Angola and the DRC are principal contributors to wealth 
creation in ECCAS with 36 per cent and 19 per cent of regional GDP, respectively, but the third 
contributor to regional GDP is Cameroon in the first place of regional integration. Multiple and 
overlapping intra-REC membership is being rationalised and streamlined in terms of project delivery. 
For example, the Central Corridor in East Africa connecting Tanzania (EAC member) to the DRC 
(ECCAS member); the Northern Corridor connecting Kenya (EAC member) to DRC (ECCAS 
member) and the Sudan (CEN-SAD member); the North-South Corridor connecting Egypt (CEN-
SAD member) to South Africa (SADC member) are all inclusive of the TAZARA railway line Corridor.  
The Kenya-Ethiopia and South Sudan Corridor exhibiting multiple and overlapping membership 
launched the Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) project on 2 March 
2012, that integrates oil pipeline, rail and fibre optic cables infrastructures. This is rationalising, and 
deepening intra-regional and continental connectivity (AfDB 2010b and 2011a). The COMESA Fund 
has been factored into the regional integration measures as a revenue loss compensatory fund for 
affected member states. Burundi and Rwanda have already benefited receiving US$15.1 million and 
US$6.5 million respectively in anticipation of revenue losses from reduced EAC tariffs in order to 




Within COMESA, Egypt, with 35 per cent of regional GDP, is the first contributor of wealth creation 
and is in fourth position on regional integration. Sudan and Libya are, respectively, second and third 
contributors of wealth creation, but are not top performers (ARII 2016:1-10). Within CEN-SAD, 
Nigeria has multiple membership in ECOWAS and in the former represents 37 per cent of regional 
GDP but is not in the top performers of regional integration. The Ivory Coast, both a member of 
CEN-SAD and ECOWAS, is the top performer on both RECs but only contributing 3 per cent of 
regional GDP. Lastly, in UMA-REC Algeria contributes 42 per cent of regional GDP but is not a top 
performer in regional GDP but instead Morocco and Tunisia are ahead in regional integration scores. 
Other major infrastructure development programmes that are deepening intra-regional trade and 
connectivity are: 
• COMESA Transport and Communications Strategy and the Priority Investment Plan. 
• SADC Infrastructure Master Development Plan. 
• The Corridor-based COMESA/EAC/SADC Joint Aid for Trade Programme. 
• The EAC Railway Development Masterplan. 
• The IGAD Transport, Energy and Water Programme. 
• Shire-Zambezi waterway aimed at linking Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
• SEGANET an interisland high-speed cable link for Indian Ocean Commissions Islands. 
• North-South Corridor a joint COMESA-SADC-EAC project. 
• The ECCAS, Central African Consensual Transport Master Plan that integrates rail and road 
transport and water transport around the Great Lake Regions. This will connect the 
Brazzaville-Kinshasa rail and Road Bridge across the Congo River a joint ECCAS and SADC 
programme. 
•  ECOWAS Trans-coastal and Trans-Sahelian key surface transport projects including the 
Cameroon Transport Facilitation Programme; Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest 
Africaine (UEMOA) Road Infrastructure and Transport Action Programme. 
 6.4.1. Trade Integration and Facilitation 
Abuka (2005), Karingi and Mevel (2012) highlight that the AU’s MIP was adopted in Sirte, Libya July 
2009 to intervene and fast-track intra-African regional integration on fundamental key points. As 
demonstrated by the ECA (2004), transport costs are prohibitively high in Africa averaging 14 per 
cent of value of exports. Rationalised and upgraded transport systems inform the Minimum 
Integration Programme (MIP) on the backbone of ICTs as the cornerstone of a trade facilitation 
programme.  




High-speed networks of statistics availability, one-stop border REC customs and immigration 
processes with radically minimal red tape. The REC secretariats of COMESA, EAC and IGAD are 
reaping economies of scale due to integrated auto-systems, improved and upgraded transport 
facilitation systems as shown in Table 10 below.126 The African Infrastructure Development Index 
(AIDI) compiled by the African Development Bank (AfDB), shows overall progress between 2000 
and 2018 (AfDB 2018). The AIDI covers four sectors: transport, electricity, information and 
communication technology, and water and sanitation. The most rapid progress has occurred in sub-
Saharan Africa’s low-income countries.127 The harmonising of intra-regional systems has reduced 
transaction costs, impacted savings and efficiencies; evident in greater turnaround times and better 
reflecting balance sheets. ICTs are availing real-time knowledge such as business statistics, data 
processing, risk analysis profiling and measurement and this is forging not only intra-African 
connectivity but global as well. Intergovernmental databases are converged and speedily available 
such as the UNCTAD, WB, IMF, WTO, World Customs Organisation (WCO) and the World Health 
Organisation (WHO). Land-locked countries such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are part of 
the RVC integrated in specialisation with the South African industrial base and leveraging on 












                                                          
126 See Pearson, M. 2012. Trade Facilitation in the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area. T. Hartzenberg et al, The 
Tripartite Free Trade Area: Towards a New African Integration Paradigm? Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa: Stellenbosch, 
142-79. 
127 See AfDB, “The Africa Infrastructure Development Index (AIDI),” May 2013, http://www.afdb.org/Documnents/Publications. 
Pp1-3. Accessed 26 February 2019. 
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Table 10: Transport Facilitation Measures Undertaken by Regional Economic Communities 
 
 
The Automated System for Customs Data and Management (ASYCUDA) and Euro-Trace have 
improved and rationalised intra-REC’s harmonisation of customs, procedures and documents. 
Across the RECs, standardisation of systems and data collection and analysis is evident. For 
example, within COMESA, member-states have adopted the Harmonised Commodity Description 
Coding System (HS). This provides a COMESA customs tariff integration platform and trade 
statistics nomenclatures. Thus, the HS is the platform for COMESA, common tariff nomenclature 
and common external tariff (CTN-CET). This automated and harmonised CTTFP has replaced 32 
documents to be completed as a one-stop transit border system. All NTBs to trade, in the form of 
unnecessary red tape, have been eliminated. The Advanced Cargo Information System (ACIS) is 
an integrated transport logistics management tool that tracks transport equipment and cargo at the 
COMESA railways, ports and roads. This enables real-time statistics generation and faster turn-
around times with spillover and other multiplier effects (UNECA 2017). The ASYCUDA-COMESA 




When it was introduced in Mauritius, the turn-around time for the process of declaration at the airport 
improved from 48 hours to 30 minutes (UNECA 2017). Trade facilitation within the RECs is key to 
competitively improving AfCFTA in infrastructural development, rationalising and synergising cross-
border systems and processes (UNECA 2010; AfDB 2010a). The AfDB intermittently and 
strategically intervenes in REC’s skills upgrade and training development; simplifying and 
harmonising complex customs clearance procedures; eliminating NTBs; using ICTs as a strategic 
resource; synergising with international business best practices in acceptable standards in quality, 
accreditation and metrology and standardising sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures (Somer and 
Luke 2017). 
In this regard, SADC has developed a Model Customs Act with CTN and CET, common ROO 
regulation and common transit regulation. All SADC members migrated to HS in 2007 and are now 
compliant with the approved SADC-CTN. After NEPAD’s creation, the AfDB trade facilitation and 
infrastructure contribution in 2007 reached US$2.27million, up 88 per cent from 2006. Again, in 
2007, AfDB approved five regional projects under NEPAD at a total cost of US$327million, and the 
NEPAD Special Fund Infrastructure Project for financing seven projects in energy, transport and 
communications for intra-regional development approved US$4.21billion. In support, the WB has 
supported intra-regional trade facilitation programmes through RECs like ECOWAS (World Bank 
2004).  
This will enable small and medium sized businesses to engage in regional and international trade 
with capacitated global financial institutions (UNECA 2016). The institutional capacitation of RECs 
by the WB will enhance and harmonise compilation of data on investment and capital flows by 
stabilising macroeconomic regimes and harmonising intra-African exchange rates as in 
standardising the recording of FDI transactions. Standardisation and categorisation of investments 
will be through exchange of shares between investors and acquired firms or investment from indirect 
sources; government bonds and loans; overseas development assistance and upgrading the skills 
of statistical data compilers (UNCTAD 2011). There is still a greater demand for ongoing trade 
facilitation programmes to rationalise and improve intra-Africa trade. This is against the asymmetries 
whereby African countries are still importing the same products that other African countries are 
exporting to the rest of the world. The outside sourcing of products from Africa that are available in 
Africa’s RECs suggests that more effort in intra-African trade facilitation programmes must be 
exerted to boost intra-African trade potential. The adoption of the MIP within a variable geometry 
system demonstrates Africa’s urgency and seriousness in pursuing intra-regional trade. There are 
ongoing infrastructural development trade-facilitation interventions towards achieving the AEC. The 
quantitative analysis and delineation as statistically demonstrated by the above Tables calls to 
robust intra-African trade.  
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The deepening of an AfCFTA envisages static effects on the continental allocation of resources and 
factors of production in trade creation and trade diversion within the regional and global value chains 
(Viner 1950; Baier and Bergstrand 2007:72-95; ECA 2015). Trade creation would entail increased 
level of trade from the elimination of trade barriers within the AfCFTA. This opens up opportunities 
for comparative advantage for member states in the optimal use of the means of production and is 
welfare enhancing. This aspect of inclusivity of economic development is one of the main aspirations 
of Agenda 2063 (Mevel and Karingi 2012). 
Trade diversion between AfCFTA member states will replace trade with third party countries not 
party to the AfCFTA and this will contribute to Africa’s industrialisation and continental exports within 
the AfCFTA. Additional gains as hypothesised for the AfCFTA: 
• Amiti and Konings (2007), Estevadeordal and Taylor (2013) allude to cost effective access 
of productive inputs and intermediary goods from other African countries. This enables 
efficient and competitive specialisation within a regional value chain at greater economies of 
scale provided within an AfCFTA regime. 
• Improved consumer welfare due to proximity and accessibility to cheaper products and 
services from AfCFTA (Broda ad Weinstein 2004). 
• The AfCFTA will also help eliminate challenges associated with multiple and overlapping 
trade agreements (Krueger and Bhagwat 1995). This will enhance continental food security 
thus mitigating productivity shocks induced by climate change (Ahmed 2012; Maur and 
Shepherd 2015). 
• The AfCFTA will enable small, medium and large enterprises to compete and this will unlock 
the competitive pressures, prising open monopolistic and oligopolistic cartels to more 
competition, impacting transaction costs and other multiplier effects (Melitz 2003; Melitz and 
Ottaviano 2008). 
• The cost to research and development is mitigated as imported inputs and intermediary 
goods offer economies of scale with a new wide combination of variety (Broad, Greenfield 
and Weinstein 2006). 
• Greater intra-African trade within the AfCFTA will encourage specialisation of production and 
RVC formation. For example, the South African automobile sector involves sourcing of 
leather seats from Botswana and fabrics from Lesotho. Such spillovers and multiplier effects 
within the AfCFTA benefit member states with a comparative disadvantage and reduces the 
risk of conflict (Cali 2014; Berman 2014; Maystadt 2014:721-749; Rustad 2016:475-484). In 
this regard intra-African trade within the AfCFTA will comparatively embody a large share of 
industrially beneficiated, value added goods and services (Bergstrand 2007; Egger 2011; 
Mevel and Karingi 2013; Chauvin 2016). 
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6.4.2. Continental and Tariff Revenue Losses 
Saygili (2017) argues that a deeper intra-African trade and liberalisation process will produce tariff 
revenue losses and shocks to some countries128. However, with proper pacing, timing and 
sequencing and flexible compensatory payments to revenue loss, structural developments and 
adjustments to all intra-regional processes can be effectively managed to extract welfare gains 
beneficial to all. 
This chapter argues that a parallel implementation strategy of the freedom and right of movement, 
establishment and residence must be put into effect as a compensatory plan, to relocate citizens to 
RECs that will be gaining more. Economic development and benefits within the AfCFTA must 
resonate with the greater public and not the elite neo-patrimonial governing networks that have 
remained Africa’s Achilles heel. For example, the DRC receives a large tranche of imports from 
South Africa and Zambia. Paced and sequenced exclusion lists may provide considerable value in 
helping the DRC to sequentially soften and ease the tariff revenue impact of AfCFTA. This is an 
important confidence building measure to ensure a win-win AfCFTA outcome, in which no country 
is threatened by revenue losses (Gaisford and Leger 2000:100-112; Davidson and Matusz 2000:42-
56). Another vulnerable group is Africa’s smallholder farmers that represent 53 per cent of Africa’s 
agricultural producers and contribute to continental food security (ILO and UNCTAD 2013). It will be 
imperative for the AfCFTA to provide a short-, medium- and long-term supportive regulatory regime 
that promotes the integration of smallholder farmers. The exposure of smallholder farmers to 
commercial export agro-businesses through RVC of specialised production will avail welfare gains 
to all within the AfCFTA. For example, they can be supported by simplified continentally automated 
ROO requirements and other trade facilitation measures that help standardise their sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary exports and the availability of capital.  
The AU’s Agenda 2063 has committed to the UN’s SDGs of Agenda 2030. Within that framework is 
to attain gender equality. This is against the background that women as a vulnerable group 
constitute 70 per cent of informal cross-border traders. They suffer ongoing NTBs of bribery, 
harassment, confiscation of their goods; because of ignorance of the law and illiteracy (Lesser and 
Moise-Leeman 2009; Ghils 2013; Mwanabiningo 2015). Chauvin (2016) observes that there are 
uneven and asymmetrical gains distribution within Africa’s REC’s Free Trade Agreements.  
 
 
                                                          
128 On Tariff Revenue Losses see UNECA (2012:79). 
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This unevenness is dependent on a particular gendered trade and tariff structure in each country 
and its household. With deeper AfCFTA integration, provisions should be made for women’s 
participation to upgrade from lower value subsistence crops to cash crops for export. Factoring in of 
women to benefit from value addition and commercial export as they are in the majority of society’s 
female-headed homes (UNCTAD 2014; UNDP 2016). According to the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) (2016), 60 per cent of Africa’s population is aged 24 years or younger. In this 
regard Africa has the highest birth rate and youth population as shown in Table 11 below. 




It is imperative for the AU to leverage this youth dividend by consolidation and reinforcement of 
robust trade facilitation interventions. This is echoed in the 2007 World Development Report and the 
AU Roadmap on Harnessing the Demographic dividend through investments in the youth. This 
includes skills development training, such as the Continental Strategy for Technical Vocation 
Education and Training; science and technology training; health and well-being; governance, youth 
rights and empowerment (Innovation Strategy for Africa 2014-24).  
An integrated and balanced strategy factoring in both capital- and labour-intensive policies would 
be inclusive of youth in its job creation and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), 
industrial policy and opportunities. This should be inclusive of youth in ICTs, agriculture and agro-
enterprises in value addition RVC that exhibits push and pull factors to turn the youth dividend into 
a profitable factor of Africa’s political economy (Saygili, Peters and Knebel 2017). Member states 
bring about budgetary sustainability and predictability (AU 2016a). The AU’s total budget in 2016 
amounted to US$417million and only 44 per cent was provided by the member states, with 56 per 
cent from international donors such as the EU, China, USA and the WB (AU 2015). The 0.2 per cent 
import levy is intended to full-fund the AU’s projects.  
Ongoing training and upskilling in regional projects would engender savings, and bring about cost-
effectiveness and higher margins of productivity and efficiencies. Regional programmes may affect 
countries differently; this therefore mismatches prioritisations to multi-country trade-related barriers. 
Coordinated interventions and policy deliverables with compensation for revenue loss are 
imperative. This is contributory to countries at different developmental levels, as the process of 
variable geometry can sequentially align them to the AfCFTA’s continental policies. As a result, Aid-
for-Trade is more effective whereby standards are equivalent intra-regionally to boost AfCFTA (IEG 
2011; World Bank 2011; UNCTAD 2013; Dube 2016). 
6.4.3 Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR): E-commerce and Integration in a Digitalising Africa 
Africa is now digitalising, and the current moment offers a leapfrogging opportunity with far-reaching 
implications for economic development, integration and structural transformation. Today’s 
technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, block chain, drones, internet of things (IoTs), 
3D printing, Big Data, and software-enabled industrial platforms indicate the scale and speed at 
which technology is dynamically transforming all socio-economic sectors. This is a global 
inseparable environment where individuals straddle digital domains and offline reality with the use 




 To reinforce the aforementioned Schwab (2015) asserts that the 4IR is a fusion of technologies that 
is blurring the lines and interfacing the physical, digital and biological spheres. The speed, velocity, 
scope and systems impact and interconnectivity have no historical precedent. Every industry in 
every country that demands a transformation of all systems production, management and 
governance is affected. Table12 below shows the first industrial revolution that changed people’s 
lives and economies from agrarian and handicraft economy to one of plant and machinery within 
sector industries. Oil and electricity subsequently underpinned the second industrial revolution with 
its mass production and consumerism. ICTs then became the hallmark of the third industrial 
revolution with its interconnectivity of automated production and distribution systems (Miller 2015:3). 






Against the backdrop of global technology convergences, the AU and its member states have 
invested in a comprehensive digital transformation strategy to harness comparative advantages and 
economies of scale to upscale its RVCs to competitively interface with global value chains. Based 
on the AU Executive Council Decisions related to ICTs129, ECA Resolution 812-XXXI on the African 
Information Society Initiative and the Smart Africa Board meeting held on the margins of the 32nd 
AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the AUC undertook to develop a comprehensive 
Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (DTSA). This was done in collaboration with the UN ECA, 
Smart Africa, AUDA-NEPAD, RECs, AfDB, Africa Telecommunications Union, Africa Capacity 
Building Foundation, International Telecommunication Union and the WB. 
The DTSA addresses the objectives of the 4IR within the AfCFTA. The DTSA seeks to converge 
centripetal processes and systems within AfCFTA frameworks such as the Policy and Regulatory 
Initiative for Digital Africa (PRIDA), PIDA, the African Union Financial Institutions (AUFIs), the Single 
African Air Transport Market (SAATM); and the Free Movement of Persons. This will be to support 
the development of a Digital Single Market for Africa further enhancing integration towards Agenda 
2063. E-commerce and digital economy as a constituent of 4IR is already in use in Africa but at 
uneven levels of development. Table 13 below shows some of the e-commerce platforms operating 
in Africa. They include Jumia and Konga (Nigeira), Takealot and Bidorbury (South Africa), and 
Kilimall (Kenya). These platforms bring together African consumers and entrepreneurs and sell 
goods outside the continent, including from China which dominates cross-border sales (Kaplan 
2018). This entails placing and receiving orders over computer networks, using multiple formats and 
devices, including web and electronic data interchange and the use of personal computers, laptops, 
tablets and mobile phones (OECD 2011).  
Table 13: Examples of Businesses Active in the Different e-Commerce Business Categories 
 
Source: Kaplan (2018) 
                                                          
129 EX.CL/Dec.739(XXII), EX.CL/Dec.545(XVI), EX.CL/Dec6.613(XVIII), EX.CL/Dec835(XXV), EX.CL/Dec987(XXXII) 
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The terms e-commerce and digital economy cover both physical and intangible products and 
services that reach the end user digitally. A well-known example is the M-Pesa mobile money 
solutions, which first emerged in Kenya to extend services to the previously unbanked (UNCTAD 
2017b). Clearly, the digital economy in Africa has leapfrogged and reduced many barriers to entry 
and has mitigated market concentration costs. 
Although market segregation remains due to the languages and specific characteristics of different 
markets, herein lies one of the many objectives of the Digital Single Market in Africa by 2030 to 
harmonise standards and systems. The enablement of the coherence of existing and future digital 
policies and strategies at regional and national level will enhance cooperation between institutions, 
thus leveraging regional value chains towards Agenda 2063. According to UNCTAD estimates, 
worldwide e-commerce sales in 2016 reached approximately US$26 trillion, 90 per cent in business-
to-business (B2B) e-commerce and 10 per cent in business to consumer (B2C) sales. China, the 
US and India lead in the global B2C segment. This chapter, therefore, argues that with Africa having 
the largest youth population by 2050, it is necessary to urgently converge its digital policies to carve 
a global niche for it in this lucrative global market. Table 14 below of SADC and COMESA as the 
AU’s RECs affirms and attests to their e-commerce strategy frameworks that continue to inform the 



































Source: ECA (2010) 
In 2010, SADC developed a comprehensive regional strategy as its members have national ICT 
strategies based on four converging pillars:  legislation; national and sub-regional infrastructure; 
skills development; payment solutions and data collection as shown in Table 14 above. Further, in 
2018, COMESA adopted a digital free trade area (DFTA) to leverage ICT comparative advantages 
and harness economies of scale in cross-border trade and these include: 
• E-trade, a platform for online trade, an e-payment and mobile application for small-scale 
cross-border traders. 
• E-logistics that contributes to trade facilitation systems improving standardisation, 
harmonisation in logistics and ease of doing business. 
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• E-legislation that creates an intra-legal environment among member states in order to 
efficiently expedite e-transactions and e-payments; Kenya’s M-Pesa is a case in point.  This 
has also incorporated into the DFTA an electronic certificate of origin (e-CoO) accessible to 
users through a web browser thus enhancing efficiencies and economies of scale (Hope 
2018). 
Other RECs do not have comprehensive digital economic strategies, but are endowed with 
technology-related policies and tools such as biometric passports, telephone roaming free areas 
and regional payments systems to support cross-border payments and transfers. This chapter, 
therefore, argues that the SADC and COMESA DFTAs are suitable platforms to further converge 
and synergise e-commerce interoperability as templates to link its programmes to similar initiatives 
in the TFTA, the AfCFTA and globally within the WTO protocols. As e-commerce activities are 
predicated on the use of varied technologies, such as internet services as shown in Table 15 below, 
cloud and data hosting services of providers governed by regulatory systems across multiple 
jurisdictions has necessitated convergences of regulations and policies in ICT infrastructure and 
4IR. With the ratification of AfCFTA and adoption of various protocols such as the manufacturing 
and trade policy protocol; the competition protocol; it is imperative that the AfCFTA digital 























With increasing internet penetration rates in Africa, its digitalisation is supported by active mobile-
broadband subscriptions as shown in Table 16 below. Notwithstanding other challenges besetting 
Africa like electrification, gender inequality; e-commerce and digitalisation have demonstrated that 
Africa can leapfrog some of its challenges. This was the case with M-Pesa in Kenya that afforded 
the unbanked the ability to e-transact nationally and regionally through systems innovation.  
The AU has also mainstreamed gender issues specifically to benefit women who have been 
disadvantaged as shown in Table 17 below by the African countries with gender-disaggregated data 
for 2019. E-commerce has enhanced women’s access to entrepreneurship and markets. The 
convergence of technologies helps overcome barriers like physical distance, lack of access to 
networks, limited access to finance and constraining domestic responsibilities. The internet user 
gender gap is the largest in LDCs, increasing from 29.9 to 32.9 per cent in 2017 (ITU 2017). A 
gender digital divide is found in each African country with gender-disaggregated data. The leading 
barriers to mobile ownership include cost, low literacy, low digital skills and safety and security 
concerns all affecting women (ITU 2017). Under the aegis of the AU, some RECs have taken steps 
to close the gender digital divide and enhance women’s access to digital trade opportunities. Thus 
far, the AU has demonstrated in its DTSA to adopt the use of e-commerce to deliver gender equality 
and inclusiveness in order to fulfil the aspirations of Agenda 2063. 






























Table 19: Individuals Using the Internet, by Gender, for African Countries with Gender-
Disaggregated Data, Latest Available Year 
 
The UNCTAD’s B2C e-commerce Index 2018, reflects the process in an online B2C shopping 
transaction as shown in Table 20 below. This chapter argues that this attests to Africa’s gradual and 
growing capability to proffer its statistics to be compared with the rest of the world. This is proof of 
Africa’s integrated elements relating to web presence of the seller, internet access of users, 
availability of a payment method such as: credit card, mobile payment, or cash on delivery and the 
delivery of the product to the customer’s home or at a pick-up point. As much as the UNCTAD B2C 
e-Commerce Index 2018 confirms that Africa is lagging behind the rest of the world, it also attracts 





This is because gaps are identifiable, measurable and quantifiable. For example, the regional 
electronic payments systems that already exist have attracted governments and the private sector 
to facilitate the interface of national banks. This will reduce the cost and time associated with cross-
border payments. In this regard, the Afrexim Bank has proposed a Pan-African payments and 
settlement platform to enable intra-African trade (UNCTAD 2018i). 
Table 20: Regional Values for the UNCTAD B2C e-Commerce Index, 2018 
 
The DTSA has also noted that data is the life-blood of e-commerce and that adoption of e-commerce 
legislation (see Table 21) by countries enhances trade facilitation measures and intra-Africa trade 
in meeting the objectives of Agenda 2063. The free flow of data across borders has become 
imperative to firms engaged in e-commerce as it underpins many trade agreements. In this regard, 
the AU adopted the Convention on Cyber-security and Personal Data Protection in the Malabo 
Convention in June 2014. The aims of the convention further support the DTSA by establishing 
regional and national legal frameworks covering: cyber-security, electronic transactions and 
personal data protection (AUC and Internet Society 2018).  
Seven of the 15 ECOWAS member states have enacted legislation in compliance with the Malabo 
Convention: the EAC Framework for Cyber laws adopted in 2010 and the SADC Model Law on Data 
Protection (UNCTAD 2016). The e-commerce legislation has become imperative as access to and 
control over data represent intangible capital assets which are key factors for competitiveness. 
Against this backdrop the ECOWAS Commission developed a cybersecurity agenda in 2015: 
Enhancing Cybersecurity in ECOWAS region, to promote convergences of policies by member 
states. This is a confidence building measure and has attracted global collaborations with the 
Council of Europe, International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and UNCTAD. This affirms the 
imperative that the convergence of global cybersecurity legislation is an indispensable ingredient 














In conclusion, ICTs in some ways have positively affected Africa’s political economies to leapfrog 
into certain aspects of industrialisation and development, and in other instances widened the digital 
divide (Azmeh and Foster 2016). The AU and NEPAD are continuing with the AfCFTA and attendant 
trade facilitation programmes in order to fast-track intra-African trade. Africa’s continental 
industrialisation predicated on the back-bone of e-commerce and ICTs would assist in narrowing 
the global digital divide, assist its MSMEs and position it to harness economies of scale with its 
continental RVCs (OECD 2011; Budree 2017).  
In its trade facilitation interventions, the AU (NEPAD) and the AfCFTA by narrowing the global digital 
divide in empowering its MSMEs, must be wary of proposed WTO rules within the Trade Related 
Aspects in Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Trade Related Investments Measures (TRIMS) 
(Bauer 2014). These draft proposed rules have the implicit impact of ring-fencing developed 
economic hegemony at the expense of developing countries. 
 
 As a countervailing measure, Africa could consider proposing the following e-commerce rules of 
principle as indicated: 
• Prohibiting digital customs duties on electronically transmitted products such as books, 
music, videos and software. These rules strengthen intellectual property rights encouraging 
hegemonic monopolistic and oligopolistic cartels in global value chains that constrain Africa’s 
MSMEs as new entrants in a free world competition (te Velde 2016). 
• Non-discrimination principles require that national treatment be provided to e-commerce 
goods and service. 
• Data localisation, thus prohibit rules requiring that storage, routing and processing of other 
use of data be within the territory of a country. This will mitigate TNC’s predatory and 
monopolistic tendencies and minimise illicit financial flows. 
• Safeguarding network competition, thus enabling digital suppliers to build networks in the 
markets they serve or to access such facilities and services from incumbents.  
• This fosters a culture of transparency and public scrutiny and accountability, thus mitigating 
and eliminating dependency and exploitative economics in public goods such as health, food 
security and education. 
• Enabling cross-border data flows, facilitating companies and consumers to move data without 
restriction. This mitigates rent-seeking and other corrupt behaviours by promoting public 
scrutiny and accountability in public goods and global non-territorial challenges such as the 
impact of climate change on livelihood. 
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• Free and open internet rules that target governments to block certain websites for commercial 
or political reasons as well as similar initiatives by private companies. This promotes anti-
competitive behaviour and feeds into the illicit financial flows systems such as tax avoidance 
and evasion, price-transfers, mispricing and under-invoicing. 
• Protecting critical source code requires that businesses do not have to hand over their source 
code or proprietary algorithms to their competitors. Trade secrets including source codes are 
not covered by the TRIPS regime. 
• Ensuring technology choice, thus prohibiting governments from forcing foreign businesses to 
use specific local technologies when they invest in a particular economy. 
• No technology transfers, prohibits governments from requiring companies to transfer 
technology, production processes and other proprietary information (ARIVA VIII 2016:132-
155). 
Against the previously mentioned, it is imperative for NEPAD and AfCFTA to robustly consolidate 
and reinforce a continental common position approach in global interregional and multilateral 
engagements with the WTO, UN, IMF, WB and other global institutions. Brexit, the UKs exit from 
the EU, as underscored by its 51.9 per cent referendum results holds lessons and benefits for Africa 
and its AfCFTA in trade creation and trade diversion (Mendez-Parra et al. 2016). A full 
consummation of the Brexit would positively affect Southern Africa’s Citrus Growers Association’s 
exports to the UK by way of trade diversion as the UK reverts to its WTO provision (Luke and 
MacLeod 2016; Mold 2017). Inversely the British currency’s devaluation has made UK global 
exports favourably competitive but simultaneously negatively impacting Africa’s goods exports and 
the dollar value of UK aid, investments, remittances and tourism in African countries (Mendez-Parra 
et al. 2016). Luke and MacLeod (2017) argue that a completed Brexit process would usher in a 
totally renewed autonomous UK trade policy towards Africa. They further intimate that Brexit is a 
motley bag of opportunities and risks for AfCFTA. This is as preferential regimes of the UK for Africa 
through the current EU Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative; GSP and EPAs may be excluded from 
a renewed UK trade policy. If the UK continues to devalue its currency it would impact Africa’s export 
resulting in negative TOT making UK imports into Africa such as plant and machinery expensive (te 








6.5. NEPAD and External Actors 
6.5.1. A Case of USA and AGOA 
The US development policy towards Africa since 2000 is predicated on the AGOA. As shown in 
Tables 22-26 below, it has significantly promoted access of Africa’s exports into the USA market 
especially value-added textiles and apparels but with negligible overall impact (USTR 2016).130 
 









                                                          
130 See Graph (Page 119); Table(Page 120);Tables(Page121);Table(Page 122): The highest penetration of African products within 



























































Table 26: Inward and Outward Investment between the United States and sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
In September 2016 the US released the Beyond AGOA Report that indicated a renewed multi-
layered approach with Africa. This was informed by interregional competitive pressures and shocks 
from the EU, India, China and Asian Tigers’ countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Malaysia and Singapore (Melendez-Ortiz 2014; Nguyen and Ananthalaskhmi 2017). Additionally, 
lessons were learnt from its failure of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations that 
commenced in December 1994 in Miami, USA. The goal of this US-led project was to create by 
2005 the world’s largest FTA comprising 34 economies of the western hemisphere. The FTAA 
negotiations coincided with the failed WTO Doha negotiations. 
The FTAA was finally terminated in November 2005 as it failed to reach agreement. As the case 
with Africa, FTAA countries had disparities in development levels such as institutional capacities, 
skills base, literacy levels and per capita GDP disparities. In that regard, the USA was resistant in 
flexibility measures of pacing and sequencing of variable geometry to level the playing field 
incrementally (Bown and Kee 2011). As the FTAA stalled, as is the case with EU-EPAs (after Brexit), 
the USA expanded an alternative bilateral free trade network with better-industrialised countries 
such as Chile in 2003. This split the South Americas into fragmented regional blocs and US- friendly 
Pacific Alliance and Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR). To date, intra-regionally the trade was 
a paltry 16 per cent of exports by 2015 into the USA. This is a lesson and a warning to the AU-
NEPAD to galvanise and maintain a common continental strategy in its interregional strategic 
approaches; whether engaging the USA, EU or China (Baldwin 2014a and 2014b).  
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This dissertation, therefore, argues that under the aegis of the AU-NEPAD, African trade policy- 
makers should take cognisance of the FTAA experience and principles indicated below to adopt and 
ratify the AfCFTA sooner and negotiate inter-regionally as a single, cohesive and strong entity: 
• Leadership is essential, probably driven by powerhouses of Africa such as Nigeria, Egypt, 
Kenya and South Africa. Negotiations must be a continental concerted effort not one country 
or a particular region seeking to concentrate most benefits to itself. 
• A one-size-fits-all policy without allowing variable geometry to sequentially and incrementally 
level the playing field to every stakeholder’s benefit is a recipe for disaster in politico-socio-
economic negotiations. This fuels a zero-sum game play instead of win-win outcomes. For 
example, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt as Africa’s powerhouses must 
accommodate the least developed member states by compensating for revenue loss as they 
integrate into the continental value chains. 
• It is imperative for the AU to robustly galvanise common policy AfCFTA positions in global 
interregional and multilateral negotiations. 
• North-South negotiations like the WTO, EU-EPAs, FTAA have proved to be intractable as 
developing countries close ranks, and perceived hegemonic zero-sum mechanisations by the 
developed Global North, for example, in areas of TRIPS, TRIMS and General Agreement on 
Trade and Services (GATS) where the global south fears loss of policy space. Reaching 
agreements within the AfCFTA could be more feasible than in the FTAA. 
  
6.5.2 Emerging Market Economies 






Table 28: Rank of Africa’s Export Partners by Value 
 
As indicated above in Tables 27 and 28, the EU has maintained its number one position as Africa’s 
most important trading partner in terms of value of exports and imports. In 2012, China and India as 
emerging economies displaced the USA for second and third positions respectively as Africa’s 
export partners by value. Japan, which was Africa’s third most important destination in 2000, has 
been superseded by China, India, Brazil and South Africa respectively. Nevertheless, the EU 
remains the number one source of Africa’s imports. China, in 2005, overtook the USA for the second 
position and South Africa in 2012 before recovering to third position above South Africa in 2013. 
The cumulative impact of the rise of emerging market economies has been an increase in Africa’s 
exports to the markets from US$18billion to US$130billion from 2000-2014. 
Africa’s percentage increase in the same period has been from 9 per cent to15 per cent and imports 
rose from US$13billion to US$145billion over the same period thus from 8 per cent to25 per cent 
respectively (Baldwin 2014 and 2014b; Sommer, Calabrese., Mendez-Parra and Luke 2017). The 
aforementioned global interregional trading shifts mitigates Africa’s dependence on the traditional 
trading markets of the global north such as the EU, USA and Japan. It further enhances policy space 
for the AU-NEPAD to pursue alternative trade objectives, being less dependent on the EU and USA 
and thus the interim EU-EPA’s MOAs undertaken (Melendez-Ortiz 2014; USTR 2016). The 
composition of Africa’s trade with emerging markets and intra-regional value-added trade reinforced 





By 2050, the African population growth will account for more than half the world’s total, thus one in 
four people in the world will be African (UNDESA 2017). Africa’s extractive exports with the emerging 
market economies increased from US$194billion in 2000 to US$544billion in 2014. In contrast, 
greater traction in intra-African trade accounted for 32 per cent of Africa’s total growth in non-
extractive value-added products during the same periods (Baldwin 2014a; Aglionby and Mance 
2016; ECA 2017). 
6.6 Continental Anti-Competitive Behaviour 
It is imperative within the trade facilitation intervening programmes to foster a culture of public 
scrutiny and accountability. These monitoring and evaluation tools mitigate corrupt practices of rent-
seeking and other anti-competitive behaviours. Reviewing and refining ongoing negotiations on 
competition policy and intellectual property rights engenders policy convergence through common 
regimes levelling the playing field to mitigate monopolistic and oligopolistic corrupt cartels. In 2004, 
the American Bar Association indicated that about US$51.1billion of cartel affected imports were in 
Africa. Cartels’ anti-competitive behaviour and economic harm spawn deleterious consumer welfare 
losses and other NTB asymmetries (de Beer 2013:884-901; UNCTAD 2017). Against this 
background, a regional and an AfCFTA approach is imperative to deal with oligopolistic cartels, 
mergers and acquisitions and abuse. The EAC established the Community Competition Act; the 
SADC Treaty and the SACU Treaty advocate for cooperation in competition law and policy 
enforcement. The AfCFTA can draw on these experiences and leverage on them continentally and 
globally (Brown, Kiyota and Stern 2008:461-484; EAC 2010; Mukwaya and Mold 2014; Jordaan 
2011:229-244). Safeguards dealing with anti-competitive practice spawn other ingenious NTBs 
affecting adversely on economies of scale. This anti-competitive behaviour is also evident among 
TNCs that practise predatory behaviour and eliminate local competition; engage in price-fixing and 
collusion. 
This reduces consumer choice, increases price and denies the consumers and other producers the 
benefits of trade liberalisation (Brown, Kiyota and Stern 2008:461-484). Another complementary 
discipline is the Intellectual Property Rights in Africa that need to be coordinated, synergised as they 
are evidently fragmented (de Beer 2014; Ncube 2016). This will allow a business environment 
conducive to mitigated and restrained anti-competitive behaviour. Presently the African Regional 
Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO) and the Organisation Africaine de la Propriete 




The continental powerhouses such as Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, do not belong to 
either of these organisations. Under the auspices of the AU the Pan Intellectual Property 
Organisation (PAIPO), ARIPO and OAPI have concluded a third cooperation agreement to closely 
converge and continentally align their work within the AfCFTA strategic initiative of 2012-2017. In 
2016 ARIPO also signed a memorandum of agreement with COMESA for its COMESA Intellectual 
Property Unit Programme to work closely with the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite FTA and 
incrementally align and harmonise its policies and protocols within the AfCFTA (de Beer 2013; 
ARIPO 2016; COMESA 2017; ARIPO 2017).To mitigate against zero-sum tactics and policies on 
knowledge production processes and ownership, variable geometry facilitates sequencing of 
countries at different developmental levels. In this regard, intellectual property rights negotiations 
must not only be top-down, but bottom-up, inclusive of public and civil society organisations 
(Karaganis 2011). This horizontal public participation in policy formulation is a hallmark of 
organisations such as the World Intellectual Property Organisation and national lawmakers that 
involve the public and civil society groups and allow access to draft documents and public hearings. 
This open and transparent culture would be an enabling space for Africa’s unique voice in its 
traditional knowledge production.  
This would then be factored into the Global Intellectual Property regime. The balance   between 
intellectual property rights and inalienable human rights would restrain and mitigate zero-sum 
outcomes and engender win-win solutions and benefits, especially in public goods such as health, 
food-security, education, housing and so on (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; Oguamanam and 
Armstrong 2010; de Beer, Armstrong and Schonwetter 2014). 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to interrogate the contributions of Pan-Africanism to NEPAD. In so doing, it 
displayed infrastructure development under the aegis of NEPAD across the continent as the most 
visible face of regional integration. This was prefaced by the Global Trade Analysis (GTAP-CGE 
Model) as an integrated ex-post and ex-ante tool to help analyse and facilitate the AfCFTA. The 
APRM and Africa’s Regional Integration Index assist to monitor and evaluate Africa’s eight REC 
infrastructure projects. These include the PIDA programme. These are strategically connected intra-
regional roads, hydro-power supplies, ICTs, one-stop border processing posts and harmonisation 
of administrative processing of documents. This results in reduced transaction costs, faster business 
turn-around times and many other positive multiplier effects and welfare gains. Increased intra-
regional trade also attracts both domestic and FDIs in the productive sectors of the regions resulting 
in trade creation and spillover gains. RVCs leverage on comparative advantages to competitively 
enhance their trade-flows on global economy. 
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 Further, the Africa Regional Integration Index demonstrated the following findings. 
• IGAD is the highest performing REC on regional integration. 
• Regional infrastructure has average REC scores (0.461) closest to the average REC scores 
on regional integration overall (0.470). 
• There are 30 high performing countries across the eight RECs. 
Further, this chapter underscores the post-positivist meta-theoretical model that encapsulates an 
integrative intersubjective framework of evolving and fluid transforming global political economy 
impacted by the ICTs (e-commerce and the 4IR) and non-territorial factors such as climate change. 
It is against this background that Africa continues to engage in multilateral trade (AGOA and EPAs) 
in support of its continental integration agenda. This would unlock Africa’s productive potential in 
agriculture, industrial production, thereby injecting investments and make all its sectors globally 
competitive. By being part of the regional and global value chains, this would advantageously 
industrialise Africa towards diversified value addition of its manufactured products. The multiplier 
effect as a result of the constructivist cum functionalist model are welfare gains as consumer 
purchasing power rises. Supply-side intermediate goods will be imported by productive businesses 
in Africa to supply manufactured goods continentally. This will also trigger economies of scale in 
services industries that are complementary and pivotal for Africa’s internal market.  
Productive integration will induce trade creation making the continental economy more diversified 
and resilient to both endogenous and exogenous shocks. This will stimulate human resources 
training and development for a more skilled regional and continental labour force. The Africa 












Table 29: Average REC Scores in all Dimensions of Regional Integration 
 
 
• EAC is the highest performing REC on productive integration. 
• There are 30 high-performing countries across the eight RECs on productive integration. 
Clearly, the AU-NEPAD socio-economic programmes are statistically quantifiable and measurable; 
in stark contrast to the OAU’s LPA/ABUJA that remained rhetorical policy documents without any 
form of implementation. But still, a supra-national authority as envisaged by President Kwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana would yield much more effective processes and results against the zero-sum 







NEPAD: A Comparative Political Economy Study in the Making of New Regionalism 
7.1 Introduction 
William Brown and Sophie Harman (2013:1-3) explain African agency as 
 the ways in which Africa’s political, economic, social and security actors can and do exert 
influence both on the continent and in global politics, as opposed to simply being passive 
targets or victims of others actions, is an effect not only of the continent’s regional powers, 
but also of its developing state and non-state network.131  
This definition of African agency unequivocally underpins NEPAD’s raison d’etre of pragmatism and 
eclectism in engagements continentally and globally to become a competitive participant in the ever- 
fluid new regionalism of the global economy. The rules of global economics and governance are 
changing in intertwined ways, both licit and illicit. This brings Africa and its heavily resource-based 
economies both challenges and opportunities to innovate: 
The political economy of natural resources is increasingly shaped by the large, structural. 
shifts underway in the world. The world must now contend not just with growing environmental 
threats such as climate change and water scarcities, but with the shift in consumer power 
form West to East, concentration of resource ownership and the rise of state capitalism. All 
these moving pieces are changing the rules of the game132 
Regionalisms are, therefore, in constant transition and its understanding is in flux as actors respond 
to a succession of global changes and crises in the 21st century. In this regard, the AU-NEPAD is 
spearheading integration projects and programmes instead of remaining dependent on others. 
Heterogeneous coalitions are emerging around global non-territorial issues such as climate change, 
terrorism and continuing conflicts, health threats, depletion of fossil fuels and transnational 
organised crime.  
 
                                                          
131 See William Brown and Sophie Harman (eds.), African Agency in International Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp.1-3. 
132 See Bernice Lee, Felix Preston, Jaakko Koorshshy, Rob Bailey, and Glada Lahn, Resources Futures,Chatham House, December 
2012, http://www.chathamhouse.org(accesseed 25 February 2019). 
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African agency and regionalism spearheaded by the AU-NEPAD and non-state actors takes place 
in an assortment of constellations, within and beyond various kinds of borders. In the new century, 
regionalism on the continent is embracing a spectrum of level, both micro and macro, the 
aforementioned US-AGOA; BRICS; FOCAC (Forum on China Africa Cooperation); EU EPAs; 
corporate networks and security.133 
In such a world of paradigmatic shifts, the classic North-South dependencies are giving way to East-
South axes (BRICS) but also including Japan and Korea. These shifting dependencies are not only 
economic and political but also cultural: including sports and athletics, film, art and music. 
Multinational corporations are no more traditionally from the global north, but from new economic 
powers like BRICS (See Tables 38 and 39 where China Brazil and India have displaced the 
traditional West in global economic growth). By December 2014, the MNCs announced nearly 
US$8billion in mergers and acquisitions deals with African companies.134 It is against this 
background, that African states under the auspices of the AU-NEPAD were reluctant in signing the 
EU’s EPAs despite the latter’s mix of soft- and hard-power diplomacy and Africa’s worsening global 
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Fredrik Soderbaum and Ian Taylor (eds.), Afro-Regions: The Dynamics of Cross-Border Micro-Regionalism in Africa (Uppsala: 
Nordic Africa Institute, 2008). 





Table 30: Rate of Growth in Gross Domestic Product per Capita (per cent/year) 
 
Africa showing the lowest rate of growth in GDP per capita. 
 
The EPA negotiations are being conducted between the 25 EU countries with a combined GDP of 
US$13.3billion and six groups of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Hinkle (2005:267-80) 
explains that this is against a miniscule Pacific Island combined GDP of US$9billion, that is 1 400 
times smaller than the EU, and the ECOWAS in Africa’s GDP is more than 80 times smaller than 
the EU. This chapter will interrogate and assess the EU’s insistent rhetorical assertions that EPAs 
meet Africa’s integration aims and objectives. Thereafter, it provides an assessment of the LPA and 
NEPAD by focusing on the following areas: the mining sector; public health, peace and security; 
financial integration and convergence; free movement of persons and right of residence; free 
movement of capital goods; comparison of trade policies and multiple memberships; and ROO. In 






7.2 Motivation for African Regional Integration 
The African vision of regional integration resembles the European integration project. Among its 
many reasons are the reduction of conflict and enhancement of peace-building culture through 
greater interdependence and cooperation (OAU 1981; ADB 1989; Oyejide 2000; Adedeji 2002). 
Economically this would translate into giving Africa increased global bargaining power and 
structurally transforming its peripheral dependent economies (UNECA 2004b). 
Adedeji (2002) highlights the urgency in this regard to develop Africa’s infrastructural challenges, 
human resources deficit and a robust demonstration of political commitment. Cross-border RVCs 
must engage in specialisation in value-addition manufacturing, distribution and marketing of goods. 
This win-win variable geometry matrix will fairly and incrementally benefit all, including the 
landlocked and the LDCs (UNECA 2002). This is what the LPA failed to implement and the NEPAD 
has recorded some progress in this regard. 
7.3 A Comparative Analysis: Africa’s Integration Strategy versus EU’s Conditionality 
Table 31: Unequal Partners in Trade 
 
As demonstrated by Table 31, the disparity and inequality in economic power relations between the 
EU and Africa encourages zero-sum hegemonic dominance by the former. This consigns the ACP 
countries to a dependency framework as suppliers of primary commodities with no alternative of 
developing a value-adding manufacturing industry (Hinkle 2005:267). 
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Since 1975, the Lomé Convention has benefited ACP countries’ exports non-reciprocally into the 
European market. However, with the new WTO trade compliance rules of non-discrimination and 
reciprocity came the transitioning to the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. This was followed in 2008 by 
non-discriminatory WTO trade agreements known as EPAs (Oxfam 2006; Christian Aid 2006). 
Against the previously mentioned, the EU has been demanding that EPAs must conform to Article 
24 of the GATT. Article 24 currently stipulates that FTAs require an elimination of tariff barriers.  This 
chapter argues that the EU’s insistence on removal of all ACP trade barriers is not equally matched 
by its maintenance of protective barriers like its agricultural subsidies and other NTBs. This clearly 
attests to the global north’s tendency to maintain its hegemonic neo-colonial dominance. Asante 
(1997) and Chang (2002) argue that EPAs are likely to undermine Africa’s integration project further, 
as the EU will not consider ACP’s variable geometry propositions that allow a gradualist approach. 
More important the EPAs as shown in Table 29 below create revenue shortfall for AU RECs with 
unsustainable adjustment cost and further lock Africa in debt distress. 







The pursuit of the AEC and Agenda 2063 is underpinned by the 1991 Abuja Treaty of Africa’s self-
sustainable development and industrialisation predicated on a supply-side strategy. This would 
entail infrastructure development and modernisation; human resources skills development; 
rationalisation; streamlining and harmonisation of policies and protocols; elimination of cross-border 
tariff and NTBs in order to encourage higher productivity and efficiencies within strategically 
positioned regional value chains (Adedeji 2002; UNECA 2002; World Bank 2003; UNCTAD 2005). 
Therefore, as agreed by the AU, academics and representatives of civil society across the continent 
supply-side industrialisation should be the primary objective of regional integration (Public Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility 2005). In this regard, NEPAD has recorded progress towards 
implementation, unlike the LPA that ended by being a talk shop. This was additionally echoed and 
highlighted by Collier (1995:387-410) a former WB economist. Collier (1998) further elaborated that 
freight costs negatively affected Africa’s exports, resulting in high transaction costs. Rapid 
accumulation in human and physical capital and the bridging of the digital divide would engender 
reduction in transaction costs with an attendant automated monitoring and evaluating regimen.  
The EU-Africa Business Forum (2006) agreeably considered that the internal foundational phase of 
the supply-side phase was imperative and that trade liberalisation would then be complementary. 
Africa’s powerhouses such as Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya and South Africa would have to apply a variable 
geometry approach. Approaches to tariff liberalisation and subsidiarity principles would impact 
poorer states with significant loss of revenue that contributes to their GDP. Charalambides (2005) 
advises that Africa’s powerhouses have a compensatory benefit mechanism for revenue loss of the 
least developed states. This would encourage and maintain high levels of commitment towards 
Africa’s integration project. On the contrary, the EU with its EPAs is opposed to Africa’s foundational 
supply-side proposals. Instead, it is demanding a comprehensive reciprocal trade compatible with 
Article 24 of the WTO rules of non-discrimination (UNECA 2005b:17). The EU trade liberalisation is 
informed by neoclassical orthodoxy, that protectionism at whatever level creates bottlenecks and 
inefficiencies.135 Further, it encourages corrupt rent-seeking, patronage networks and other NTBs 
(UNECA 2006a). 
However, the EU’s duplicity of retaining its own protectionist barriers such as agricultural subsidies 
is irreconcilable and inconsistent with its demands on Africa for complete elimination of its protective 
tariffs. Herein lies the contradiction between Africa and the EU’s strategy towards regional economic 
integration. The WB (2005) supports the elimination of tariff barriers as stipulated in the EPAs, as 
they argue that it would result in trade creation beneficial for Africa.  
                                                          
135 S.K.B. Asante, Europe’s Brand of a Trojan Horse? Africa and the Economic Partnership Agreements (Tema: Digibooks Ghana, 
2010), pp. 49-52. On the current status of EPA negotiations. 
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This will result in high quality affordable imports that would be beneficial to the African market. 
Further, this would induce trade diversion as a result of competition pressures against monopolistic 
and oligopolistic cartels. Unlike the LPA, this dissertation argues that NEPAD is operating in a 
different socio-political environment where it has to comply with global protocols of the WTO that 
did not exist during the LPA’s tenure. The EU-EPAs are in favour of maintaining protective barriers 
that restrict competition and choice for the market. Chang (2005) and Akyuz (2005) highlight the 
double standards of the developed countries. The open regionalism being demanded of Africa by 
the EU and the WB, discounts the EU’s and USA’s development predicated on protectionist policies 
to date. Clearly, the duplicity on the part of the EU and the WB’s open regionalist approach seeks 
to limit, constrain and undermine Africa’s economic integration project. This similarity of the North’s 
policy is evident in both the LPA and NEPAD. 
Single-framework agreements advocated by the EU and the WB’s open regionalism ignores 
disparities and asymmetrical levels of development in African states. This would inappropriately 
attract FDI that exacerbates and undermines intra-regional value chains, devoid of a regulated 
milieu. A possible crowding out of national and regional investors is detrimental to achieving the 
aims and the objectives of Agenda 2063 (Adedeji 2002; UNCTAD 2003, 2005). With the UK’s Brexit 
from the EU a possible review of the EPAs is a likely option; probably to Africa’s advantage. Section 
7.4 examines Africa’s integration to date with its success and failures respectively. 
7.3.1 Impact of EPAs in Africa: Interrogating EU and World Bank Claims 
As previously demonstrated by the ACP, economies are non-viable to operate as single nation 
states in a global economy. Their small size, lack of a competent human resources and skills base 
and poor infrastructure do not attract investor confidence. For example, 49 per cent of Ghana’s 
exports are destined for the EU compared to its neighbouring state Benin at a miniscule 2.6 per cent 
(UNECA 2005c:18-20). To Africa’s interest and benefit eliminating barriers intra-regionally would 
boost economic growth and induce other spillover benefits. Inversely would EPAs foster intra-ACP 
trade? Evidently, this chapter argues, the EU’s competitive imports are likely to displace RVC 
production and trade. The ROO that the EU adopts in relation to ACP countries would marginalise 
and undermine intra-regional manufacturing and value addition (Hamouda 2006:30). This will result 
in the widening and promotion of protective barriers among ACP countries resulting in a zero-sum 
outcome to the EU’s advantage and benefit. Goodison (2006a) warns of the divisive zero-sum 
approach of the EPAs by citing the Swazi sugar sector industry. The EU has implemented a 36 per 
cent reduction in the sugar price paid to ACP sugar suppliers. This has adversely affected Swaziland 
in revenue loss. 
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 Therefore, an intra-regional focus for Swaziland within the SACU market would be beneficial. 
UNECA (2000a, b, and c) argues that reciprocity demanded by the EU-EPAs predicated on the 
WTO rules compatibility would eliminate intra-regional industrialisation and trade in Africa by 
flooding in cheap exports and loss of revenue on Africa’s part as indicated: 
1. COMESA countries would lose US$242million, that is a 5.8 per cent decline in intra-regional 
trade and conversely the EU would earn more than US$1.152 million through increase in its 
exports to COMESA countries, an unwarranted trade diversion to the detriment of Africa 
(UNECA 2005b:27). 
2. ECOWAS countries would forego US$365million through trade diversion by impacting its 
infant job creating industries to the benefit of the EU (UNECA 2005c:44). 
3. Unfavourable terms of trade would affect Burkina Faso to EU benefit. The latter would 
increase its exports by 8 per cent (about US$40million) and Burkina Faso’s exports to the 
West African region would decline by more than US$2million, thus 6 per cent of the current 
exports to the West African region (UNECA 2005c:64). 
4. Fulfilling WTO compatibility rules of elimination of tariffs on 80 per cent of ACP trade with the 
EU would eliminate up to 22 per cent growth of the ACP’s own regional trade (UNCECA 
2005). 
5. The EU’s share of exports to Rwanda would favour its terms of trade, thus increasing from 
27.4 per cent to 32.25 per cent to the detriment of Africa’s infant RVC’s development (UNECA 
2005:5). 
6. Mwega (2005) explains that Kenya enjoys regional value-added exports to COMESA and the 
EAC countries. For example, in 2003, 67 per cent of its value-added exports were destined 
for the COMESA market compared with 9 per cent to the EU market. As highlighted by 
Kenya’s research office KIPPRA, the EU-EPAs threaten 15 per cent of Kenya’s intra-regional 
advantage to the benefit of the EU. Mwega (2005) cautions that this will undermine Kenya’s 
industrialisation and increase dependency on primary exports. 
Stevens (2005:1) warns of EPAs demands based on failed WTO Article 24 compatibility rules that 
they are unfavourable to Africa’s industrialisation project. This view is reinforced by UNECA 
(2005c:34-55) that WTO Article 24 that stipulates complete reciprocity of tariffs is irreconcilable with 
Africa’s deeper regional integration project. This will further undermine Africa’s industrialisation of 
value addition in manufacturing and consign it to a dumping ground for EU exports. If anything, 
EPAs will provoke regional realignment that results in an increased level of defensiveness between 
the REC member states. 
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There would be a split between member states favouring an EPA within the same REC and those 
choosing to opt out of the EPA. For example, instead of harmonised and common intra-regional 
ROO benefiting its RVC, different rules would apply to same member states of a REC. 
Charalambides (2005) and Stevens (2005:1-12) concur on the deleterious impact of EPAs on 
Africa’s own industrialisation to the benefit of the global north. Mwega (2005:10) advocates for a 
gradualist variable geometry approach that is beneficial for Africa’s intra-regional trade.  
For example, COMESA’s Common Investment Area (CCIA) has been liberalised between 
COMESA-REC countries themselves. In this regard, the EU has been requested to provide funding 
for this structural building capacity contrary to its EPA’s imposed policy demands. Africa’s RECs 
have refused to negotiate EPA’s regional rules with the EU as they bring about fragmentation instead 
of harmonisation of policy protocols towards the AEC. 
7.3.2. A Case of Brexit: Challenges and Opportunities for African Integration 
Most African countries have cautiously signed interim MOAs concerning EPAs with the EU. This is 
due to the disagreements at WTO Doha talks, the 2008 global financial meltdown that adversely 
affected economies and Sovereign Wealth Funds of Europe such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, 
Ireland, Germany and Finland. This further induced the UK’s sentiments to exit from the EU as well 
as Scotland and Catalonia’s secessionist demands from the UK and Spain, respectively. Countries 
like Tanzania, have postponed signing its EAC-EPA due to the aforementioned reasons (Stevens 
and Kennan 2016). On an ex-ante prognosis, the UK’s unilateral exiting of the EU (Brexit) might 
reduce the cost for African countries to leave the EU-EPAs by removing from the EPA the UK which 
is one of the EUs largest markets for African exports (Inglehart, Ronald and Norris 2016). As 
identified by Stevens and Kennan (2016) the UK accounts for 11 per cent of Africa’s exports to the 
EU; 67 per cent is agricultural and beef exports; 41 per cent tea and spices; 31 per cent wine; 22 
per cent of Africa’s fruits export to the EU. Ghana’s export to the EU via the UK is 29.3 per cent; 
Kenya 27.3 per cent; Namibia 15.5 per cent and 9.6 percent for Swaziland. Against the 
aforementioned factors, Ghana and other African countries’ EPAs are interim, a wait and see 
outcome and ramifications of the Brexit. Arguably, Brexit in some instances can be contextualised 
as a failure and rejection of regional integration on the part of the UK.  
Against this background Africa in its AU integration project can tread and proceed circumspectly 
and incrementally as sovereignty sentiments and perceptions are evident as much as is the case in 
Europe (Stevens and Kennan 2016; Mendez-Parra 2016; Papadavid and te Velde 2016; Mold 2017; 




Given the previously mentioned European integration dynamics, the AU AfCFTA may review post-
Brexit trade negotiations with the EU on a more even and better leveraged position. In the 2008 
global financial meltdown, the UK’s global GDP declined from 3.0 per cent in 2000 to 2.3 per cent 
in 2015, the trade wars between the USA and China and the referendum majority vote on  23 June 
2016 by the British electorate to leave the EU all have catalysed in the AU  accelerating its Agenda 
2063 project (Office for National Statistics, 2016; Luke and McLeod 2016; Sow and Sy 2016). This 
section will therefore articulate the potential impact and consequences of Brexit for Africa. In March 
2017, the UK triggered Article 50 of the Treaty of Rome, notifying the EU officially of its intention to 
leave the bloc. To date there has been recorded global volatility and uncertainty with no 
consummation of the UK’s exiting. Table 33 will also show the UK’s and Africa’s trading relations 
representing an identical share of just 2.6 per cent of both imports and exports and how Brexit will 
impact this configuration (IMF 2017). 
 
Table 33: UK Trade with Africa, 2006–2015 (billion US$) 
 
Source: IMF DOTs database (2016) 
 
In 2015, the UK-Africa trade balance sustained a surplus in favour of Africa of US$5.1 billion but this 
was on the back of the volatile commodities market that does not support Africa’s industrialisation 
programme (Mendez-Parra et al. 2016). The UK-FDI investment stock in Africa is mainly 
commodities and financial services that has doubled between 2006-2015 to US$59 billion and total 
FDI stock of Africa is estimated at US$740.4 billion including other global north investors (Office for 
National Statistics 2016; UNCTAD 2016). It is this structural transformation sought by AfCFTA to 




Table 34: UK FDI in Africa, by Sector, billions UK pounds 2012–2015 
. 
 
Source: Office of National Statistics (2016) 
With its declining global market share and a potential Brexit by the UK, a channel of contagion from 
Brexit could potentially affect Africa through remittances. For example, Kenya had approximately 
US$523 million of remittances from the UK in 2015, followed by Uganda’s US$283million as shown 
in Table 35. 
Table 35: Estimated Remittance Flows to the EAC from the UK, the European Union and the World 
(millions USD, 2015) 
 
 
These remittances were directly impacted by the devaluation of sterling in the second half of 2016. 
Additionally, Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly of the Ivory Coast lamented the tanking of the 
global price of cocoa since the Brexit vote of 2016 and explained: 
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Ivory Coast produced an estimated 1.98m tonnes in 2016/17, or about 40% of the world total, 
according to the International Cocoa Organisation. But export prices fell 35% between late 
2016 and the first quarter of 2017, hitting the economy and contributing to a budget deficit 
that is forecast to widen to 4.5% of GDP.  
As Ivorian cocoa is priced in sterling and the CFA franc in West Africa is linked to the Euro the falling 
of the pound’s value became a loss for the Ivory Coast as the value of its cocoa sales dropped; 
adversely affecting its public finances (Wheatley 2017; Dreyfus Polichinelle 2017). Hence, the 
former Ivorian Minister of Commerce Jean-Louis Billon with the assistance of the AU is demanding 
the Ivorian currency be made independent and convertible to guarantee the country’s stability in 
global trade (Dreyfus Polichinelle 2017). The continued weakening value of sterling because of the 
South-South trade link, especially the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa), may 
discourage UK direct investments abroad (Dunning and Lunda 2008). For example, this is evident 
as the UK has declined as a market for EAC exporters, going from 14.6 per cent to 3.4 per cent 
between 2000-2015 as shown in Table 36 below. Also, the nominal value of EAC trade towards the 
UK has been falling, peaking at US$766 million in 2008 and dipping to US$447 million in 2015. 
 
 
Table 36: EAC Exports to the World, European Union and UK, 2000–15 (millions USD and as a 




Source: IMF DOTs database 2017 
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With demonstrable declining global competitiveness against emergent economies like BRICS, the 
UK government has relooked its ODA funding to Africa, especially after the 2016 Brexit referendum 
(Vardy 2017). For example, the EAC with its high aid dependence as shown in Table 37, through 
the AU-AfCFTA, Africa must robustly improve its domestic resource mobilisation and radically 
reduce if not eliminate its aid dependency. 
 
 
Table 37: Aid Dependence Within the EAC, 2015 
.  
 
This chapter, therefore, argues that the mere exercise of Brexit ought to herald a warning to Africa 
that this could contribute to undermining the UK’s commitment to ODA in the medium- to long-term. 
This makes Africa even more vulnerable, but instead it should dedicate itself to domestic resource 
mobilisation given the world’s nationalist and protectionist dynamics as an axiom of realism. Given 
the growing scourge of global terrorism and trade wars, Brexit only exacerbates the global economic 
uncertainty and volatility (Giles 2017; World Bank 2017; Largade 2018). Worse still, Africa is a price-
taker of finished goods from the developed countries as it is a commodities export dependent whose 
value addition has no control over the final distribution of goods. Its global exposure to an 
interminable balance of payment deficit locks it into the unending unenviable debt distress. Export 
earnings that are supposed to fund its industrialisation programme and Agenda 2063 are committed 
to debt servicing (UNECA: 2017). 
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Another school of thought, as explained by Mania (2016), is that Brexit will have the effect of 
emboldening some African nation state leaders to remain recalcitrant and guard against ceding their 
national sovereignty to a continental supra-national authority: 
It is not the thing one says in polite society but, barring a dramatic reset, the East African 
Community is in a terminal crisis, barely a decade and half since it was re-established: East 
Africa’s problems are deep-seated. They include a lack of fit between the interests of Kenya 
and Tanzania; inability to agree on shared values; and a mistaken expansion strategy that 
favours geographical breadth over institutional depth. 
This dissertation agrees that Africa must learn from all global experiences but on the contrary it 
cannot indulge in mimicry and copycatting all and sundry but must fulfil its own aims and objectives. 
The historical, political, cultural and other dynamics influence and affect global politics similarly and 
dissimilarly. Finally, as argued by Stevens and Kennan (2016), the finalisation of Brexit could unravel 
the divisive EU-EPAs, which were unpopular with most African nation states. EPAs sought to replace 
existing preferential non-reciprocal agreements to align with the WTO discipline of levelling the 
global trading field. Instead of supporting regional integration and Africa’s industrialisation, EPAs 
were seen as pitting countries within regional blocs against each other (Mold 2007; Luke et al. 2017; 
Ligami 2017). The former Tanzanian president Mkapa (2016) supported by Hinkle and Newfarmer 
(2006:163), explained that the implementation of the EPA would be tantamount to undermining the 
viability of the region’s development and integration plans: 
Tanzania’s position is one of concern for the implications of the region’s drive to 
industrialisation and the capacity of EAC firms to compete directly with European firms. The 
EPA is a free trade agreement: such a high level of liberalisation vis-à-vis a very competitive 
partner is likely to put our existing local industries in jeopardy and discourage the 
development of new industries. Regional integration and trade is the most promising avenue 
for EAC’s and Africa’s industrial development. The EPA would derail us from that promise. 
This dissertation therefore argues that the postulations of EU-EPAs and the tentative Brexit 
breakaway have resulted from Europe’s incremental loss of market share   across Africa given 
sustained competition from emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, China and India. For 
example, with regard to imports to Africa, the EU experienced a market share decline from 40 per 
cent in 2000 tanking at 23.3 per cent in 2017(IMF 2017). Within the EAC-REC, imports from China 




This reinforces the context by the EU to fast-track and finalise divisive EPAs in Africa. This 
dissertation argues that this is a window of opportunity for Africa, having ratified the AfCFTA on 30 
May 2019, to renegotiate the terms of the global trade policies, among others, the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), which subsides Europe’s agribusiness and makes it unviable for Africa’s 
agriproducts to compete and export into the European market.   
In conclusion, Brexit presents opportunities and challenges to Africa’s Agenda 2030 and 2063. It is 
imperative for Africa to negotiate as a single unit to extract maximum value in order to benefit its 
RVCs. This also resonates with Boateng (2016): “Brexit presents both Africa and the UK with an 
opportunity to put development at the heart of our trading relationship with Africa in a way frankly 
that it has not always been in relation to the EPAs, let’s be frank about it”. Nevertheless, challenges 
abound with or without a Brexit. As Fosu and Ogunleye (2018:35) reinforce, the late UNECA 
executive director Adedeji, that against a backdrop of global uncertainty in the global trading system 
and multilateralism that has historically, hitherto marginalised Africa “that African countries must 
adopt growth strategies that are more regionally inward-looking and self-reliant”. Mold (2018) and 
UNCTAD (2018) present evidence to this assertion, for example, Uganda’s average figures for 
2015-2017 show that 51 per cent of the country’s exports are intra-African, and for Kenya and 
Rwanda it was 39 and 31 per cent respectively. This attests to the EAC as the top performing REC 
towards regional integration in Africa and with the ratification of AfCFTA on 30 May 2019, Africa 
must redouble its efforts towards regional integration in bilateral and multilateral platforms. 
7.4 LPA and NEPAD African Integration to date: Success, Failures and Recommendations 
There have been successful intra-regional projects by public and private partnerships in Africa. 
Simuyemba (2000) highlights the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) that links South Africa’s 
industrial base of Gauteng with the Mozambican port of Maputo. Established in 1995, it links 
upgraded roads and rail infrastructure between the two countries. This corridor has generated over 
180 projects both formal and informal including the Mepanda-Unca hydroelectric project on the 
Zambezi River. This intra-regional hydroelectricity project also includes Swaziland and 
Mozambique. SAPP, another example, is an intra-regional project between 12 countries that 
harnesses hydroelectric energy from the Kariba Dam in Zambia and Zimbabwe and the Inga Dam 
in the DRC and the coal-fired power of South Africa (Adot 1999; World Bank 2000b; Oyejide 2000). 
Additionally, there is the cross-border Lesotho Highlands Development Project (LHDP), supplying 




There is also the Nile Water Agreement project that links the eastern and southern African public 
private partnerships into intra-regional energy harnessing partnerships (World Bank 1998). Other 
completed projects and those under progress are as indicated in Tables 38-41 with international 
infrastructure investors that have been attracted to Africa to date. With these recorded 
achievements, African regional integration is still characterised by serious challenges and failed 
initiatives.  
 
Table38: Growth Rate of Africa’s Road Network 
 
 































This is also evident within the EU achievements and its failures especially of the UK’s Brexit   from 
the EU as from 31 January 2020. The 2008 global financial meltdown also revealed the shaky fault-
lines of the EU’s integration. This resulted in EU member state economies imploding resulting in 
near bankruptcy of the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain). Greece has 
expressed sentiments of exiting the EU, Scotland wanting to secede from the UK and the 
Catalonians to be independent of Spain. ECA (2006a: 26) has repeatedly expressed its concerns 
over EPAs being forced on Africa with a variable geometry win-win approach. This is contrary to the 
gradualist and sequenced approach applied by the EU. However, the UK’s Brexit to Africa’s 
advantage has rendered the EPAs as interim and non-binding. This creates policy space for Africa 
to review the EPAs to align with Agenda 2063 of regional integration. 
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To retain the legitimacy of the EPA process, among other factors, there must be increased 
participation, transparency and accountability between AU RECs and the EU negotiators in order to 
have a win-win outcome. The review of the interim EPAs should consider the following: 
1. Impact assessments to be improved in order to calibrate short-, medium- and long-term 
adjustment implications of EPAs and their impact on long-term development policy. 
2. In compliance with Article 37.6 of the Cotonou Agreement, mutually beneficial alternatives to 
EPAs must be examined. For instance, arrangements without reciprocity in market 
liberalisation that continues to deindustrialise and marginalise Africa in the global economy 
particularly in relation to the WTO’s TRIPS, TRIMS, GATS regimen. Transparency by 
participants in negotiations would openly test different arrangements that best contribute to 
sustainable development and poverty reduction in Africa. 
3. Disclosure of negotiation information to the public including findings of independent impact 
assessments to encourage civil society participation. 
4. Unconditional funding and technical assistance from the EU donors must be sufficiently 
provided to enable transparent and participatory negotiations and debate. 
5. The EU not to exert disproportionate pressure on Africa’s RECs to speedily conclude 
negotiations thereby compromising Africa’s integration project. 
According to the ECA (2016) the first stage towards the realisation of the AEC has been completed, 
thus the recognition of the eight REC’s. These are: 
• Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
• Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
• East African Community (EAC) 
• Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
• Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
• Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
• Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 









Table 42: Industry, Value Added, Annual Growth 
 
The principle of variable geometry accommodates the politico-economic asymmetries and 
unevenness of the eight RECs.136 Therefore, regional integration is paced, timed and sequenced 
variedly as the political economies of the REC member states are structured differently. The stages 
that inform the road map towards an AEC are the following: To ensure consolidation within each 
REC by gradual removal of tariff  and non-tariff barriers; policy and protocol harmonisation between 
RECs; establish FTAs and customs unions in each REC; harmonised and coordinated tariff and 
non-tariff systems for  an integrated convergence among RECs to create a CET and a CCU by 
2019; create an African Common Market by 2023; and establish an AEC, including, an African 
Monetary Union by 2028  (ECA 2016). Within the variable geometry calculus as indicated in Table 
42, the EAC has made the most progress among all eight REC’s. This quantitative evidence is 
demonstrable under the aegis of NEPAD and was non-existent in the LPA. The NEPAD blueprint is 
not dogmatic; notwithstanding its eclectic approach it has also factored in a critique of the principle 
of variable geometry (UNECA/UNDP/IGO/UNSAS/VII/10 and Nagar 2019). The foregoing argues 
that the strategy of variable geometry is a diversionary ploy to stagnate Africa from industrialising 
and competing globally. I argue in support that the other side of variable geometry is that it stagnates 
political will to cede greater national sovereignty to a continental supra-authority to effectively realise 





                                                          




Table 43: Africa Regional Integration Index 















EAC       3 out of 5 ᵡ 
COMESA   ᵡ ᵡ Only Burundi 
ratified; 
Rwanda’s 
ratification is in 
progress 
ᵡ 
ECOWAS     ᵡ All 15 ᵡ 
SADC   ᵡ ᵡ 7 out of 15 ᵡ 
ECCAS   ᵡ ᵡ 4 out of 11   
CEN-SAD ᵡ ᵡ ᵡ Unclear ᵡ 
IGAD ᵡ ᵡ ᵡ No Protocol ᵡ 
AMU ᵡ ᵡ ᵡ 3 out of 5 ᵡ 
 
Source: ECA (2016) 
As a monitoring and evaluating tool, the Africa Regional Integration Index was adopted on 26 April 
2016 to measure quantitatively the variable geometry of the eight RECs towards deeper intra-trade 
and integration (AfDB 2016). The following Tables capture each of the recognised eight RECs in 
terms of each country’s overall score and how variable geometry reflects on each member to its 
RECs. 
7.4.1 Mining Sector 
At the behest of the AU-NEPAD The African Minerals Development Centre was set up in 2013 to 
bring about RVC in minerals with central nodes and convergences of economically interlinked cross-
border energy, transport and administration centres. A systematic cross-border RVC would leverage 
on economies of scale and further implement an integrated mining charter framework and code for 
both continental and global investors (AMDC 2016).  
Commented [E19]: Heading? 
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An intra-African mining charter, with intra-regional contiguous mining concession and a fiscal regime 
would mitigate against more than US$50billion of illicit financial flows resulting from an asymmetrical 
uncoordinated mining regime (AMDC 2017). Fiscal regimes across countries remain incoherent and 
uncoordinated enabling TNCs to exploit these loopholes and asymmetries. Therefore, an integrated 
regional regimen in the extractive sector mitigates these illicit financial flows and fulfils the UN SDGs 
of environmental protection, good governance and respect for human rights (AMDC 2016). 
Clearly, an intra-African approach towards attaining an African Mining Vision would mitigate single 
country limitations in contract negotiations, infrastructure development and other trade facilitation 
programmes against exploitative TNCs. This would engender pooling of resources and markets for 
value addition, thereby diversifying Africa’s manufacturing base and increasing its bargaining power 
in contract negotiations. 
 7.4.2 Public Health, Peace and Security 
Under the auspices of the AUC, NEPAD, and the African Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, 
African countries are cooperating in the prevention and management of public health cases such as 
malaria, HIV-AIDS and Ebola. This five-year strategic plan was launched in March 2017 (AU 2017a; 
AU 2017b). Since the transitioning of the OAU to the AU in 2002, the number of armed and violent 
conflicts have drastically reduced in Africa. From the OAU’s policy of non-interference to the AU’s 
non-indifference that empowers the AU PSC under Article 13 to intervene by deploying its brigades 
in areas of genocide and human rights violations (Breytenbach 2008:254; Franke 2009:173). The 
AU has its military mission in places like South Sudan, Somalia and a multinational action against 
the Boko Haram in West Africa (ECA, 2017e; ECA 2017f). Sanctions and other means have been 
enforced to discourage coups and other unconstitutional takeover of legitimate constitutional 
governments.137  
For example, ECOWAS member states forced the Gambian president to leave office when he was 
defeated in the 2017 elections. The AU-PSC, together with ECOWAS military personnel, supported 
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138 See Akenroye A (2012) ECOWAS and the recent coups in West Africa: Which way forward? IPI International Peace Institute, 




7.4.3 Financial Integration and Convergence 




Burkina Faso 362 















Source: ECA calculations, based on IMF (2017) 
Karingi and Davis (2017) and COMESA (2017) observe that intra-African macroeconomic and 
financial integration and convergence of systems is imperative towards an African Monetary Union. 
Table 44is indicative that Benin’s negative value of (-5) represents investments withdrawn by 
investors due to an unfavourable investment climate. Comparatively, a small sized economy like 
Mauritius enjoys most foreign investments (21,380) because of its favourable investment climate 





Against this background, an African Monetary Union and an attractive investment climate is 
imperative to attract FDI. As shown in Table 45 there is a growing number of African banks in multiple 
REC member states. This is a foundational basis to standardise and harmonise cooperative 
regulatory rules in terms of trade facilitation and finance and improved macroeconomic planning and 
implementation. 
Table 45: African Banks in Multiple African Countries, 2013 
 
Among other measures, a single currency and an ACB is critical for macroeconomic management 
and stability that would bring about a stable exchange rate regime. 
 ECOWAS already has stipulated criteria towards monetary union convergence and a monetary 
union attainment in that this REC would have a positive spillover and multiplier effect on other RECs 
to follow suit (West African Monetary Union, cited in EAC 2017b) 
7.4.4 Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Establishment 
Among the founding principles of the AEC (Chapter VI of the 1991 Abuja Treaty) is the free 
movement of people and their right of residence and establishment across borders. This basic 
human entitlement is also recognised in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UNDP 2009).  
Movement of people invariably paves the way for the free movement of labour. In an increasingly 
integrated world, international migration will continue. As such, migrant labour security rights and 
their qualifications need to be recognised in other countries (Lloyd 200). Among the eight RECs 
protocols, recognising free movement of people across Africa is being implemented, albeit at a 







Table 46: Measures on Free Movement of Persons by Regional Economic Community 
 
Factors such as security and national high unemployment levels have adversely affected the whole 
process. Although, as Pritchett (2010) argues, intra-African mobility of the means of production 
would increase world current levels of GDP to about US$65 trillion. Additionally, free movement of 
people impacts a country’s GDP by way of remittances that migrants send home (Davis and Head 
1995:439-50; Ratha 2011). Remittance inflows in Africa quadrupled between 1990 and 2010 to 
nearly US$40billion or equivalent to 2.6 per cent of continental GDP in 2009. Nigeria received US$10 
billion in 2010, the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, it is imperative that the harmonised 
immigration and emigration regimen underscored by the REC protocols be promoted and 
implemented (Deacon 2008; World Bank 2011). ECOWAS, for example, has implemented 






Article 61 of the ECOWAS Treaty continues to enable the harmonising of labour and social security 
laws with the REC. Approximately 3 per cent of West Africans living in the region are not living in 
their country of origin and the harmonisation of policies is beneficial to free movement of people 
(ECOWAS Commission 2007:3). Other RECs have taken steps to liberalise their visa regimes, 
especially to attract and facilitate unencumbered free movement of skilled labour.  
There is ease of availability of work permits and study visas in that regard. This has influenced RECs 
to align their employment codes with REC protocols and to ensure that the rights of migrant skilled 
labour in host countries are protected. As highlighted by Romans (2006) and Ndulo (2005), mining 
in South Africa has caused significant movement of people from central and southern Africa as semi-
skilled labour. Beyond the impact of mining since 1994, South Africa as the most industrialised 
country in Africa attracted an influx of migrants continentally and globally. 
7.4.5 Movement of Capital Goods and Services in Africa 
Globalisation and shifting economic paradigms and conditions continue to influence Africa on how 
best to attract global investments. In this regard, the AU-NEPAD RECs continue to build and improve 
an enabling environment conducive to boosting intra-regional financial flows and investments 
(ECOSOC 2017). This will attract both continental investment and FDI, for strategic continental 
productive development and the enhancement and diversification of its manufacturing base into 
RVC. 
Therefore, linked cross-border infrastructures supported by a developed financial sector within the 
RECs act as push and pull factors of FDI (Dunning 2001:173-90). Therefore, it is imperative for 
Africa’s RECs to continue to deepen intra-regional systems (UNCTAD 2009). According to an 
UNIDO (2005) survey, in the last decade 29.4 per cent of FDI inflows went to Nigeria and 18.2 per 
cent to South Africa. The bulk of portfolio inflows of 87.6 per cent went to South Africa, which has a 
highly developed capital market. However, these FDI inflows supersede intra-Africa FDI that 
vacillates between US$1.6billion and US$2 billion annually. UNCTAD (2008), advises that intra-
African FDI must be drastically improved in the intra-regional production sectors, as this would 
create more value-added jobs than global FDI. 
 7.4.6 Comparison of Trade Policies and Multiple Memberships 
Although the AUC recognises eight RECs, the problem of multiple membership and overlap persists 
within the RECs. Herein lies the challenge of developing a CET, as a member state cannot be a 
part of two customs unions (UNDP 2011). The overlapping multi-membership of RECs undermines 
binding commitments of intra-Africa mandates towards AEC and the attaining of aims and objectives 
of Agenda 2063. 
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For example, COMESA launched an FTA in 2000, aimed at reducing tariffs within intra-COMESA 
trade, yet implementation rarely followed the plan. Worse still, unlike ECOWAS and SADC, 
COMESA does not compensate for revenue loss to its disadvantaged least developed member 
states (Oyejide and Njinkeu 2001; Nhara 2006). Ethiopia has the lowest commitment to market 
integration of COMESA-FTA, as it fears revenue loss and only reduced its tariffs by a miniscule 10 
per cent (IGAD 2009). NTBs are also inhibitive towards intra-African trade as they impede free 
movement of goods and people and encourage rent-seeking and other oligopolistic corrupt 
patronage networks (Alaba 2006; UNECA 2008). To help mitigate and eliminate this anomaly, 
COMESA, EAC and SADC have developed a computerised online common reporting mechanism 
that monitors and evaluates the removal of the NTBs. 
7.4.7 Rules of Origin 
ROO within RECs impact intra-African integration and trade and its international competitiveness if 
they are costly and restrictive. The ROO aim to ensure that products traded within the REC originate 
within a member country. The ROO act as a preventive measure to discourage third party countries 
that are not members of AfCFTA from re-exporting via one AfCTFA member to another and, thus, 
illegitimately benefiting from trade preferences that are exclusive to its members (Estevadeordal et 
al. 2014). As a trade policy, ROO defines the scope of preferential trade agreement and provides 
industries with incentives to source from within AfCFTA. In order to fast-track an AfCFTA with a 
common external tariff, the ROO are costly to monitor and enforce and impinge on creating an 
enabling business environment (Abdoulahi 2005). This section will further amplify what ROO are 
and how they are a constituent part of the industrial and trade policies within the AfCFTA and how 
they should enhance global competitiveness of Africa. 
The ROO are the rules for determining the country of origin of goods. According to UNCTAD (2019) 
“rules of origin are like a passport for a product to enter a free trade area (FTA) and circulate without 
being imposed a duty”. This is further reinforced by the WCO that 
 the basic role of rules of origin is the determination of the economic nationality as opposed 
to the geographical nationality of a given good: the rules of origin are used as an important 
trade measure. They do not constitute a trade instrument by themselves and are not to be 
used to pursue trade objectives directly or indirectly or as a policy measure. The rules of 
origin are used to address different commercial policy instruments and they can be used to 
attain specific purposes of national or international policies (UNCTAD 2016c and World 




In pursuing the AfCFTA as a flagship project of Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063, the section below 
will discuss the extent to which ROO can be refined to increase the contributions of the AfCFTA to 
the furtherance of the continent’s industrial and agricultural development and the emergence of 
RVCs. 
In this regard, by defining the nationality of a product, ROO stipulate the conditions for the application 
of tariff concessions, delimiting the range of products eligible for preferential treatment. Additional 
to ROO, there are other trade-specific factors that would optimally operationalise the AfCFTA, such 
as: customs cooperation towards a CET, and trade facilitation measures to improve skills and 
infrastructural efficiency. The interaction between all these factors is imperative to AfCFTA meeting 
the aims and goals of Agenda 2063, also specifically diversifying Africa’s manufacturing and value 
addition base to delink from export dependency of primary commodities.139 In this regard, the ROO 
contribute to the following objectives: 
• To analyse how intra-African trade can support structural transformation, and how continental 
preferences and ROO can enhance and maximise on comparative advantage and value 
addition and boost trade in Africa. 
• How to create a sustainable and enabling environment for business in Africa to leverage on 
greater coherence between trade policy and industrial policy objectives at a continental level. 
• To further upscale on the existing work on the trade industrialisation nexus in Africa in order 
to leverage on RVCs to compete against global value chains. 
In pursuit of these objectives, investment will be attracted to Africa in agricultural and associated 
value chains such as the minerals industry (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015; Hallward-Driemeir and 
Nayyar 2017). The integrated strategy of the industrial and trade policy for Africa underpinned by 
catalytic ROO may replace the volatility of revenues dependent on commodity extraction. 
Macroeconomic instability has thwarted most of Africa’s industrialisation projects dependent on a 
commodity-based economy whose configuration and pricing of end-products is determined from 
global north countries. As of 2016, Africa’s manufacturing output was estimated at US$500 billion 
and an ex-ante estimated projection of US$930 billion by 2025 is attainable if Africa urgently 
industrialises within the AfCFTA to meet its domestic demand (Valensisi and Karingi 2017; 
McKinsey Global Institute 2016; Coke-Hamilton 2019). 
 
 
                                                          






This chapter asserts that the AU should move with haste and intelligence against the current context 
of globalisation with its trade wars, for example, between the USA and China, and the UK’s Brexit 
from the EU, which has resulted in volatility and uncertainty in the global economy. Africa exhibits 
significant differences in economic wealth, population size, geophysical characteristics and legal 
and political systems including variations in experiences with RECs. This will influence the mapping 
out of expected long-term gains and short- to medium-term losses from trade liberalisation across 
the continent. This chapter argues that refining ROO, industrial and trade policies to enhance 
AfCFTA must be undertaken in parallel with other measures such as freedom of movement and 
establishment and residence of people and immediately actualising a single African currency like 
the South African rand. Success of Agenda 2063 against a competitive global economy also 
requires assisting potential losers through job training, social security safety nets and other welfare 
measures that mitigate the adverse effects.140 The latter caveats will catalyse a continental 
macroeconomic planning supported by a legal tender continental currency. This will assist the 
continent to reap the benefits of regional integration, harnessing trade complementarities across 
large economies and sub-regions, which are trading with each other on an MFN. The option for an 
Africa-REC to use the MFN option highlights the use of trade deflection or the arbitrage of external 











                                                          
140 On human rights and social safety nets see: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and Friedrich-Ebert-Stitung, 




Table 47: Imports to the European Union from Africa, by Value and Utilisation Rate, 2009-
2016 
 
For Africa’s imports to the EU to increase vis-a-vis its intra-African trade was a result of arbitrage of 
external tariff differences in FTAs. This was a result of the EU reforming its GSP, which simplified 
ROO in particular in textiles and apparels. From 2009-2016, preference utilisation rates increased 
from 92.6 per cent in 2009 to 94.9 per cent in 2014, thereafter decreasing to 92.6 per cent in 2016 
(Cadot and Ing, 2016).This chapter, therefore, argues that on a cost-benefit analysis, the reformed 
GSP of the EU constituted the MFN regimen as it presented competitive preferential trade benefits 
attendant with lenient ROO and sizeable preference margins that intra-African trade could not 
counter. This is because the MFN basis also benefits third-party nations, which are not signatories 
to the AfCFTA.141 It should be clear that; trade policy alone cannot be a substitute for 
transformational industrial policies that will have to develop Africa’s productive capacities. 
Additionally, strategic trade integration can attract FDI, but this must be complemented by a 
domestic resource mobilisation against a deficit of FDI and ODA. This is the rationale behind the 
Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade142 in support of AfCFTA that developing the productive 
sector and trade facilitation, there must be a robust drive towards domestic resource mobilisation. 
                                                          
141 As Africa exhibits different levels of wealth and development the need for flexibilities, special and differential treatment for 
LDCs is imperative “variable geometry” to realistically negotiate points of convergence to propel the AfCFTA. However, some 
African policy makers are of the view that AfCFTA should limit the flexibilities as this might defeat the purpose of the AfCFTA. As 
I argued there must be attendant quid pro quo of freedom of movement of persons and a single continental currency, as people 
will gravitate where there are better opportunities. 
142 See https://www.uneca.org/pages/action-plan-boosting-intra-africa-trade. 
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This should be transparent and accountable to public participation and scrutiny to prevent special 
interest groups dominating trade negotiations. Public participation by civil society organisations will 
inform competition policies to discourage concentration by monopolies and oligarchies in support of 
elite neo-patrimonial networks. Public participation will engender equitable distribution of bargaining 
power along the various value chains (UNCTAD 2015a; UNCTAD 2016b; UNCTAD 2018 b; 
UNCTAD 2018c).  
7.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to underscore the legitimacy of African agency under the aegis of the 
AU-NEPAD engaging Europe and the rest of the world multilaterally within the WTO and EPAs. 
Notwithstanding the present challenges and the UK’s Brexit from the EU, the negotiations are not 
terminated, but rather, interim arrangements with Africa continue. Consequently, the environments 
that the LPA and NEPAD operated in are fundamentally different.  
Africa faced many challenges with the advent of the new millennium. The 2008 global financial 
meltdown has engendered nationalistic tendencies and policy uncertainty with the UK unsure 
whether to be or not to be part of the EU. As shown in this chapter, this has compounded Africa’s 
socio-economic challenges. The US, this chapter has argued, has abdicated its self-righteous 
Washington Consensus neoliberalism resorting to traditional nationalistic realism engaging in tariff 




8.1 Overview of the Research 
Within the OAU, Pan-Africanism aspirations of regional integration have been expressed 
intermittently, variedly and severally. In light of this, this dissertation sought to locate and give a 
comparative analysis to the historical processes of cooperative agency that engendered a 
decolonised Africa under the aegis of the Pan-African diplomacy and agency. It conducted a 
comparative analytical study of three Pan-African initiatives, namely: the OAU’s 1980 LPA; the 1991 




The comparative analytical study was predicated on integrated meta-theories, which provided an 
intersubjective theoretical and conceptual framework on which to address the two main research 
questions: What reasons led to the formation of the 1980 LPA, the 1991 Abuja Treaty and the 2002 
adoption of NEPAD under the aegis of the AU? Why has Africa’s self-reliant continental aims and 
objectives not been realised?  
In responding to its two main research questions, the dissertation made the following four 
arguments: First, it argued that the ultimate adoption of the 1980 LPA was Africa’s independent self-
assertion to define it against global hegemonic forces but with no translation into tangible 
deliverables. Second, it argued that the 1991 Abuja Treaty emerged in response to the failed 
implementation of the 1980 LPA and differed from its predecessor in that it was informed by the 
neoliberal orthodoxy that dominated the international development discourse in light of the fall of 
communism at the end of the Cold War. Third, it argued that the adoption and ratification of the AU-
NEPAD in 2002 was informed by Africa being pragmatic in developing its domestic industrial base 
in partnership with neoliberal global capital.  
Lastly, this dissertation argued that Africa’s self-reliant continental aims and objectives have not 
been realised because Africa simply lacks a hard-power military diplomatic arsenal in both its LPA 
and NEPAD policy documents to give effect to genuine Pan-African diplomacy. 
8.2 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS 
In conclusion, this study has comparatively examined the OAU/LPA versus the AU/NEPAD design 
and implementation. In response to a marginalising global economy, the OAU/LPA design sought 
an ISI design strategy to mitigate its global vulnerability and engender a self-reliant African economy. 
However, a counterintuitive BWI doctrine of the Berg Report forcefully promoted the neoliberal 
Washington Consensus and rendered the LPA a damp squib that resulted only in quixotic rhetoric 
and non-implementation. The thesis advanced an integrative analytical, multi-causal framework 
encompassing neorealism; constructivism; functionalism and other arguments against which the 
OAU/LPA and AU-NEPAD were formulated. The aftermath of WWII experienced an unprecedented 
surge in global Cold War rivalry between the two superpowers: the former USSR and the USA.  
This resulted in Africa as an arena of superpower proxy wars and ideological contestations. This 
thesis argued that this polarity of divide and rule rendered Africa non-conducive to the 
implementation of the OAU/LAP. Instead, it encouraged despotism, abuse of human rights 




With the demise of the USSR in 1989, the bargaining leverage of Africa was neutered by the 
ascendancy and hegemony of the neoliberal West that dictated without challenge the new global 
political economy. SAPs and PRSP continued as conditionalities in the 1990s in liberalising the 
African economies, with the LPA immobilised.  
The integrative constructivist and causal-structured focused comparative framework then explained 
the shift from LPA to NEPAD given the dominance and the hegemony of the neoliberal global north. 
This thesis has argued that the adoption and ratification of the AU-NEPAD in 2002 was informed by 
Africa being pragmatic in developing its domestic industrial base in partnership with neoliberal global 
capital. This is contrary to the LPA’s inward-looking self-reliant industrialisation that sought to delink 
from the global economy.  
The AU-NEPAD has three fundamental key frameworks, among them peace and security 
governance that is also anchored with the APRM. To date, the number of conflict areas has been 
minimised and contained and the voluntary membership of the APRM continues to grow; an 
attestation to continental norm diffusion. This is also evident with the growth of continental 
infrastructural constructions and increased FDI. The AU-NEPAD quantifiable and measurable 
capacitation of the eight officially recognised RECs of the AU as the drivers of Africa’s integration 
project continues to grow, but with difficulties, unlike the LPA where there was no continental 
implementation.  
NEPAD has drawn critics and supporters alike, with the former criticising NEPAD as a neoliberal 
top-down, elitist and state-centric approach that perpetuates Africa’s dependence on the global 
north (Nwonwu 2006:22; Onimode 2004:233-255). Contrary to Afro-pessimists, the supporters of 
NEPAD hail it as pragmatic and that, given the new democratic space created in Africa and the 
world, it is up to the civil society organisations to force and influence horizontal and non-state actor 
activism. The media as the Fourth Estate enjoys global connectivity to help catalyse parallel 
processes of public participation and scrutiny such as the APRM and thereby increase norm-
entrepreneurship and diffusion (Cilliers 2003; Mashele 2006). The NEPAD-AU’s interventions of the 
MIP and the Boosting Intra- African Trade (BIAT) continue to accelerate the rationalisation and 
harmonisation process of continental integration. The WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, as a new 
form of open regionalism, also supports this multilaterally. The trade facilitation programme 
infrastructurally creates and improves an enabling environment to do business such as one-stop 
electronic customs systems, one-stop border posts and the removal of other NTBs that encourage 
corruption and patronage systems. 
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The recently adopted AfCFTA sought to make trade continentally integrated.143 Out of the eight 
RECs, the TFTA (consisting of COMESA, EAC and SADC) already have zero tariff barriers, and will 
soon move to a Customs Union that exercises a CET. This liberating of tariff barriers will serve as a 
data variable for the CGE model in its policy formulation to be a benchmark to other REC’s. The AU-
NEPAD unlike the OAU-LAP, continues to show traction, albeit with difficulty, inconsistencies and 
slowness towards implementing its policy aims and objectives.  
This has been enabled by a global democratic space of non-state actor, non-territorial functionalist 
and constructivist activism that challenges both global neo-imperial designs of the BWIs and their 
African outposts as comprador rentiers. Clearly, NEPAD, unlike earlier African regional initiatives, 
has institutionally aligned the vertical state-centric and public horizontal policy activism towards 
governance reforms on the socio-economic development of Africa towards Agenda 2063. The 
political insecurity and vulnerability that have plagued the OAU/LAP era in the form of coups and 
unconstitutional change of governments continue to be neutralised and discouraged by the non-
indifference intrusive instruments of the AU-PSC.  
This dissertation has demonstrated that supra-national compliance remains a challenge coupled 
with the AU’s inconsistencies in meting out non-compliance sanctions. On the voluntary and non-
sanctioning character of the APRM, this dissertation has argued that its gradual incremental growth 
from the initial member states of seven to the present 39 demonstrates the beneficial norm diffusion 
of peer pressure dialogue. This is also reinforced by both soft- and hard-policy tactics of sanctions 
to reinforce democracy and constitutionalism, as was the case in Mali, Gambia, Burkina Faso and 
others. This dissertation concludes by noting that the success of the AU-NEPAD, notwithstanding 








                                                          
143 See Saqndrey, R and H.G. Jensen (2012:70-141) Manufacturing and Regional Free Trade Areas: CGE Approach Towards a New 
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